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Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim:
Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against
White-Collar Crime?
G. Robert Blakey*
Scott D. Cessar**
[The great object of the maxims of interpretation is, to discover the true intention
of the law; and whenever that intention can be indubitably ascertained, and it be
not a violation of constitutional right, the courts are bound to obey it, whatever
may be their opinion of its wisdom or policy. But it would be quite visionary to
expect, in any code of statute law, such precision of thought and perspicuity of
language, as to preclude all uncertainty as to the meaning, and exempt the com-
munity from the evils of vexatious doubts and litigious interpretations. Various
and discordant readings, glosses and commentaries, will inevitably arise in the
progress of time, and, perhaps, as often from the want of skill and talent in those
who comment as in those who make the law. ***
In Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim,' the United States Court
* William J. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, J.D.
1960, University of Notre Dame. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969-1970 when the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970), was processed. Compare Hilder v.
Dexter [1902] App. Cas. 474, 477 (Halsbury, Lord, L.C.) ("mhe worst person to construe [a stat-
ute] is the person who [was] responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what
he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed.") and State v.
Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 552 (1884) (testimony before court of drafter of ambiguous statute held inad-
missible) with Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 856-57 & n.13 (1984) (Marshall, J.) ("[I]t is
significant that the apparent draftsman of the crucial portion" of the statute so construed it and "it
seems to us senseless to ignore entirely the views of its draftsman."). See also Banque Worms v. Luis
A. Duque Pena & Hijos, Ltd, 652 F. Supp. 770, 772 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Goettel, J.) ("The rather
broad draftsmanship of RICO has resulted in its expansive application. A professor who served as a
draftsman for the bill has stated that this broad application is what he intended. There is no indica-
tion, however, that the Congress which passed the bill was adopting his intentions.") (emphasis in
original). Courts have not been so reluctant to accept the writings of other professors who have
been draftsmen. See, e.g., Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 29 (1959), cited with approval in Aaron v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 706 n.1
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sanders v.John Nuveen & Co., Inc.,
619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 605 n.6 (5th Cir.
1975); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 619 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1296 n.52 (2d Cir. 1973); Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (Goettel,J.); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (E.D.N.Y. 1983);
In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The difference may lie,
not so much in the source of the opinion, but its content; it ought to rest on the character of the
reasons supporting (or not) the opinion.
** B.A. 1984, Dickinson College;J.D. 1987, University of Notre Dame. Incoming Associate, Eck-
ert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, Pittsburgh, PA.
*** IJ. KENT, COMMENTARIES 468 (8th ed. 1854).
1 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987). Justice Douglas once sug-
gested the adoption of an editorial policy by law reviews that would require each author to indicate
his special interest in the subject matter of his article. He warned, "I fear that law journals have been
more seriously corrupted by non-disclosure than we imagine." Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclo-
sure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229 (1965). In that spirit, we note that one of our number, Professor
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit "decide[d] essentially as a matter of first
impression for an appellate court whether injunctive relief may be
granted... under civil RICO." 2 As the first appellate opinion squarely
addressing the scope of equitable remedies available under civil RICO,
Wollersheim will likely be given great weight by district courts and other
appellate courts.3 Accordingly, its reasoning merits careful analysis. The
Blakey, was a counsel of record on the petition for certiorari in Wollersheima and on the motion for a
preliminary injunction in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Antonio, 649 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Colo. 1986)
(appeal pending). The views expressed in the petition to the court and on the motion in Antonio,
however, did not differ from those previously expressed in a more scholarly context. See Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTE DAaE L. REv. 237, 330-41
(1982) [hereinafter Civil Action]; Blakey and Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1038, 1047 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Basic Concepts].
2 796 F.2d at 1082.
3 Wollersheim has already begun to have an impact. Wollersheim suggested that The Church of
Scientololgy was not "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 796 F.2d at
1088 n.14 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). RICO, the court
suggested, was "aimed principally at protecting the public from organized crime front enterprises,
not at enabling a religious organization to prevent the dissemination of doctrinal materials by a rival
religious organization." Id. The court, however, mischaracterized at this point the record on the
appeal. In fact, the district court had found that the matter was "a stolen document case." 796 F.2d
at 1079 (quoting unpublished district court opinion). In addition, the district court stated that "[the
theft appeared to be as much for economic as for doctrinal reasons." Id. Contrary to the court of
appeals finding, the Church would, therefore, fall within the class of those for whose "especial bene-
fit" the statute was in fact drafted: a victim of a RICO offense. Indeed, the court itself recognized
that the Church had been the victim of RICO cognizable conduct. 796 F.2d at 1080. It left open
only whether the Church had adequately pled RICO cognizable harm to "business or property"
within 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 796 F.2d at 1080 n.6.
More importantly, Wollersheim is not an opinion limited to suits brought by religious organiza-
tions, however correct the court may have been to deny to a church the benefit of a law that it would
have used to protect a commercial business. As written, Wollersheim denies equity type relief to all
RICO plaintiffs. But see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 525 (1953) (Jackson, J.) (a
law's application ought not depend "on whose ox it gores"); Parcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985
(4th Cir. 1944) (law of unfair competition protects churches as well as businesses). In Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Antonio, 649 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (D. Colo. 1987) (appeal pending), the district
court, in reliance on Wollersheim, denied the FDIC's request for injunctive relief pursuant to RICO to
prevent multistate defendants from dissipating assets pending trial. The complaint alleged a fraudu-
lent scheme by the defendants to use $3 million of the bank's assets to purchase $9 million in stolen
currency. Few would contend that the FDIC is not within the class for whom RICO's protection was
designed when it takes over banks that fail because of criminal activity. Nor would many suggest
that, if proven, such defendant's conduct does not fall within RICO's core concern. See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) ("[T]he major purpose of... [RICO was] to address the
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."). Nevertheless, while the FDIC's request for
an injunction was granted pursuant to Colorado's little RICO statute, it was a happenstance that the
bank's failure occurred in a state that had enacted such special legislation. In fact, only 27 states
have such legislation, of them, only 21 expressly provide, under varying conditions, for such pre-
judgment relief. See Appendix A. Yet the problem of bank failures stemming from criminal conduct
is nationwide and of epidemic proportions. N.Y. Times,Jan. 22, 1987, at 45, col. I (FDIC testimony:
1987 bank failures may increase 25% over 1986, which had a record 145 banks fail; $18 billion
reserve fund may shrink by $1 to $3 billion). See also N.Y. Times, May 22, 1987, at 17, col. 6 (failure
of Butcher banking dynasty inflicted $1 billion estimated harm). The assets of the 1986 moribund
banks totaled $7.7 billion; it cost the FDIC $2.8 billion to pay off insured depositors and shut down
the institutions. About 1,500 institutions remain on the Corporation's "sick list," 10% of which will
fail each year. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1987, at 20, col. 1. Similarly, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation's funds are nearly exhausted from the failure of savings and loan associa-
tions. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, p. 30, col. 1 (General Accounting Office determines FSLIC is
insolvent according to ordinary accounting principles; multibillion dollar rescue plan considered by
Congress). At least one half of bank failures and one quarter of savings and loan association failures
involve criminal activity by insiders. Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Na-
tion's Financial Institutions, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984). One of the most
19871
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thesis of this Article is that Wollersheim's reasoning is fatally flawed, since
it is inconsistent with the text, legislative history, and purpose of RICO,
and it cannot be easily squared with the teaching of the Supreme Court
on how to read statutes in general or RICO in particular.
The Article that follows is divided into four parts. Part I sets out the
facts of Wollersheim. Part II provides an overview of civil RICO and ex-
plains how the plaintiffs in Wollersheim satisfied the requirements for a
civil RICO action. Part III details the opinion in Wollersheim and exam-
ines and critiques its reasoning. Part IV addresses the adverse conse-
quences of Wollersheim, advocates that it not be followed by other courts,
and suggests that Congress, if necessary, amend the statute to correct its
result. Finally, the conclusion makes an effort to place Wollersheim in a
larger economic and political context.
I. The Facts of Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim4
The plaintiff in Wollersheim was the Church of Scientology
("Church"). The Church alleged that a group that had separated from it,
the Church of the New Civilization ("New Church"), was disseminating
to its members scriptural materials in fact stolen from the Church. Alleg-
ing federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. section 1964, 5 the provisions of
RICO authorizing the use of civil remedies, the Church sought a prelimi-
nary injunction in federal district court prohibiting the New Church from
using the scriptural materials. In addition to the RICO claim on which
federal jurisdiction was predicated, the Church's complaint contained six
pendent California state law claims, including misappropriation of trade
secrets.
After issuing a temporary restraining order, the district court con-
ducted a two day evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the district
court granted the Church's request for preliminary relief. It issued an
injunction prohibiting the New Church from "using, distributing, exhib-
common faults in failed banks is fraudulent real estate appraisals. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1986, at
22, col. 1 (during 1983 to 1985, more than 800 of 3,200 thrifts found to have significant appraisal
deficiencies amounting to $3 billion understatement). See also Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1987, at 41 (De-
partment of Justice pursuing 300 cases involving "significant fraudulent dealing" by insiders; FBI
probing another 200 cases representing $1.5 billion in losses at institution's closed by regulators).
Unless the assets of defendants, whose conduct cause the bank or associations to fail, can be moni-
tored during lengthy litigation through equity-type relief, civil suits against many of those who are
involved in such scams cannot be successfully undertaken. See Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 49 (45
major bank fraud cases investigated by FBI awaiting trial for more than a year because of shortage of
prosecutors). Wollersheim, therefore, portends ill for more than religious organizations.. See also Re-
public of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987) (RICO suit against former president
of Philippines; injunction to freeze assets sought under state law; act of state doctrine precludes
granting relief). Unfortunately, too, narrow and erroneous federal decisions tend to replicate them-
selves in state jurisprudence. See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (Florida RICO plaintiff must meet traditional criteria for preliminary equity relief); Note,
14 FiA. ST. U.L. REv. 975 (1986) (Finkelstein based on mistaken reading of Florida RICO statute).
4 The facts are taken from the opinion of the court of appeals, except, as noted, where
supplemented from the pleadings.
5 The Church also alleged federal jurisdiction under federal patent, copyright and trademark
laws. The court of appeals, however, found that because the Church's complaint did not make "sub-
stantive allegations of patent, copyright or trademark infringement," the only basis for federal juris-
diction was under the RICO count. 796 F.2d at 1080 n.4.
[Vol. 62:526
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iting or in any way publicly revealing" the scriptural materials. A bond
in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars was posted by the
Church.
The New Church took an immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Following submission of an initial set of briefs, the
Ninth Circuit requested the parties to file supplemental briefs on an issue
that had not been raised in the district court or in the original briefs in
the circuit court. The issue was: Did civil RICO authorize injunctive re-
lief for private plaintiffs?
II. Background of Civil RICO and its Application to the Facts in
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim
A. The Background of Civil RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, Title
IX of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO).7 RICO's "legislative history clearly demonstrates that
... [it] was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for
an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." 8 "[Tihe major
purpose of Title IX [was] to address the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses by organized crime."9 RICO, however, was not limited to the
prohibition of the infiltration of legitimate organizations.' 0 Nor does
RICO apply "only to organized crime in tht classic 'mobster' sense.""
In brief, RICO was enacted as a general reform designed to sanction
"enterprise criminality", 12 that is, patterns of racketeering activity com-
mitted by, through, or against an enterprise.' 3
6 796 F.2d at 1079.
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
8 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (citing with approval Civil Action, supra note
1).
9 Turkette v. United States, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
10 Id. at 590. See also United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[Ihe courts
are all but unanimous in their refusal to read RICO as prohibiting only the infiltration of legitimate
organizations .... ).
I1 United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). See
also Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 ("not just mobsters"); Owl Constr. Co. v.
Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ourts and.., commentators
have persuasively and exhaustively explained why... RICO... [is not limited to] organized crime
....") (citing with approval CivilAction, supra note 1), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Basic Concepts,
supra note 1, at 1014.
12 Basic Concepts, supra note 1, at 1013-14.
13 One court has objected that such a reading of RICO works "a revolutionary consequence
[nowhere noted] in the legislative history." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). The
facts do not support the court's statement. First, the scope of RICO, as a general reform not limited
to organized crime, is noted repeatedly in its legislative history. See Civil Action, supra note 1, at 272-
73 & nn.112-131, and 275-79 & n.116. Second, and more importantly, this statement ignores the
structure of the entire Organized Crime Control Act. It is, after all, the statute, not the legislative
history, that is voted on by Congress and signed by the President. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Act is composed of 11
substantive titles, each of which (with two principal exceptions) Congress drafted in light of the
problem of organized crime, but consciously enacted as general reform; other courts, too, have repeat-
edly rejected arguments that the 1970 Act did not work general reform under its various titles. See,
e.g., United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1265 n.19 (5th Cir. 1976) (Title VIII (18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1976)) not limited to organized crime); United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 1011-16 (9th Cir.
1987]
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The core of RICO is found in section 1962, which sets out standards
of "unlawful" conduct, which may be then enforced either criminally by
the government or civilly by the government or by private parties. 14 The
civil enforcement mechanisms of RICO were modeled on, but are not
identical to the antitrust laws.- 5 As with the comparable provisions of the
antitrust laws, RICO's civil provisions create a "private enforcement
mechanism . . .that ... deter[s] violators . . . [and] provide[s] ample
compensation to the victim .... "16 RICO authorizes persons injured in
1974) (Ely, J., dissenting) (Title VIII unconstitutional under commerce clause, since not limited to
organized crime; Title X (18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982)) not limited to organized crime); United States v.
Schwanke, 598 F.2d 575, 578 (10th Cir. 1979) (Title XI (18 U.S.C. § 844 (1982)) not limited to
organized crime). Accordingly, the Organized Crime Control Act, including Title IX, conforms to a
consistent pattern of federal legislation enacted over the past half century as general reform aimed at
a specific target, but not restricted in its drafting to that specific target. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224
(1976) (sports bribery) (held not limited to organized crime in United States v. Walsh, 544 F.2d 156,
159 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977)); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (1970) (loan sharking)
(held not limited to organized crime in United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972)); 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976) (obstruction of criminal investigation) (held
not limited to organized crime in United States v. Koehler, 544 F.2d 1326, 1330 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977));
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) (extortion) (held not limited to racketeering in United States v. Culbert,
435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978)); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976) (Travel Act) (held not limited to organized
crime bribery in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 46 (1979) and United States v. Wander, 601
F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1979)); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1964) (lottery tickets) (held not limited to
organized crime in United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1966)); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)
(1982) (bank robbery) (held not limited to gangsters in Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 358-62
(1983)); 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1982) (assault on custodian of property of United States) (held not lim-
ited to postal carriers in Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 72-80 (1984)); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424
(white slave traffic) (held not limited to commercial prostitution in Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485-90 (1917)). See generally Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in Statutes and Law Enforce-
ment Administration, in THE IMPAcT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGAN-
IZED CRIME 511-80 (1986). For two independent recognitions of the fact of the pattern, albeit both
with deep reservations on its wisdom, see Baker, Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make
it Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 495 (1985); Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime,
22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2132 (1984).
14 See CivilAction, supra note 1, at 243 n.20. Section 1962, in short, states what is "unlawful," not
"criminal." As such, RICO is not, as some courts have found, "primarily a criminal statute." See,
e.g., In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Va. 1983). Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(3) (1982), "person" ("individual" or "entity") defines the class who may be sued civilly for
violations of § 1962 under § 1964; under 1 U.S.C. § 1, "whoever" ("individual," "corporate body,"
but not "governmental unit") defines the class who may be indicted for violations of § 1962 under
§ 1963. Because the civil scope of RICO is broader than its criminal scope, RICO is not primarily
criminal and punitive, but primarily civil and remedial. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593 (RICO is "both
preventive and remedial"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, No. 81-44, slip op. at 19 (Sup. Ct.Jun. 3, 1987) ("priority of the compensatory function"). See
also 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Roman L. Hruska regarding S. 1623, the immedi-
ate predecessor to S. 1861, from which Title IX was drawn: "[T]he criminal provisions are intended
primarily as an adjunct to the civil provisions which I consider as the more important feature of the
bill."). RICO's civil sanctions, imposed once a plaintiff's allegations are proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, are available to the government or private parties. See United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (government suit); Wilcox v.
First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1986) (private suit); Alcorn County v.
U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984) (private suit). See also Sedima, 473
U.S. at 491 ("no indication... [to] depart from [preponderance]"); Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal
Conviction and Burden of Proof, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 560 (1985).
15 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 81 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-
70 (1970). Nevertheless, Congress drafted RICO outside of the antitrust laws because it wanted it to
have a broader impact. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99.
16 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). The antitrust statutes have been
aptly termed "the Magna Charta of free enterprise." United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972). They "are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
[Vol. 62:526
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their "business or property" by a violation of the statute to "recover
threefold the damages sustain[ed] and the cost of the suit, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees."' 17 Such compensation "provide[s] strong incen-
Id. Under the antitrust statutes, the private "treble-damages remedy [is needed] ... precisely for the
purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (emphasis in original). In fact, RICO and the antitrust statutes are well inte-
grated. "There are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to: violence (or the threat of
it), deception, or market power." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1959). See also
American C & L Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis,J., dissenting) ("Restraint
may be exercised through force or fraud or agreement."). RICO focuses on the first two; antitrust
focuses on the third. As the antitrust laws seek to maintain economic freedom in the market place,
so, too, RICO seeks to promote, among other things, integrity in the market place.
17 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (1982). The idea of multiple damages for certain kinds of unlawful prac-
tices has deep roots. The earliest such provision in English law was the Statute of Gloucester, 6
EDW. 1, ch. 5 (1278) (treble damages for waste). Modem antitrust statutes have their origin in the
Statute Against Monopolies, 21 JAc. 1, ch. 3, § 4 (1624) (authorizing treble damages for those in-
jured by unlawful monopolies). Even the English Parliament, however, recognized that it was "one
thing to pass statutes and.., quite another thing to insure that [they were] actually enforced." 4 W.
HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 335 (3d ed. 1945). Accordingly, "it was a common expe-
dient [in the Middle Ages and beyond] to give the public at large an interest in seeing that a statute
was enforced ...." Id. The multiple damage enforcement mechanism was also present in early
colonial laws. See, e.g., THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 5 & 24 (1648) (provisions pro-
viding treble damages for pilfering and theft and gaming, respectively).
The idea of multiple damages for various kinds of wrongs was a characteristic feature of Roman
law. The delict of theft existed as early as the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.). See THE INSTrrtrES OF
GArus (PART I) 217 (F. de Zulueta trans. 1951). "mhe penalty... [was] four times the value of the
thing stolen" when the offender was caught in the act; otherwise, it was double. A. WATSON, THE
LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 76 (1970). Extortion was remedied by four times the loss. Id. at 80.
Possession of stolen property was remedied by three times the value of the property. Id. at 77.
Greek law provided for double damage if stolen property was recovered; tenfold damages otherwise.
5 C. KENNEDY, THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES, APP. VI 187 (1909) (quoting a law of Solon), quoted
in, I J. WIGMORE, PANORAMeA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 343 (1936). Biblical law, too, reflected
multiple damage recovery. See Exodus 21:37 (theft ofox or sheep, if killed, restoration of five for ox
and four for sheep); Exodus 22:3 (double damages for trespass to property); 2 Samuel 12:1-6 (resto-
ration of fourfold for taking of lamb).
Modem law and economic analysis support the wisdom of this history. Indeed, a number of
federal statutes, particularly in the commercial area, contain treble damage provisions. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) (Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933); 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982) (Bank Holding
Company Act); 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (1982) (Real Estate Settlement Act of 1974); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)
(Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (Revenue Act of 1916: restraints on import trade); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117 (1982) (Trademark Act of 1946); 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (1982) (Electronic Fund Transfer Act);
15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1982) (Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act); 22 U.S.C. § 4209 (1982)
(penalties imposed on consular officers for exacting excessive fees); 30 U.S.C. § 689 (1982) (Lead
and Zinc Stabilization Program); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) (patents); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982) (CER-
CLA); 45 U.S.C. § 83 (1982) (government aided railroads); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1982) (Merchant
Marine Act of 1970). Professor (now Judge) Posner supports the concept of private enforcement
mechanisms allowing for more than actual damages against deliberate antisocial conduct, particu-
larly where the factor of concealment is present. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 560 (pri-
vate enforcement), 194, 346 (more than actual damages for deliberate conduct), 293 (concealment)
(3d ed. 1986). Concealment, of course, is the sine qua non of most RICO-type behavior, particularly
fraud. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS-How EXTENSIVE IS IT?-
How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED?, cover page (1980) ("Most fraud is undetected. For those... commit-
ting fraud, the chances of being prosecuted and eventually going to jail are slim .... The sad truth
is that crime against the Government often does pay.") In brief, if society authorizes the recovery of
only actual damages for deliberate antisocial conduct engaged in for profit, it allows the perpetrator
know that if he is caught, he must return the misappropriated sums. If he is not caught, he may keep
the money. Even if he is caught and sued, he may be able to defeat part of the damage claim or at
least compromise it. The balance of economic risk under traditional single damage recovery, there-
fore, provides little economic disincentive to those who would engage in such conduct. See R. Pos-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 223 (1976) ("If, because of concealability, the
probability of being punished for a particular.., violation is less than unity, the prospective violator
will discount (i.e., multiply) the punishment cost by that probability in determining the expected
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tives to civil litigants and [is] integral to the effort of Congress to enlist
the aid of civil claimants in deterring racketeering .... 18 In addition,
such "private . . . litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective
enforcement"' 19 of the law, and it "provide[s] a significant supplement to
the limited resources available to the government." 20
Congress directed that RICO be "liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 2 1 The directive is a "mandate." 22 "RICO is to be
punishment cost for the violation."). See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), afd on other grounds, 473 U. S. 606 (1985):
[It is also true that] the delays, expense and uncertainties of litigation often compel plain-
tiffs to settle completely valid claims for a mere fraction of their value. By adding to the
settlement value of such valid claims in certain cases clearly involving criminal conduct,
RICO may arguably promote more complete satisfaction of plaintiffs' claims without facili-
tating indefensible windfalls.
747 F.2d at 399 n.16. Similarly, studies under the antitrust statutes show that most treble damage
suits are now settled at close to actual damages. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 98th
CONG. 2D SESS., STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY, SERIAL No. 8, HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 14 (1984). No reason exists to believe that a similar pattern
will not develop under RICO, at least in the fraud area. Empirical studies show that it is the threat of
treble damages, not criminal prosecution, that is the backbone of the antitrust statutes. See, e.g.,
Block, Nold and Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429, 440 (1981)
("Neither imprisonment nor monetary penalties pose... a credible threat to colluding firms ....
[T]he deterrent effect ... [comes] from ... the likelihood of an award of private treble damages
.... "). Ironically, it may be necessary to authorize treble damages to assure that deserving victims
receive actual damages. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct 2323,
2345 (1987) ("remedial role"); Genesco, Inc. v. Kakivchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 851 (2d Cir.
1987) ("§ 1964(c) is primarily a compensatory and secondarily a deterrent measure"); Note, Treble
Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 533-34 (1986):
Treble damages have unique characteristics that can be creatively used to address the
problems of sophisticated crime. Treble damages can be used to (1) encourage private
citizens to bring RICO actions, (2) deter future violators, and (3) compensate victims for all
accumulative harm. These multiple and convergent purposes make the treble damage pro-
vision a powerful mechanism in the effort to vindicate the interests of those victimized by
crime.
18 Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984).
19 Leh v General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965) (quoting Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965)). In fact, between 1960 and 1980,
of the 22,585 civil and criminal cases brought under the antitrust provisions by the government or
private parties, 84% were instituted by private plaintiffs. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs 431 (1981).
20 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 ("Private attorney general provisions such
as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps."). See also supra note 17 (treble damages)
and infra note 191 (public enforcement).
21 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). See
also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10, 497-98; Russello, 464 U.S. at 27 ("[T]his is the only substantive
federal criminal statute that contains such a directive .... ).
The presence of a liberal construction clause is not unusual in state law. Such clauses had their
origin in the codification movement of the 19th century. Edward Livingston suggested the rejection
of the old common law rule of strict construction in the farsighted code he drafted for Louisiana
between 1820 and 1825. 1 E. LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS ON CRIMINALJURISPRUDENCE 231 (1873
ed.); 2 E. LIVINGSTON, supra, at 14 ("[A]I penal laws whatever are to be construed according the
plain import of their words .... "). Livingston's suggestion for Louisiana was followed by David
Dudley Field in his influential draft of codes of penal law and criminal procedure for New York. THE
CODE OF PENAL LAw 5 (1865 ed.) ("fair import"); THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 470-71 (1850 ed.) (revised code to be given "liberal construction" as old rule had no
support in any "principle of substantial justice, and . . . [its] highest aim, practically considered,
seem[ed] to be, to render that law inconsistent with its spirit and as a consequence, absurd and
ridiculous"). Ultimately, Livingston's and Field's work formed the intellectual basis for the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 104 (1969).
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read broadly."123 In addition, "[its] 'remedial purposes' are nowhere
more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured
by racketeering activity."' 24 "RICO was an aggressive initiative to supple-
ment old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime ....
[and] it is in this spirit that all of the Act's provisions should be read." 25
Accordingly, RICO's language must be read in the same broad fashion,
whatever the character of the suit.26
At first, the Department ofJustice moved slowly to use RICO crimi-
nally. Today, it is the prosecutor's tool of choice in organized crime,
political corruption, white-collar crime, terrorism, and hate-group prose-
cutions. 27 The Department of Justice has also begun to implement
RICO's civil provisions. 28 Nevertheless, despite the promise of new
methods to remedy old wrongs, the private bar did not begin to bring
civil RICO suits until about 1975. When it did, the district courts reacted
Judicial hostility to change through legislation was common in the 19th century. See J. HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw 186 (1950):
[W]here (judges] were not ready boldly to declare [it] unconstitutional, [they were ready] to
interpret it so restrictively as to narrow its effect.
These factors found expression in the abstract canons of statutory interpretation... : strict
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law; strict construction of penal stat-
utes, or of legislation that imposed 'drastic' burdens, or of legislation that imposed special
damages....
The effect was to put a primarily obstructive, if not destructive connotation on the process
of statutory interpretation.
Legislatures reacted. "[I1t became standard practice in drafting statutes to insert a preamble stating
broadly the purpose of the act and to dose with a provision declaring that the statute should be
liberally construed." D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAw 174 (1974); see E. PAT=ER-
SON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAw 421 (1953); see also CivilActions, supra note 1, at 245
n.25 (review of the statutes and relevant decisions). In fact, a majority of states has abolished the
common law rule. Judicial hostility, however, continues into the 20th century. See, e.g., Sedima, 473
U.S. at 529 (Powell,J.) (liberal construction applies only to criminal provisions); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc.,
582 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (D. Colo. 1984) (same). Courts have recognized that strict construction is
not of constitutional dimension. See Tarrant v. Ponte, 751 F.2d 459, 466 (1st Cir. 1985); CivilAction,
supra note 1, at 288 n.150. For a different view of the relationship between "liberal" and "fair im-
port" construction, see Baker, supra note 13, at 560-66.
22 United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981).
23 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
24 Id. at 498.
25 Id.
26 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1986);
Alcorn County, 731 F.2d at 1170-71; Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983) ("ITlhis
Court would be hard pressed to justify a narrower construction of RICO's civil cause of action than
that afforded RICO's criminal provisions."); see also Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The words cannot be read one way in a suit which is to
end in fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction.").
27 See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiday, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 109-11 (1985) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott) [hereinafter Over-
sight]. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (conviction under RICO of nine men and one
woman, members of the "Order," a racist and antisemitic group, accused of multiple murders,
armed robberies, counterfeiting, weapons, and arson); N.Y. Times, Sep. 6, 1985, at A-17, col. 3
(conviction under RICO of leader of "Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord," a militant
white supremacist group). Federal prosecutions of various hate groups have "depleted the leader-
ship [and] drained the resources of several organizations." N.Y. Times, Jun. 10, 1987, at 14, col. 1
(study of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of.Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.NJ. 1984),
aft'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986) (civil suit against organized
crime controlled union); Oversight, supra note 27, at 116-17; N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 1
(court trustee struggles with union "one of the most corrupt in the nation"); Wall St. J., Feb. 10,
1987, at 1, col. 6 (teamster local greets court trustee angrily).
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with extreme hostility and, with few exceptions, undertook to redraft the
statute in a concerted effort to dismiss civil suits in all possible ways.29
Indeed, prior to Sedima, sixty-one percent of the reported decisions were
dismissed on various motions of defendants.30 The first effort to redraft
civil RICO took the form of reading an "organized crime" limitation into
it. 3 1 Because that limitation had no support in the text of the statute-it
was also specifically rejected in the legislative debates-the courts of ap-
peals for the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits rejected it out
of hand.3 2 The next effort involved reading a "competitive injury" limi-
tation into the statute.33 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits quickly turned
29 The district courts have in fact acknowledged that their rewriting of RICO was motivated by a
concern about a "flood of litigation." McCarthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 139 (D. Haw.
1984). The district courts' concern over a flood of RICO litigation is not only misplaced factually,
but also constitutionally inappropriate. Previously, separate statistics on RICO litigation were not
kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See generally ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (1985). Approximately 275,000 civil
cases, however, are filed each year. Id. at 11. Approximately 39,000 criminal prosecutions are
brought. Id. at 16. Slightly more than 118,000 of the civil cases involve the United States as a
plaintiff or defendant. Id. at 1I. Private litigation embraces approximately 160,000 filings, of which
60% are federal question and 40% are diversity filings. Id. at 11. The principal areas of litigation
concern recovery of overpayments and enforcement ofjudgments (47,000 filings), prisoner petitions
(30,000 filings), social security (25,000 filings), civil rights (20,000 filings), and labor (11,000 filings),
id. at A-12 & A-13. Antitrust litigation includes 959 civil filings and 47 criminal cases, id. at A-12 &
A-47. Securities, commodities and exchange-related filings include 3,200 civil and 13 criminal cases,
id. at A-13 & A-46. Fraud-related litigation accounts for 1,700 civil filings. Id. at A-12. Accordingly,
if most securities and fraud-related cases were also RICO cases, RICO filings would not exceed
5,000, not more than 2% of all federal filings. How many wholly new pieces of litigation, particularly
in the fraud area, RICO will draw into the federal courts cannot be reliably determined. Yet, it is
doubtful that the number will be relatively high, as most significant commercial litigation is now in
the federal courts under other federal statutes or diversity jurisdiction. In fact, the Department of
Justice indicated that of the approximately 500 civil RICO cases brought pre-Sedima, 65% of them
had an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See Oversight, supra note 27, at 127. More recently,
too, Administrative Office data indicate that in 1986 only 1069 civil RICO cases were filed, while 294
were terminated. See infra Appendix B. Of reported decisions, 58% had an independent basis for
Federal jurisdiction. Id. As such, "the perceived problem of civil RICO case load is exaggerated
.... " 2 CIvIL RICO REPORT No. 34, at 3 (Feb. 4, 1987) (remarks ofJudge Pamela A. Rymer). In
fact, the decisions have "calmed down" and "actually present no greater problems than antitrust or
complicated securities cases." Id. In any event, "hostility to the extraordinary breadth of civil RICO
is not a reason for courts to restrict its scope." Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977 (7th
Cir. 1986). Allegations of civil RICO abuse may be dealt with by the vigorous enforcement of ex-
isting remedies for general litigation abuse. See Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations
in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 103-04 [hereinafter Civil RICO Abuse] ("[U]pon review ... RICO
abuse is not a serious problem for our legal system so long as counsel and courts appreciate the
utility of existing remedial procedures. Accordingly, both Congress and the courts should recognize
that abuse arguments are more likely motivated by hostility to the RICO remedy."). "Resolution of
the pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly" is for the legislative
branch. United States v. Rodgers, 446 U. S. 475, 484 (1984). As such, it is neither necessary nor
constitutional for courts to redraft legislation. Congress, too, is being pressed both to retain and to
circumscribe civil RICO. For a review of the various arguments and proposals, see generally Note,
Congress Responds to Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851, 930
(1986) ("Though it might be conceded that RICO's private right of action has been something less
than a lethal weapon in the war against organized crime, the measure may prove a hero in the war
against fraud."). No evidence exists that Congress is unable or unwilling to fulfill its constitutional
role.
30 Oversight, supra note 27, at 127.
31 See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
32 For a list of courts rejecting the reading in of an organized crime limitation, see cases col-
lected in Alcorn County, 731 F.2d at 1167.
33 See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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aside that effort.3 4 Then, the district courts hit upon the "racketeering
injury" limitation.35 Together with a criminal conviction limitation, this
effort was rejected by the Supreme Court in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.36
When the court of appeals heard the Wollersheim appeal, therefore, none
of the efforts by the district courts to circumscribe RICO's congres-
sionally designed breath had been ultimately successful on appeal.37
34 See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983)
(The organized crime limitation "revived under ... [a new] guise"); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982)), affd 710 F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
35 See, e.g., Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
36 473 U.S. at 488, 495 ("The language of RICO gives no obvious indication that a civil action
can proceed only after a criminal conviction.... [We perceive no distinct racketeering injury re-
quirement.... A reading of the statute belies any such requirement.").
Writing for a sharply divided court of appeals, Judge Oakes had suggested that civil RICO suits
against "respected and legitimate enterprises" were "extraordinary, if not outrageous." Sedima, 741
F.2d at 487. Included among the cited "legitimate" enterprises was E.F. Hutton. But see White Collar
Crime (E.F. Hutton): Hearings Before the SenateJudiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 132 (1986) (Sena-
torJoseph R. Biden: "Where I come from that is called 'theft.'" Robert Foman, Chairman of E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc.: "It is probably not different."); Why the E.F. Hutton Scandal May Be Far From Over,
Bus. WK., Feb. 24, 1986, at 98, col. I (Hutton pleads guilty to 2,000 counts of mail and wirefraud in
multimillion dollar bank scam). See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 395 n.14 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd, 473 U. S. 606 (1985) ("[T]he white collar crime alleged in some
RICO complaints against 'legitimate' businesses is in some ways at least as disturbing ...."). Those
who make such remarks are apparently unaware of the substantial body of literature on white-collar
crime committed by so-called respected businesses. See, e.g., Ross, How Lawless Are Big Companies,
FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 57 (1,043 major corporations indicted between 1970-1980: 117 convic-
tions or consent decrees for 98 antitrust violations; 18 kickbacks, briberies or illegal rebates; 21
illegal political contributions; 11 frauds; and five tax evasions). See infra notes 193 (white-collar
crime) & 253 (same).
37 The Supreme Court's opinion in Sedima contained the often cited footnote number 14, stating
that "the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of'pattern' ... resulted
in the extraordinary uses to which civil RICO ... [had] been put .... 473 U.S. at 500. Ignoring the
general teachings of Sedima, and narrowly focusing on footnote 14, the district courts have, however,
continued to dismiss most civil RICO cases, not seeking, as the Supreme Court suggested, to de-
velop a "meaningful" definition of the concept of pattern, but to find an easy device to dear their
dockets. See Appendix B (51.1% dismissed, 40% of which dismissed on "pattern" grounds). In-
deed, those district courts, while acknowledging that Sedima eliminated the "organized crime,"
"competitive or racketeering injury," and "criminal conviction" requirements, have declared open-
season on civil RICO. Such arguments, however, "[turn] the Supreme Court's reasoning on its
head," and are "out of line with the tenor of the... Sedima opinion." Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbour
Place Assocs., 632 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("narrow reading of ... pattern ... is, in
principle, very similar to the criminal conviction and racketeering injury requirements that were
rejected. ., in Sedima"). Substitute "pattern" for "organized crime" or "racketeering injury" and
the decisions continue on their pre-Sedima course. A conflict in the circuit courts, too, has now
developed. Compare California Architectual Bdlg. Prods. v. Francisan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466,
1469 (9th Cir. 1987) (single episode test rejected); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st
Cir. 1987) (single scheme or episode limitation rejected: multiple factors must be considered); Inter-
national Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) (single scheme test rejected);
United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-93 (2d Cir. 1986) (single scheme limitation rejected;
continuity for "pattern" may be found from continuing character of enterprise and open-ended na-
ture of scheme) and Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 974-77 (7th Cir. 1986) (single
scheme limitation rejected; pattern may be found where series of discrete harms inflicted) with Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 255-58 (8th Cir. 1986) (single scheme establishes relationship,
but negates continuity for "pattern") and Madden v. Cluck, 815 F.2d 116 n.1 (8th Cir. 1987) (Fulmer
"adhere[d] to" despite Janniello). For an excellent analysis of "pattern" that precedes, but antici-
pates the holdings of Roeder, International Data Bank, lanniello and Morgan, see Note, Reconsideration of
Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 92 (1986). This development threatens to
frustrate Congress' 1970 promise of "enhanced sanctions and new remedies" for old wrongs. See 84
Stat. 923 (1970).
The question of "pattern" was, of course, not before the Sedima court. 473 U.S. at 500. Since
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"pattern" was neither briefed nor argued, "pattern" was not decided. See Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.). In short, little reason exists to believe that the Court, in
a footnote, without briefs or arguments, cavalierly rejected wholesale a decade and one-half of well-
considered intermediate appellate court jurisprudence. See lanniello, 808 F.2d at 190 ("Because the
Sedima footnote does not rise to the level of a holding, it is not controlling."); Page v. Moseley,
Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1986) ("The meaning of... [pattern
in] a civil RICO claim has yet to be clearly established in the law."); Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 353 n.20 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Sedima [does] not ... give much
guidance as to how 'pattern' should be interpreted"), affid on other grounds sub. nom., Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., No. 86-497 (Sup. Ct. Jun. 22, 1987). But see Cowan v. Corley,
814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987) ("direct a narrower definition of pattern"); Smoky Greenhaw
Cotton Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1280-81 n.7 (5th Cir.
1986) ("more rigorous interpretation"). Were a court to take a fresh look at the issue of "pattern"-
a course invited by the Court in Sedima but a course that was neither mandated in its method (ignore
controlling precedent) nor dictated in its outcome (disembowel the statute)-the approach that
ought to be taken is straightforward: any definition of "pattern" must be faithful to the text of the
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose. It is crucial, too, for four functions:
1. The definition of criminality (when an indictment may be returned);
2. A statement of a claim for relief (when an action may be brought);
3. The principle of claim preclusion (when an action must be brought); and
4. The application of the statute of limitations (when, in whole or in part, it is too late to
bring an action).
In addition, any definition of "pattern" ought to meet two tests: It ought to work equally well on the
civil and criminal sides of the statute, and it must work equally well in § 1962 (a) (b) and (c). See L.
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 20 (2d ed. 1953) ("For a large class of cases-though
not for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is
its use in the language.") (emphasis in original); RICO REVISITED: AN ADVANCED SEMINAR ON THE
LATEST TECHNIQUES IN CIVIL Surrs, 157 (1987) [hereinafter RICO REVISrrED] ("Pattern may be used
in RICO violation in at least 240 different contexts [3 (sections) x 5 (kinds of enterprises) x 4 (kinds
of predicate offenses) x 4 (roles in violations) = 240].").
Any effort to develop a meaningful definition of "pattern" ought to begin with the language of
the statute. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 n.13; Russello, 464 U.S. at 20; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. The
statute says "activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). It does not say "schemes," "transactions," or
"episodes." See lanniello, 808 F.2d at 192 n.16 ("Multiple scheme requirement is not grounded in
the statutory language of RICO."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Herr, 637 F. Supp. 828, 835
(W.D.N.C. 1986) (same). The statute "requires" that the "activity" be "patterned." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) ("at least two ... within ten years," etc.). Pattern is not defined; it is limited. Sedima, 473
U.S. at 496 n.14 (requires: "while two acts are necessary, they may not be suffiient") (emphasis added).
See also Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1 (1934) (discussion of difference between
"means" and "includes"). As such, "pattern" should be read in its ordinary or plain meaning, but it
must be viewed in the context of the entire statute. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489, 495 n.13; Russello,
464 U.S. at 21, 22-23; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 582, 587. One definition for all sections and all uses
will not work. While their uses in each context will be different, they will reflect a "family of mean-
ings." L. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra at 36. "[W]e see a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." Id. at 32 ("fam-
ily resemblances"). The requirement of a "pattern" is, therefore, like a "standard" and not a
"rule." Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976 ("The doctrinal requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is a
standard, not a rule, and as such its determination depends on the facts and circumstances of the
particular use with no one factor being necessarily determinative."); see II R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE
124-29 (1959). See also Nash v. United States, 229, U.S. 373, 376 (1913) ("restraint of trade")
(Holmes,J.) ("[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that
is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree."). THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY paraphrases "pattern" as "design" or "discernible form." See VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 565-66 (1933) (thirteen uses are noted; number eight refers to "design"); III THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315 (1933) (definition number 8C: "An arrangement or order of things or
activity in abstract senses; order or form discernible in things, actions, idea, situations, etc. Freq.
with of, as pattern of behavior... and as second element with defining word.") (emphasis in original).
The legislative history of the statute should also be examined. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486; Turkette,
452 U.S. at 586. The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history materials regarding pattern.
See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14. The materials mention nothing about "schemes," "transactions,"
or "episodes." See lanniello, 808 F.2d at 192 n.16 (no "clear legislative history" mandating multiple
schemes). In fact, the materials specifically point only to two factors: "Relationship" and "con-
tinuity." Nothing in the text or legislative history of the statute, therefore, requires a "single
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scheme" or "multiple schemes" for a showing of "pattern." Compare United States v. Quaod, 777
F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985) (single scheme not required; acts need only be related to the enter-
prise), cert. denied sub nom., Callanan v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1499 (1986) and A.B.A., CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LrI-
GATION: A REPORT OF THE RICO CASES COMMITrEE 36-37 (1985) (common scheme limitation re-
jected, since it would frustrate the application of RICO to conglomerates of crime) [hereinafter
RICO COMMrTEE REPORT] with Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 (single scheme not precluded; "otherwise
... a single scheme would automatically escape RICO liability ... an untenable result."). One act
does not make a pattern. See United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986). Nor do
isolated acts. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("[O]ne 'isolated racketeering'
activity ... [is] insufficient .... The target ... is... not sporadic activity."). Moreover, nothing in
the text or legislative history of the statute indicates that continuity (or its threat) may only be found
in, or inferred from, the racketeering activity itself; it is wholly consistent with the text and legislative
history of the statute to find continuity in any aspect of a violation that relates to the racketeering
activity. Cowan, 814 F.2d at 227 (threat from formation and execution of illegal association); Ian-
niello, 808 F.2d at 190-91 (threat of continuity found from ongoing character of organized group);
City of New York v.Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 536, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (continuity mea-
sured between acts not at termination); Hill v. Equitable Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (D. Del.
1986) ("cover-up"); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781,
810 (E.D. La. 1986) (would have continued if not caught). The statute is part of Title 18, the federal
criminal code. As such, "act" is best understood in the traditional sense of actus reus and mens rea. See
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 n.11 (1980) ("Congress in enacting criminal statutes
legislates against a background of Anglo-Saxon common law .... "). Accordingly, no reason exists,
when examining the "acts" that make up an alleged "pattern," to focus on a purely jurisdictional
"act," that is, a mailing, a use of wire communication, or interstate or foreign transportation. Roeder,
814 F.2d at 31 (mailing relating to single bribe not distinct for purpose of determining pattern);
Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1987) (mailings relating to same
fraud not distinct for purpose of determining pattern); cf. Cabbell v. United States, 636 F.2d 246,
248-49 (8th Cir. 1980) (proper prosecutorial unit under § 2314 may ignore jurisdictional elements).
While "pattern" must be read consistently in criminal and civil litigation, the "acts" that constitute
the "pattern" may differ. Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31 (single bribe not pattern simply because imple-
mented in several steps and several acts of communications); Elliott, 809 F.2d at 350 (quoting Lipin
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J., concurring) ("a multiplicity
of mailings does not reasonably translate directly into a 'pattern' ")). Compare Lipin Enters., 803 F.2d
at 325 (Cudahy, J.) ("It is not clear that the same analysis would be appropriate in cases involving
other kinds of predicate acts [such as] arson."). Instead, the focus should be on an "act"-the actus
reus-that inflicts discrete harm. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. Using this approach, a "pattern" may be
said to be present, when at least two acts occur, which are "designed," or have "discernible form," in
reference to themselves or to the enterprise, and which reflect continuity (or its threat) either by
looking at the acts themselves (e.g., extortion), the purpose for which they were committed (e.g.,
obstruction of justice) or the enterprise in itself (e.g., a criminal gang). For parallel concepts, see
Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986) (municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ("[A] plaintiff must allege [under Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 814
(1985)] a specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegations of custom or
policy .. "); United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551-52 (9th Cir.) ("pattern or
practice" prerequisite for an attorney general suit under Title VII: defined as "more than an iso-
lated, sporadic incident, but is repeated routine of a generalized nature") (quoting 110 CONG. REC.
14270 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
If such concepts as "scheme," "transaction," or "episode" are relevant to this text-based ap-
proach, they have validity solely as tests for the presence of congressionally-mandated elements.
Normally, for example, a single "transaction" or "episode" (defined to mean several acts, so closely
related in time and place that they may be fairly described as producing but a single harm) will not
carry with it the reality or threat of continuity. See, e.g., Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31 (single bribe in three
installments); Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987) (single contract and
business opportunity); Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, 811 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1987) (single
partnership transaction); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987) (sale of
single piece of commercial real estate); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806
F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (diversion of single shipment of product); Lipin Enters., 803 F.2d at
324 (purchase of single car leasing company). As such, no pattern will be present. But the single
"transaction" or "episode" tests ought not to be elevated tojudicially imposed requirements that
would be infexibly applied as a substitute for congressional elements. The point is most clearly seen
in the context of §§ 1962(b) and (d). In construing "pattern," most courts have concentrated on
§ 1962(c). See, e.g., Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 255; but see id. at 255 & n.1 (§§ 1962(a), (b), and (c)
1987]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
"share in common" the "pattern" concept). Suppose, however, that the single scheme limitation
were applied to § 1962(b), which deals with the takeover of an enterprise, and which, all concede,
represents the principal, albeit not exclusive, purpose of RICO. See Russelo, 464 U.S. at 28; Turkette,
452 U.S. at 590-91. Should no pattern be found where the racketeering activity was engaged in
pursuant to a single scheme, then § 1962(b) will have been read out of the statute-or at least rewrit-
ten to prohibit only the acquisition of enterprises. See lanniello, 808 F.2d at 192 ("requiring two
schemes to establish pattern would effectively eliminate" § 1962 (b)); see also Paul S. Mullin & As-
socs., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986) ("[Ain attempt by a racketeering enter-
prise to infiltrate General Motors could involve countless acts.... One could argue, however, that
[no pattern was] involved because only one company was subverted. Under this view, a 'pattern'
would come into existence only after the same enterprise began to infiltrate Chrysler or Ford."). But
see A.L. Williams Corp. v. Faircloth, 652 F. Supp. 51, 55 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (single stock acquisition not
pattern under § 1962(b)); Eisenberger v. Spectex Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(single scheme to take over corporation not pattern under § 1962(b)). Such a result would be both
"absurd" and "surprising." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. It is not what Congress intended. See S. REP.
No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is
this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern."). Thus, to be suc-
cessful, the takeover of a legitimate business-even though accomplished in the context of a "single
scheme"-would "normally" require not only the act of takeover, but also a "threat" of continuing
criminal activity to maintain its objective; otherwise, the business could be reclaimed at any time. See
Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 ("To focus excessively on either continuity or relationship alone effectively
negates the remaining prong."). Similarly, requiring multiple schemes for pattern potentially con-
ficts with § 1962(d) (conspiracy). A requirement of multiple schemes might defeat a single conspir-
acy charge; conversely, a showing of a single conspiracy might preclude a finding of multiple
schemes for pattern. See also Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir.
1987) ("semantical game of generalizing the illegal objective"); Thompson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc.,
652 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 n.4 (D. Utah 1987) (for a thoughtful effort to distinguish between the
concepts of "transaction," "episode," and "scheme"); RICO REvisrrED, supra, at 184-85.
Ironically, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Superior Oil was correctly decided on its facts. Judge
Wangelin's opinion rightly reflected traditional jurisprudence dealing with the single/multiple tak-
ing of oil, gas, and electricity, which requires the breaking of an otherwise continuous taking before
more than one taking occurs. See, e.g., Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78 N.E. 607 (1906); Reynolds
v. State, 101 Ga. App. 715, 115 S.E.2d 214 (1980) (Woods followed). See also Reg. v. Firth, L.R.I.C.C.
172, 11 Cox Crim. Cases 234 (1869). But Judge Wangelin's use of the language "one continuing
scheme to convert gas" and "one isolated fraudulent scheme" was unfortunate. Had he focused
solely on "the underlying conversion or theft of gas," his result as well as his reasoning would have
been correct. In addition, the special set of circumstances (theft of gas) in Superior Oil has now been
ignored by the Eighth Circuit in Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 207-10 (8th Cir. 1986) (three
separate draws on letter of credit over six months not a pattern since indistinguishable from Superior
Oil); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (six-year course of"churn-
ing" brokerage account not a pattern); Madden, 815 F.2d at 1164 and Ornest v. Delaware N. Cos.,
Inc., 817 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1987) (single scheme over eight years to defraud individual of
commissions). Unfortunately, too, the Eighth Circuit's other "pattern" decisions are in hopeless
disarray; it is likely that the court will have to sit en banc to resolve the various inconsistencies.
Compare Superior Oil with Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 770 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir.
1985) (fraudulent audit pattern), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 799 (1986) and Barnes v. Resources Royalties,
Inc., 795 F.2d 1359, 1367 (8th Cir. 1986) (three separate investments over six months a pattern).
Moreover, Superior Oil is inconsistent with earlier, but carefully reasoned decisions of the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1985) (multiple investments by
investors in same failing company constituted pattern); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1986) (audit report: single scheme sufficient; different
episodes rejected). The Fifth Circuit's unfortunate decision in R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774
F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) has been questioned by the Circuit itself. See Smoky Greenhaw
Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1280 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986),
n remand, 650 F. Supp. 220 (W.D. Tex. 1986), aftd, 805 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1986). Cf Cowan, 814
F.2d at 227 n.6 (Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. indicates "narrower" definition). Superior Oil has also been
criticized by the Third Circuit. See Malley-Duff&Assocs., 792 F.2d at 353 n.20 ("very restrictive defini-
tion of'pattern' "); see also Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D. Md.
1986) ("unnecessarily restrictive"); Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1408 (N.D. II. 1986)
("breaking point").
The court in Superior Oil was also misled by Judge Shadur's opinion in Northern Trust
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Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985), which, of course, no longer states the law
in the Seventh Circuit in light of Morgan, 804 F.2d at 974-76. See Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
653 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (D.V.I. 1987) ("rejected" by Morgan); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 650 F. Supp. 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("presumably overruled by Morgan"); Morris v. Gilbert,
649 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("repudiated in its home circuit by Morgan"). In Inryco,
Judge Shadur faced under RICO a construction contract that involved a kickback scheme, "imple-
mented through a number of payments." In all, five kickbacks were made from December 1979
through October 1980. 615 F. Supp. at 830. "Each of... [the] payments ... took the form of a...
check, [which was] made out to ... [the perpetrator under an alias], and deposited in [his account]
.... Id. Judge Shadur recognized that precedent in the Seventh Circuit held that "acts taken in
furtherance of a single criminal end... [may] satisfy the 'pattern' requirement [and that] the conten-
tion [had been rejected] that constituent acts do not form a pattern unless they are performed in the
course of separate criminal events." Id. at 831 (citing United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 826 (1981) and United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02
(7th Cir. 1978)). Nevertheless,Judge Shadur felt that "Sedima ... dearly create[d] a whole new ball
game." Id. at 833. As such, he felt "no longer obligated to follow contrary court of appeals opin-
ions." Id. So freed of legal constraints-and without the benefit of adversary briefing on the point-
he reasoned:
True enough, 'pattern' connotes similarity, hence the cases' proper emphasis on related-
ness of the constituent acts. But 'pattern' also connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the
continuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts
to carry out the same criminal activity.
Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
Judge Shadur's analysis in Inryco cannot be accepted without substantial qualification. To the
degree that he focuses on jurisdictional predicates (mailings, wire communications, or interstate
travels) in connection with a single criminal act (an extortion, a bribery, a fraud, etc.), he correctly
focuses "pattern" on "continuity of crime." See Elliott, 809 F.2d at 350. But he misapplied his focus
to the complaint before him, which allegedfive kickbacks over a thirteen month period. Wholly apart
from RICO-and independent of the peculiarities of federal jurisdiction-such conduct may be
properly treated as five separate offenses. The issue turns on the factual characterization of the kick-
backs as separate payments or installments of a single payment. Compare Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31 (one
bribe, although three payments); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1987)
(fraud accomplished at one time, but fruits of the fraud realized over period: no pattern) with United
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59-60 (3d Cir. 1971) (single extortion scheme, but separate extor-
tions), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1962)
(same); and United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 1980) (single extortion scheme,
but separate extortions for RICO pattern), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). For another ofJudge
Shadur's efforts-fortunately unsuccessful-to rewrite RICO, see United States v. Yonan, 623 F.
Supp. 881, 883-86 (N.D. Il. 1985) ("associated" with § 1962(c) must exist independent of"racke-
teering"), ff'd in part and rev'd in part, 800 F.2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 930
(1987). Inryco, at least in its reasoning if not on its facts, has been widely and correctly followed. See,
e.g., Emmanouilides v. Buckthorn, Ltd.,. 642 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (seven vessels
sold simultaneously not pattern); In re Evening News Ass'n Tender Offer Litig., 642 F. Supp. 860,
861 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (one tender offer to one entity not pattern); Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F.
Supp. 570, 577-79 (D. Utah 1986) (single bank loan to one customer not pattern); Allright Mo., Inc.
v. Billeter, 631 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (single transfer of real estate to one limited
partnership not pattern); Wright v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co., 637 F. Supp. 155, 158 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (single denial of fire insurance claim to one policyholder not pattern); Ichiyasu v. Christie,
Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. I1l. 1986) (single theft of three artworks not
pattern). Other decisions that purport to follow Inryco are more problematic on the pattern issue.
See, e.g., Anisfeld v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (offering
of limited partnerships to 16 partners not a pattern); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 632 F. Supp.
1164, 1172 (D. Kan. 1986) (publication of two separate articles not pattern); Frankart Distribs., Inc.
v. RMR Advertising, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1198, 1199-1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (multiple false billings for
advertisements over seven month period not pattern); Small v. Goldman, 637 F. Supp. 1030, 1040
(D.NJ. 1986) (fraudulent leases not pattern). Superior Oil, too, has been followed with mixed results.
Compare Rich Maid Kitchens v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 312 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (disputes as to fire coverage of single policy not pattern) and Wolin v. Hanley Dawson
Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (single purchase of car not pattern) ("This is
the kind of RICO complaint that lends fuel to the fire of those who would seek legislative emascula-
tion of the statute. It trivializes a cause of action that Congress created for a legitimate social pur-
pose.") with Eastern Corp. Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532,
1535 (D. Mass. 1986) (audit report sent to multiple investors not pattern); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F.
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B. The Use of Civil RICO in Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim3 8
Section 196239 makes it unlawful for a "person" 40 employed or asso-
ciated with an enterprise, which is engaged in or affects interstate or for-
eign commerce, to operate the "enterprise" 41 through a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 42 Section 1961(1) defines racketeering to include
Supp. 1405, 1409 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (credit extended fraudulently five times over seven years not
pattern); Madden v. Gluck, 636 F. Supp. 463, 465 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (class action of multiple parties
defrauded by scheme over 18 months not pattern) and Frankart Distribs., Inc. v. RMR Advertising,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1198, 1199 (multiple false billings for advertisement over seven months not
pattern).
Finally, the jurisprudence of the district courts reflecting a narrow, if not debilitating view of
"pattern" is unfortunately beginning to undermine state RICO legislation. See, e.g., Behunin v. Dow
Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Colo. 1986) (Colorado RICO "pattern" coincides with a
federal two scheme analysis of "pattern") (citing Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp.,
645 F. Supp. 808, 815 (D. Colo. 1986)). This development, too, is taking place despite different
state statutory language and policy considerations. See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz.
589, 667 P.2d 1304 (1983) (different interpretation adopted, since federalism not implicated).
Behunin, for example, can hardly be squared with general federal or Colorado jurisprudence. En-
acted in July, 1981, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to 109 (Supp. 1984) was, of course, "modeled
after" federal RICO. See Benson v. People, 703 P.2d 1274, 1276 n.1 (Colo. 1985). In fact, however,
it was more closely modeled on FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.01-05 (West Supp. 1983), which was enacted
in 1977. See Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1981) (discussion of Florida definition of
"enterprise," which is similar to the Colorado definition but which is different from
the federal definition and which clarifies issues litigated under federal RICO). As such, it is pre-
sumed that similar language is to be read similarly. People v. Wahl, 716 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1986).
But different language is to be read differently. People v. Wheatridge Poker Club, 194 Colo. 15, 18,
569 P.2d 324, 327 (1977). Decisions under the adopted statute prior to the date of its adoption are
also presumed to reflect legislative intent. Hoden v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 454, 412 P.2d
428, 431 (1966). See also Metropolitan R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 572 (1887) (presumed). Sec-
tion 18-17-103(3), unlike § 1961(5), however, says "means," not "requires." Compare Sedima, 473
U.S. at 496 n.14 with Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216, 533 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1975) (citing
Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121 (1934)). Unlike Congress, the Colorado legislature, there-
fore, did not leave the definition of "pattern" up to the judiciary to work out using the legislative
history of the statute as a guide. Prior toJuly 1981, too, the federal decisions had uniformly rejected
the two scheme limitation on "pattern." See, e.g., United States v. Calabrise, 645 F.2d 1379, 1389
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981); Starnes, 644 F.2d at 677-78; Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d at
602; United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
As such, it was the pre-July 1981, not the post-1985, federal law, that Behunin should have looked to.
Subsequent changes do not control. See Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Longwedel, 88 Colo. 233, 234,
295 P.2d 791, 792 (1930). See also Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U.S. 293, 312 (1882) (persuasive
only). Indeed, it is hard to see how Colorado law could be identical to post-1985 federal law when
that federal law is in conflict. Compare Garbade, 645 F. Supp. at 815 with Roeder 814 F.2d at 31;
lanniello, 808 F.2d at 192; International Data Bank, 812 F.2d at 155; and Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. The
texts of the state statutes are collected and analyzed on five major points of distinction in RICO REvrs-
rrED, supra, at 173-86 (1987).
38 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
39 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982), in relevant part, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
40 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982): "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property. See generally Basic Concepts, supra note 1, at 1022-23.
41 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982): "Enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity. See generally Basic Concepts, supra note 1, at 1023-29.
42 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982): "Pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity.
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a variety of criminal activities, including the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes.43 Section 1964 authorizes private parties to bring suit against
RICO violators. 44
In Wollersheim,45 the Church's complaint alleged that the disputed
scriptural materials were trade secrets, which the New Church had misap-
propriated through a pattern of racketeering activity. Among the racke-
teering activities that the Church alleged were the theft of the scriptural
materials and numerous acts of mail and wire fraud. In addition, the
Church's complaint charged that the relationship between the New
Church, Wollersheim and Wollersheim's counsel constituted a conspir-
acy within RICO. The Church's complaint also included a claim for
money damages. Based on these allegations, 46 the court of appeals
found that the Church satisfied the federal jurisdictional requirements
for a civil RICO action.47
43 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1982):
"Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year;, (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224
(relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472 and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section
659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is
felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections
891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the trans-
mission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relat-
ing to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction ofjustice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering parapherna-
lia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor ve-
hicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cig-
arettes), section 2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the
sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
See generally Civil Action, supra note 1, at 300-06 ("(1) violence; (2) provision of illegal goods and
services; (3) corruption in the labor movement or among public officials and (4) commercial and
other forms of fraud").
44 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). See infra note 63.
45 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
46 Concerning the theft, the court noted, but did not rule on, whether the fact that the theft did
not occur in the United States meant that it was beyond the reach of RICO. Instead, the court
found, despite the apparent presence of a "single scheme," that sufficient acts of mail and wire fraud
were alleged to satisfy the "pattern" requirement. Id. at 1080 n.5. Because the Church, at the hear-
ing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, stated that it had not suffered financial injury, but
had suffered injury to its adherents, the court of appeals also indicated that should the Church pro-
ceed with its damage action in the district court, civil RICO might not afford the Church the type of
nonfinancial relief it sought. Id. at 1080-81 n.6.
47 Id. at 1080.
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III. The Opinion in Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim
The court in Wollersheim began by pointing out, "[n]o appellate court
has expressly determined whether civil RICO permits a private party to
secure injunctive relief."48 It then surveyed the circuit courts of appeal
and found that the Fourth49 and Second 50 Circuits had indicated that
injunctive relief might not be available to private parties, while the
Eighth51 Circuit had indicated that such relief might be available. The
court also noted that the Sixth Circuit had upheld the granting of injunc-
48 Id. at 1081 (emphasis in original).
49 In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit considered
the issue of equity-type relief in the context of a denial of injunctive relief in a corporate takeover
battle. The court expressed "substantial doubt" on whether RICO included injunctive relief for
private parties, although it did not "undertake to resolve the question." Id. The court's doubt,
however, was not based on an examination of the text of the statute, its liberal construction clause,
or its legislative history; rather, the court's uncertainty stemmed from the Supreme Court's restric-
tive view on implying claims for relief, first enunciated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Dan River,
701 F.2d at 290. Uncharacteristically, the court did not realize the significance of Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982)-holding that the law in existence at the
time of enactment of the legislation is controlling-when it considered whether a remedy should be
held to be implicit in the statute. See infra text accompanying note 142. See also Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) and Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (two
subsequent cases in accord with Curran but handed down after the Fourth Circuit reached its deci-
sion). No court need be unduly troubled, therefore, by the Fourth Circuit's concern in Dan River. In
fact, the court's holding in Dan River, based on the assumption that RICO did afford equitable relief,
was that the injunction would not issue for a different reason; the court found that it was not likely
Dan River would succeed on the merits, since Carl Icahn had proceeded with advice of counsel, and,
as such, it would have been difficult to demonstrate that his takeover attempt, under either a theory
of mail or securities fraud, was animated by the sort of criminal state of mind required by RICO. Dan
River, 701 F.2d at 290-91.
50 Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We have.., doubts as to the
propriety of private party injunctive relief. ."); Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489
n.20 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985) ("It thus seems altogether likely that
§ 1964 (c) as it now stands was not intended to provide private parties injunctive relief."). The
Second Circuit in Trane expressed its "doubts" about the availability of private party injunctive re-
lief, but did not reach the question, since it felt that the likelihood of irreparable harm had to be
shown, and it had not. 718 F.2d at 28. The court in Trane uncritically relied upon Ashland Oil, Inc.
v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), which showed no awareness of the general rule that
such harm need not be shown where suit is upon a federal statute. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981);Johnson, Predator Rights: Multiple Reme-
dies For Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Law and RICO, 10J. CORP. L. 3 (1984). For a critique of
Ashland, see Civil Action, supra note 1, at 340 n.217. The Trane court distinguished United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1974), off-handedly, as a government case. Trane, there-
fore, cannot be considered persuasive authority. The Second Circuit's decision in Sedima, in turn,
adopted the fatally flawed reasoning of Judge Shadur's opinion in Kaushal v. State Bank of India,
556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Sedima, 741 F.2d at 490 (Kaushal "endorse[d]"). See infra
note 54. Moreover, as the Wollersheim court, in reviewing Sedima, aptly noted "the precedential value
of [its] conclusion, itself somewhat equivocal, is thrown into considerable doubt by the Supreme
Court's total rejection of the conclusions drawn by the Second Circuit from its historical analysis of
the RICO statute." Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1081.
51 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) ("We note for the information of the
parties and the district court such scholarship as we have discovered, without at this time endorsing
or rejecting the opinions there expressed.") (citing Basic Concepts, supra note 1, at 1038 nn.132-33, as
indicating that equitable relief is available to private plaintiffs under RICO), afd on rehearing, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983). Apparently unnoticed by the Wollersheim court were bothJudge McMillan's statement in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Eighth Circuit's en banc rehearing of Bennett v. Berg that
he "would... reach the question whether equitable relief is available to private parties under RICO
... and answer.., affirmatively," and his lengthy citation of Civil Action, supra note 1, at 331-32, as
support for his finding. See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (1983) (McMillian, J. concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (dissent on enterprise-person issue).
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tive relief to a private plaintiff on pendant state claims, where RICO pro-
vided federal jurisdiction. 52
Following this survey of the circuit courts of appeal, the court turned
to the district courts, where it found that a "similar disunity of views ex-
ists . . . [on] the issue."53 Three district courts, all from the Northern
District of Illinois, had held that injunctive relief was not available to a
private civil RICO plaintiff.54 Two district courts had held that injunctive
relief was available to a private civil RICO plaintiff,55 while three courts
had assumed the availability of such relief.56 In addition, a number of
other courts had raised, but avoided deciding the issue. 57
Finding the slate largely clean of controlling precedent in either the
circuit or district courts, the Wollersheim court proceeded to "conclude
that Congress did not intend to give private civil RICO plaintiffs any
right to-injunctive relief." s58 The court rested it decision on four bases:
(1) the language of section 1964;59 (2) the legislative history of the stat-
ute;60 (3) the fact that civil RICO's private cause of action was modeled
52 USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1982).
53 796 F.2d at 1081.
54 Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984); DeMent v. Abbott Capi-
tal Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp.
576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983). But see Johnson, supra note 50 (detailed treatment and rejection of
Kaushal). Much of the basic reasoning forJudge Shadur's Kaushal opinion was later adopted by the
court in Wollersheim. It is best treated, therefore, by critiquing it in the context of a full examination
of Wollersheim.
Two additional points, however, deserve comment. Judge Shadur suggested in Kaushal that the
analysis of one of our number, Professor Blakey, in Basic Concepts, supra note 1, was "bizarre and
wholly unconvincing." 556 F. Supp. at 582. ProfessorJohnson in her careful analysis of RICO and
her point by point rejection of the reasoning of Kaushal concluded that Judge Shadur's "poignant
criticism... [of Basic Concepts was] totally unwarranted." Johnson, supra note 50, at 72. See Stewart
Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 577 (1935) (Cardozo,J.) ("The derogatory epithet assumes
the point to be decided."). She then went on to demonstrate "several flaws in [Judge Shadur's]
reasoning." Johnson, supra note 50, at 72. It is unfortunate that the court in Wollersheim did not
discover ProfessorJohnson's able piece, for its carefully reasoned analysis ought to be consulted by
anyone trying to work through the difficult issues posed by Kaushal or Wollersheim.
In addition,Judge Shadur excoriated the "scholarship" of one of our number, Professor Blakey,
as "entirely misleading" for citing MIL.S, RICO and Injunctions, in III MATERIALS ON RICO 1332
(1980-81). Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582 n.17. Shadur's point was that the Mills piece did not analyze
whether or not, but assumed that, RICO contained private equitable relief. The original draft of
Judge Shadur's opinion stopped there. When it was brought to his attention that the cite in Basic
Concepts to the Mills piece was solely to illustrate how private equity relief might be used, and that, in
fact, Basic Concepts cited different authority for a detailed discussion of whether or not such relief was
available to private parties,Judge Shadur declined to modify his original criticism, and merely noted,
without comparable analysis of the scope of other work, brief recognition of its existence. See Basic
Concepts, supra note 1, at 1047 n.197 (citing BAILEY, Private Action for Injunctive Relief, in II MATERIALS
ON RICO, 407-27 (1980)). As such, Judge Shadur's Kaushal opinion is itself misleading.
55 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd
on other grounds, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F.
Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
56 USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807,814-16 (W.D. Ky.), affidon other
grounds, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D.
Tex. 1981).
57 McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1518-19 (D.NJ. 1985); Kaufman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
58 796 F.2d at 1088.
59 Id. at 1082-84.
60 Id. at 1084-86.
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on analogous provisions of the antitrust laws;6 1 and (4) Supreme Court
doctrine that narrowly circumscribes recognition of claims for relief or
particular remedies not expressly set out in a statute.62
A. The Language of Section 1964
The court in Wollersheim began by summarizing its reading of each of
the parts of section 1964.63 It saw subsection (a) as a "broad grant of
equitable jurisdiction to federal courts," 64 subsection (b) as "per-
mit[ting] the government to bring action for equitable relief,"65 subsection
(d) as "grant[ing] collateral estoppel effect to a criminal conviction in a
subsequent civil action by the government" 66 and subsection (c) as
"stat[ing] that a private plaintiff may recover treble damages, costs and
attorney fees." 67 It added, "[i]n contrast to part (b), there is no express
authority to private plaintiffs to seek the equitable relief available under
part (a)." 68 The court then found that this "inclusion of a single statu-
tory reference to private plaintiffs, and the identification of a damages
and fees remedy for such plaintiff in part (c), logically carries the negative
implication that no other remedy was intended to be conferred on private
plaintiffs." 69
The court's conclusion concerning the language of section 1964 is
untenable for four reasons. First, it ignores the import of the plain lan-
guage of subsection (c). 70 The plain language of subsection (c) reads
61 Id. at 1086-87.
62 Id. at 1087-88.
63 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982) states:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restriction on the future activities or investments of any
person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same
type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any action
brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as practica-
ble to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination thereof, the
court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other
actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem
proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of the chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the United States.
64 796 F.2d at 1082.
65 Id. (emphasis in original).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis in original).
69 Id. at 1083 (emphasis in original).
70 The court in Wollersheim rejected the "sue... and" argument without analysis by referring to
its treatment by the Second Circuit in Sedima, 741 F.2d at 489 n.20 ("rather remarkable argument"),
Judge Shadur's opinion in Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582 on which Sedima relied ("bizarre and wholly
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that a person injured "may sue ... and shall recover." The language
does not read "may sue.., to recover." Because the usual "assumption
[is] that ... legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words,"' 7 ' and the word "and" means "in addition to" or "along
with", 72 the "and" proceeding "shall recover" indicates that the lan-
guage following it is not to be read restrictively, as it would if "to" pro-
ceeded "may sue." Accordingly, all necessary and appropriate relief
ought to be held to be included in subsection (c). Recovery of treble
damages, costs and attorney fees that follow the "and" are explicitly ad-
ded to the right to sue for all usual forms of relief. Indeed, nothing in
subsection (c) says that they are the only relief that a person may recover.
"The contrary argument would have to suggest that by adding the right
to secure treble damage relief to the general right to sue, Congress
somehow manifested an intention to subtract the right to obtain other
forms of relief."' 73 Hence, basic principles of statutory construction 74 in-
unconvincing as a matter of plain English and the normal use of the language"), and by reference to
the use of the word "and" in § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Neither Sedima nor
Kaushal, however, meaningfully addresses nor explains the significance of the use of the word "and"
other than by a question-begging characterization. Professor Johnson aptly observes:
mhe Kaushal opinion does not satisfactorily counter the argument of the commentators
that the use by section 1964(c) of the conjunctive language "sue and" rather than "sue to"
evidences congressional intent to grant to private parties rights to seek equitable relief in
addition to treble damages. Webster's dictionary defines the word "and" as follows: "along
with or together with"; and "added to or linked to"; "in addition to." Therefore, constru-
ing this term to mean "in addition to" is not suggesting a forced interpretation of the term
as claimed by Judge Shadur.
Johnson, supra note 50, at 72. As to the error of the court's analogy to the Clayton Act, see infra
notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
71 Russello, 464 U.S. at 21 (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962)).
72 I THE OxFORD ENGLISH DicTIoNARY 316 (1961).
73 Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d at 1365-66 (McMillan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Civil Action, supra note 1, at 331-32).
74 Four basic assumptions are integral to any principled effort to interpret a statute:
1. legislative supremacy within the constitutional framework (U.S. Const. art. I, § 1);
2. the use of the statutory vehicle to exercise that supremacy;
3. reliance on accepted means of communication; and
4. reasonable availability of the statutory vehicle to those to be governed by it, not only its
text, but any other part of its legislative context that serves to give it meaning.
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTEs 7-12 (1975). With respect to the
third assumption, Professor Dickerson notes that "so long as the legislature uses language according
to accepted standards, it is justified in assuming that the courts should read it according to the same
standards. The legislature cannot adequately discharge its responsibility of shaping the future un-
less the integrity of the accepted communication process is maintained." Id.
The Supreme Court, in its decisions in Turkette, Russello, and Sedima, recognized and applied
fifteen basic propositions of statutory construction for construing RICO: (1) read the language of the
statute (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 593; Russello, 464 U.S. at 20 (citing Turkette); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495
n.13); (2) language includes its structure (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 582, 587; Russello, 464 U.S. at 22-23;
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490 n.8, 496 n.14); (3) language should be read in its ordinary or plain meaning,
but it must be viewed in context (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 583 n.5, 587; Russello, 464 U.S. at 20, 21
(citing Turkette), 21-23, 25; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 n.13); (4) language should not be read differently
in criminal and civil proceedings (Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489, 492); (5) look to the legislative history of
the statute (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586, 589; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486, 489); (6) look to the policy of the
statute (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590; Russello, 464 U.S. at 24; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493); (7) the statute was
aimed at the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591; Russello,
464 U.S. at 26, 28 (citing Turkette)); (8) the statute was not limited to the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590-91; Russello, 464 U.S. at 28; Sedima, 473 U.S. at
495, 499); (9) the statute is to be broadly read and liberally construed (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588, 593;
Russello, 464 U.S. at 21; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10, 497-98); (10) the rule of lenity in statutory
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dicate that subsection (c) should be read expressly to include all forms of
equitable and other relief.75
Second, the court's analysis misconstrues the language of section
1964. Subsection (a) confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 by appropriate orders. It is not
limited on its face or in its legislative history to a particular kind of claim
for relief-governmental or private. 76 Subsection (b) expressly autho-
rizes the Attorney General to institute proceedings "under this section."
It does not say that only the Attorney General may institute proceedings.
Indeed, absent subsection (b), it could have been argued that the Attor-
ney General could not have instituted proceedings seeking equitable re-
lief because of the traditional rule, originating in early English
jurisprudence, 77 that equity actions were only authorized where property
rights were at stake, and the government was not thought to have such a
right, absent unusual circumstances. 78 Subsection (b) was drafted, there-
fore, to assure that the government could institute proceedings free of
the traditional limitations of equity jurisprudence and not as a means of
denying private parties their usual equitable remedies. If the availability
of equitable relief were to be determined solely by subsection (b), sub-
section (a) would, of course, be superfluous. Accordingly, because sec-
tion 1964 was intended to provide broad remedies, does not distinguish
between governmental or private claimants, and is not limited by the ex-
press powers granted the Attorney General by subsection (b), subsection
construction does not apply when the statute is unambiguous (Turette, 452 U.S. at 588; Russello, 464
U.S. at 29 (citing Turkette); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10); (11) the principle of strict construction of
criminal statutes does not override the clear purpose of a statute (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587-88;
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10); (12) the rule ofd'usdm generis does not apply when the meaning of the
statute is clear (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581); (13) where Congress rejects proposed limiting language in
a bill, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended (Russello, 464 U.S. at 23-24; Sedima,
473 U.S. at 498); (14) where Congress includes or omits limiting language in a bill, it is presumed
that it did so intentionally (Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; Russello, 464 U.S. at 23); and (15) the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one (Russello, 464
U.S. at 26). Compare Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes,J.)
(rules of statutory construction are but "axioms of experience").
Nevertheless, more than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is easy, by very
ingenious and astute construction, to evade the force of almost any statute, where a court is so
disposed.... [By such] a construction [it is possible to] annul [the statute] and [render] it superflu-
ous and useless." Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 476 (1851) (Grier, J.). Such an ap-
proach to statutory construction, however, carries with it a heavy price. After a lifetime of study of
the law, Dean Roscoe Pound concluded that such "ingenious and astute" constructions (1)
"tend[ed] to bring law into disrespect; (2) ... subject[ed] the courts to political pressure; [and] (3)
... invite[d] an arbitrary personal element in judicial administration." III R. POUND,JURISPRUDENCE
488 (1959). It threatened, he found, to make "laws... worth little" and to "break down" the "legal
order" itself. Id. at 490. Its effect was seen at the polls in the last election. NAT'L .J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 3, col. 1 (voters in three states reject chiefjustices); N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at 8, col. 1
(former ChiefJustice Byrd: "What is going on is a very real politicization of the judiciary.").
75 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 50, at 76; Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age, 35 RUTGERS L. REV.
285, 323 (1983); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
455, 715 (1982); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 945, 953 (1984).
76 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1970) ("Although certain remedies are
set out, the list is not meant to be exhaustive, and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish
the aim set out of removing the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of inno-
cent persons.").
77 Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818) (equity will not enjoin a crime).
78 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582-84 (1895).
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(a), through subsection (c), ought to be held to be a grant ofjurisdiction
to allow complete equitable relief to a private party.
Third, the court's conclusion that in the absence of explicit statutory
language to the contrary, private claimants under civil RICO may only
seek money damages is inconsistent with the long-standing and well-set-
fled Supreme Court doctrine that a congressional grant of the right to
sue conveys by itself the availability of all necessary and appropriate re-
lief. As the Supreme Court noted in Bell v. Hood,79 "it is [a] well settled
[rule] that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue... federal courts may use any avail-
able remedy to make good the wrong done."8 0 Thus, the court's crab-
bed construction of the language of section 1964 cannot be squared with
basic teaching of the Supreme Court.
Fourth, the court began its analysis of Section 1964 with the wrong
question. Justice Frankfurter put it well in Estate of Roberts v. Commis-
sioner,8 l "[i]n law ... the right answer usually depends on putting the
right question."'8 2 The issue is not did Congress clearlyprovide for equity
relief? Instead, the issue is did Congress dearly exclude it? The remedy,
in short, is present unless it is clearly withheld because the rule is equally
long-standing and well-settled that "[a]bsent the clearest command to
the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power
to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction."8 3 The
heavy burden lies on anyone who would restrict the availability of the
power of a court to do justice to show that Congress has withheld it, for it
is assumed that "Congress would not, without dearly expressing such a
purpose, deprive... [a court] of its customary power .... [D]enial of
such power is not to be inferred . . . [from silence]. Where Congress
wish[es] to deprive the courts of... historic power, it [knows] how to use
apt words."'8 4 Thus, the presumption, which causes close cases to be re-
solved in favor of the power, not against it, is that the power is present,
not absent. Unfortunately, the court in Wollersheim turned the usual pre-
sumption upside down. Seemingly, it felt that the power should not be
79 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
80 Id. at 684. The teaching of Bell, for example, was explicitly recognized by the Second Circuit
in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984) as controlling on
the availability of injunctive relief under RICO ("Once the Supreme Court handed down Bell v.
Hood ... a specific statutory provision [under RICO] authorizing preliminary injunctive relief to
maintain the status quo was no longer necessary ... .
81 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943).
82 Id. at 413.
83 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979) (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395, 398 (1946) which observed that "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent
equitable powers [of the court] are ... available").
84 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942). See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary
and appropriate remedies");Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968) ("The fact that...
[the statute] is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement does
not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an effective equitable remedy."); Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. at 398 (1946) ("Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary
and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdic-
tion is to be recognized and applied."); Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood ofR. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 570 (1930) ("The right is created and the remedy exists.") (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803)).
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found unless it was clearly set out, and since the issue was in doubt, it
had to be resolved against finding that the power existed. As such, by
going in with the wrong question, the court came out with the wrong
answer.
85
B. The Legislative History of RICO
The court in Wollersheim buttressed its position on the language of
the statute by finding that RICO's "legislative history mandate[d] ' '86 its
construction of the statute. It is doubtful, however, that the court should
have even turned to the legislative history, since it is also a well-accepted
tenet of statutory construction that when the statutory language is not
ambiguous, it must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. 87 Where there
is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction, and no reason to re-
sort to legislative history.88 Thus, the Wollersheim court's concession that
subsection (a) on its face provided a "plausible reading,"8 9 which sup-
ported granting injunctive relief, was really a concession that its analysis
could have and should have stopped without a further consideration of
legislative history.
Assuming that the court recognized that it was only a "plausible
reading"90 of subsection (a), which indicated that equitable relief might
be granted private plaintiffs, it still should not have turned to the legisla-
tive history of RICO, since RICO's express language required the "lib-
eral" construction of the statute "to effectuate its remedial purposes." 91
In sum, RICO contains in its text a liberal construction clause, which
provides the controlling rule of statutory construction to ascertain
RICO's legislative intent. If RICO's language is ambiguous, the con-
struction that would "effectuate its remedial purposes" 92 "by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies" 93 ought to be adopted. A liberal
85 A reference to justice Frankfurter is again appropriate. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It is true also ofjourneys in the law that the place you
reach depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out on a case depends on
where one goes in.").
86 796 F.2d at 1084.
87 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (citing Consumer Prods. Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
88 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980); United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
89 796 F.2d at 1084.
90 Id. judge Shadur went further; he expressly conceded that the statute might be viewed as
"ambiguous." Kaushal, 556 F.2d at 583. Unfortunately, like the Wollersheim court, he then largely
ignored the liberal construction clause in resolving that ambiguity.
91 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 923,947 (1970).
The court in Wollersheim, of course, recognized the importance of the liberal construction clause,
when it observed that "as the Supreme Court has emphasized, Congress expressly admonished that
RICO 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes' and that '(t)he statute's remedial
purposes are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured by
racketeering activity ....... "Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1083 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497). Never-
theless, it largely excluded the liberal construction clause of RICO from its analysis of whether equi-
table remedies are available to private parties under civil RICO. Indeed, rather than treating it as a
congressional directive, which it is, the court referred to the liberal construction clause as only a
"spirit." Id. On the proper use of the liberal construction directive, see Civil Action, supra note 1, at
288 n.150.
92 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 923, 947 (1970).
93 Id.
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construction of section 1964 would, of course, grant, not deny, equitable
relief to effectuate RICO's remedial purposes. Accordingly, if section
1964 is ambiguous, the ambiguity should have been resolved by the lib-
eral construction clause in favor of, not against, granting private parties
equitable relief.94 Legislative history should not, therefore, have been
consulted.
As the Wollersheim opinion illustrates, often going into legislative his-
tory is a trip that does not bring a statute's meaning into focus, but a trip
that surrounds it with "a fog in which little can be seen if found." 95 In-
deed, RICO's legislative history is more ambiguous than the statute. The
Wollersheim court conceded as much when it stated that RICO's "legisla-
tive history offers some support for [the Church's] thesis."'96 As such,
because "absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent, a statute
should be interpreted according to its plain language," 97 the legislative
history of RICO hardly provided the court with a sound basis for an in-
terpretation of the relief available under the statute, and it should not
have been used to set aside a "plausible" construction of its language.
When the court in Wollersheim proceeded to examine RICO's legisla-
tive history, it concluded that its "clear message"98 was that Congress did
not intend to include injunctive relief in civil RICO. The court based its
conclusion on "two separate episodes" 99 from RICO's legislative history.
The first episode was a House floor interchange between Congressman
Richard H. Poff, the floor manager of RICO, and Congressman Sam Stei-
ger, in which Poff requested Steiger to withdraw a comprehensive
amendment, which, in turn, included a separate section authorizing pri-
vate equity relief in civil RICO. Poff also referred to Steiger's amend-
ment as offering "an additional civil remedy."' 100 The court found that
this exchange indicated that Congress intended not to include injunctive
relief in civil RICO. 1° 1
As with the text of the statute, here, too, the court misread the
meaning of the floor exchange between Poff and Steiger. Congressman
Steiger's amendment was not limited to the inclusion of private equity
relief; it also included language dealing with amount in controversy, in-
tervention by the Attorney General, nonmutual estoppel, a statute of lim-
itations, and a separate provision for an actual damage claim for relief by
94 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 66 (liberal construction clause should "resolve any language
ambiguities in section 1964 in favor of providing equitable relief to the private plaintiff"); Note, supra
note 75, at 953 ("Given the Liberal Construction Clause, the question of [whether section 1964(a)
allows a private plaintiff to seek equitable remedies] ... is largely a matter of indifference. If the text
is plain, the remedy is there; if the text is ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
enhancing the remedial purpose of RICO.").
95 United States v. Public Utilities Comm. of California, 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
96 796 F.2d at 1085.
97 United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980) (emphasis added) (construction of Title
II of the Organized Crime Control Act).
98 796 F.2d at 1086.
99 Id. at 1085.
100 Id. at 1086 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970)).
101 Id. at 1085.
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the government. 0 2 As such, it is not surprising that Congressman Poff,
RICO's floor manager, asked that such a sweeping amendment be with-
drawn, so that it "might properly be considered by the Judiciary Commit-
tee . . ."103 Moreover, as Steiger noted at the time, "the bill as it now
stands... may have this option [of equitable relief]."' 10 4 In addition, the
amendment was not, as characterized by the Wollersheim court, "re-
jected."' 1 5 It was withdrawn by unanimous consent.10 6 As to Congress-
man Pof's cryptic reference that the Steiger amendment included an
"additional civil remedy,"' 07 it escapes understanding how the court
knew that Poff was unambiguously referring to the section of the Steiger
amendment dealing with private equity relief rather than the section ac-
cording the government an actual damage claim for relief. Further, the
technique of statutory interpretation by reliance on an isolated item of
legislative history to infer that Congress consciously decided a particular
issue had already been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. In Can-
non v. University of Chicago,'08 the Court was asked to decide whether a
provision of the civil rights statutes included an implied claim for re-
lief.10 9 In determining that Title IX did contain the implied claim for
relief, the Court found that an individual senator's statements in favor of
expressly incorporating a private claim for relief, which were not acted
upon, were "merely one senator's isolated expression of a prefer-
ence,""10 and the episode was not "indicative of a rejection of a private
right of action .... " I I As such, Cannon's treatment of comparable legis-
lative history ought to have been dispositive on the question of how to
treat the Poff-Steiger interchange. Accordingly, neither the House floor
exchange between Congressmen Poff and Steiger nor Pof's statement
concerning additional civil remedies provide a "clear message" 1 2 as to
Congress' intent concerning injunctive relief under civil RICO.' 1 3
The second episode was the subsequent Congressional effort to clar-
ify the issues raised by Steiger Amendment. More specifically, the court
pointed to testimony given in 1972 before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
102 See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1085 n.9 (listing pertinent provisions of the Steiger amendment).
103 796 F.2d at 1086 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. at 35,346 (1970)). In fact, the bill was being
processed under an informal agreement among Judiciary Committee members to oppose all floor
amendments; withdrawal, rather than defeat, was desirable to avoid creating an unfavorable legisla-
tive history. Ironically, that legislative history was created anyway.
104 116 CONG. REC. 35,347 (1970).
105 796 F.2d at 1085.
106 116 CONG. REC. 35,347 (1970).
107 Id.
108 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
109 Id. at 688-89.
110 Id. at 716.
111 Id. at 715.
112 796 F.2d at 1086.
113 Professor Johnson aptly observes:
[P]roponents of both sides of the private equitable relief issue cite the offer and subsequent
withdrawal of this amendment in support of their position. A more objective analysis of this
exchange however is that it is ambiguous and is certainly not determinative of Congres-
sional intent.
Johnson, supra note 50, at 67 n.360. See also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,
No. 86-497, slip op. at 11-12 (Sup. Ct.Jun. 22, 1987) (legislative history of statute of limitations does
not indicate rejection of uniform period).
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tee on Senate Bill 16,114 which expressly provided, among other things,
for private injunctive relief under civil RICO, and to remarks made by
Senators John L. McClellan and Roman L. Hruska in floor discussions
concerning Senate Bill 16.115 Here, too, basic principles of statutory
construction were ignored. It is "well settled that 'the views of a subse-
quent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an ear-
lier one.' "116 Moreover, the failure of "[t]hese subsequent efforts ...
could [just as easily] reflect an interpretation by members of Congress
that RICO already incorporated [equity relief]." 117 In short, they, too,
are more ambiguous than the text of the statute. Accordingly, because
subsequent efforts of Congress to amend civil RICO were less than une-
quivocal in their meaning, they hardly constituted a "dear message"" 8
of Congress' intent concerning private injunctive relief under civil RICO.
As such, they did not form a basis for the rejection of a "plausible read-
ing" 119 of the text of the statute.
Indeed, the clearest meaning that can be mined from RICO's legisla-
tive history is that Congress, in fact, intended section 1964(c) to be a
basis for private plaintiffs to seek equitable remedies. The possibility was
noted, but ignored, by Wollersheim when it quoted statements that sup-
port the concept of private equity relief made by RICO's principal House
and Senate sponsors, "statements . . . [which were] entitled to
weight."' 20 In describing the bill during House debate, Poff stated,
"Courts are given broad powers under the title to proceed civilly, using
essentially their equitable powers, to reform corrupted organizations
.... In addition .... private persons injured by reason of a violation of the
title may recover treble damages ... ,"121 Similarly, in the Senate, while
describing the value of civil RICO, RICO's principal sponsor, Senator
McClellan, stated, "since enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890, the courts have used several equitable remedies .... I believe, and
numerous others have expressed a similar belief, that these equitable de-
vices can prove effective in cleaning up organizations corrupted by the
114 796 F.2d at 1086 (citing S. 16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)). The court relied on testimony of
the Department ofJustice in 1972 that "only the United States can institute injunctive proceedings."
796 F.2d at 1086 (citing Victims of Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1972) [hereinafter Victims]). As such, the
court ignored the basic principle that legislative history materials, including testimony before com-
mittees, "received without comment [or] cross examination" are of limited value in reading a statute.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977). Unfortunately, too, the court ignored contrary
testimony by the American Bar Association, which indicated that RICO was a "codification" of basic
antitrust law, which could only mean that equity relief was included in the statute, since it was at that
time available under antitrust law. Victims, supra, at 490. See also infra note 129.
115 796 F.2d at 1086 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 29,370 (1972)).
116 Russello, 464 U.S. at 26 (quoting Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n. v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 460 U.S. 150, 165 n.27 (1983)). See also United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)
("[s]tatutes are construed by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of
passage... [subsequent efforts at amendment are of] no persuasive significance .....
117 Wexler, supra note 75, at 315 n.141 (emphasis added).
118 796 F.2d at 1086. See also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., No 86-497,
slip op. at 11-12 (Sup. Ct.Jun. 22, 1987) (similar legislative history on statute of limitations does not
indicate rejection of uniform period).
119 Id. at 1084.
120 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980).
121 116 CONG. Rac. 35,295 (1970) (emphasis added).
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forces of organized crime."1 22
In sum, the court in Wollersheim did not have to undertake an analysis
of civil RICO's legislative history, but, when it did, it drew the wrong
conclusions from it. First, when it discovered a "plausible reading"'123 of
section 1964(a), it would have been justified in adopting that reading of
the statute without considering the legislative history. Second, assuming
the court believed that the statute was ambiguous, it should have used
the statute's liberal construction clause and resolved any ambiguities in a
manner that would "effectuate its remedial purposes."1 24 Third, assum-
ing that neither the "plausible reading"' 25 of section 1964(a) nor the lib-
eral construction clause was thought to resolve the issue appropriately,
the ambiguity of the legislative history itself deprived it of value as a
source to resolve the supposed ambiguity on the face of the statute.
C. The Analogy Between Civil RICO and the Antitrust Laws
The court in Wollersheim also attempted to buttress its conclusion
that the "clear message"' 26 of civil RICO's legislative history was that
private parties were not to be afforded equitable remedies by reference
to the supposedly analogous provisions of the antitrust laws. 127 In brief,
the court argued that since the language of the antitrust treble damages
remedy was similar to language of civil RICO, and since it had been held
that private equitable relief could not be obtained under the antitrust
statutes, Congress did not intend to authorize equitable relief under civil
RICO. 28 Moreover, the court noted that civil RICO contains provisions
parallel to the antitrust statutes, which specifically grant a private right to
injunctive relief.'29
122 Id. at 592. When Senator McClellan made these remarks, the bill did not contain an epress
private claim for relief. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to refer to them, since it is likely that under
1970 jurisprudence, a private claim for relief would have been implied. See CivilAction, supra note 1, at
262 n.7 1. Senator McClellan added, too, that he did not intend to "[import] ... the great complex-
ity of antitrust law enforcement into [RICO]." See 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969). Nor did he "mean
to limit the remedies available to those which have already been established." Id. The "great com-
plexity" of the antitrust law enforcement to which Senator McClellan referred is, of course, the
standing limitations, which are imposed on private, not public suits, and which the American Bar
Association had suggested could be avoided by drafting RICO outside the antitrust statute. Id. at
6995. ("inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99. It is hard, therefore,
to read Senator McClellan's comments as referring to anything other than private suits. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-50.
123 796 F.2d at 1084.
124 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
125 796 F.2d at 1084.
126 Id. at 1086.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1086-87.
129 Id. at 1087. The existence of private equity relief under § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209,
210 (1890), first came before the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48
(1904), in the context of a petition for such relief by a state attorney general to vindicate public
injury; it was denied under a "safe and conservative" interpretation of the Act. 194 U.S. at 70-71.
Subsequently, the issue came before the Court in the context of a petition by a private party to
vindicate private injury; it, too, was denied, but this time by a sharply divided Court in Paine Lumber
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917) (4-1-4 decision). Paine, however, was dead law when it was
handed down, largely as a result of the legislative reform efforts of President Woodrow Wilson and
Justice Brandeis. See Clayton Act, § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (private injunction); A. MASON,
BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 399-404 (1946). Accordingly, neither decision stood the test of time.
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Here, too, the court's argument is fatally flawed. First, fundamental
See also Hart-Scott-Rodine Antitrust Improvements Act, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976) (parens
patriae actions by state attorneys general).
RICO, too, has been held not to authorizeparenspatriae suits. See Illinois v. Life of Mid-America
Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1986) (no RICO standing for Attorney General to sue on behalf of
consumers). The Seventh Circuit in Mid-America relied on Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251
(1972) (no damages under parens patriae antitrust for injury to state's general economy), which was
decided after RICO was enacted and in a context in which liberal construction was not statutorily
mandated. See also People by Abrams v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1987) (no RICO standing for
Attorney General to sue on behalf of individuals). But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 324
U.S. 439 (1945) (parens patriae antitrust for injunctive relief for injury to state's economy allowed
without statutory text; injury to state as proprietor treated as "makeweight"). Instead, the court
should have followed the general jurisprudence that upholds such suits without express authorization as
part of the "inherent... power of every state." -Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S.
592, 600 (1982) (state's discrimination suit on behalf of residents recognized without statutory text)
(citing Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)). See generally Snapp, 458 U.S. at 592;
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (state's suit on behalf of citizens as consumers of natural
gas recognized without statutory text); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state's
suit on behalf of citizens as consumers of natural gas recognized without statutory text); United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984 (2d Cir. 1984) (state's pollution suit on
behalf of citizens allowed without statutory text; environmental group denied intervention); People
by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1982) (state's housing discrimination suit on
behalf of mentally retarded upheld without statutory text); Puerto Rico v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212,
217 (2d Cir. 1981) (state's employment discrimination suit on behalf ofmigrant workers recognized
without statutory test); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (state's police
brutality suit on behalf of citizens upheld independent of statutory authorization); Maryland Dept. of
Human Resources v. United States Dept. of Agric., 617 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1985) (state's suit for
injunctive relief on behalf of food stamp recipients upheld without reference to statutory text);
Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (state's suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief on behalf of medicare recipients and citizens recognized without statutory text); Kelley v. Carr,
442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (attorney general's Commodity Exchange Act suit on behalf of
public upheld without express statutory authorization); Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (state's employment discrimination suit on behalf of citizens upheld without statu-
tory text); Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (same). Unless Congress
expressly prohibited such suits, the court should have recognized them. Here, too, the court set the
general rule on its head. See supra text accompanying note 81. Narrow antitrust precedent should
not have been used to circumscribe RICO. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 ("exactly the problems Con-
gress sought to avoid").
The historical parallels between the implementation of the antitrust statutes and the implemen-
tation of RICO are haunting. The Sherman Act was passed by the Senate by a vote of 52 to 1; it
passed the House by a voice vote. See Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209; J. LoURIE, LAW AND THE NATION
1865-1912 37 (1983). At first, the Act was largely frustrated in the courts. See infra note 181 (data
collected). In United States v. E. C. Knight, Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, narrowly read the Act's commerce element; it held that a sugar trust, which controlled 95% of
the refining business in the nation, was engaged in manufacturing, not commerce. President Grover
Cleveland himself told the Congress in 1896 in his last annual message: "[The Sherman Act had]
thus far.. proved ineffective.., because... [of how it was] interpreted by the courts .... " IX
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES: PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 745 (1900). JusticeJackson aptly summed up the
impact of Knight: "The effect of the decision was to nullify the Sherman Act during the period when
most of the great trusts were being formed, and to shelter them during their period of growth." R.
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY 58 (Vintage ed. 1941). To be sure, the Court in
United States v. Trans Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), signaled that it might read the statute
to mean what it said: all combinations in restraint of trade would be found illegal. The victory,
however, was relatively short-lived. An effort at legislative reform by the business community failed.
See S. REP. No. 848, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1909) (refusal to amend act to prohibit only unreasona-
ble restraints). Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 62 (1911), broke up the great Rockefeller oil trust, which figured so prominently in the
debates over the 1890 Act, it also announced that only "unreasonable" restraints of trade were
proscribed under the Act, the so called "rule of reason." 221 U.S. at 105. It was a decision that led
directly to the efforts at another kind of reform by the administration of Woodrow Wilson under the
intellectual leadership of Louis D. Brandeis. See infra note 185. For a perceptive and detailed treat-
ment of this overall period of history, see generally W. LrwIN, LAw AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA (1966).
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principles of statutory construction prohibit a court from making an anal-
ogy to another statute absent "ambiguity .... The whole doctrine appli-
cable to the subject may be summed up in the single observation that
prior acts may be resorted to, to solve, but not to create an ambiguity." 130
Since a "plausible reading" 13' of RICO, without reference to the antitrust
statutes, supported upholding the power to give equitable relief, it was
not necessary to turn to the antitrust statutes. Indeed, it may be fairly
said that it was the antitrust analogy, as much as any other factor, that
gave rise to the ambiguity. Here, too, the court turned a rule upside
down. Instead of using an analogy to resolve an ambiguity, it improperly
used an analogy to create an ambiguity.
Second, the antitrust analogy is unpersuasive, since it does not take
into account the significant structural and language differences between the
antitrust statutes and civil RICO. The antitrust statutes have four sec-
tions dealing with civil relief,132 while civil RICO contains only one. 133
Each of the antitrust statute's four civil sections expressly states a sepa-
rate jurisdictional basis and sets out which parties may seek relief. In
contrast, section 1964 contains one subsection, subsection (a), which
makes a general grant of jurisdiction without reference to which parties
may seek relief. As such, the grant ofjurisdiction in subsection (a) ought
to be read to provide the jurisdictional base for both subsections (b) and
(c). Accordingly, since significant structural and language differences are
present between the antitrust statutes and civil RICO, an analogy be-
tween the texts of the two acts is neither apt nor complete. As such, the
antitrust analogy ought not be held to be an adequate basis to read civil
RICO to limit the availability of equitable relief to private parties. 34
Third, the antitrust analogy is particularly inappropriate since Con-
gress drafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes for the explicit pur-
pose of avoiding restrictive antitrust precedent. 135 By suggesting
RICO was, of course, consciously drafted outside of the antitrust statutes, and Congress in-
cluded the liberal construction clause in an express effort to avoid a repeat of the antitrust experi-
ence. Compare G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 6 (rev. ed. 1900) ("what experience and history
teaches us is this,-that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history").
Nonetheless, RICO, too, was not at first vigorously enforced by the Department ofJustice. See supra
text accompanying note 27. It is also being treated-at least civilly-with great hostility by the dis-
trict courts. See supra text accompanying note 29. Indeed, just as it took almost 20 years to bring a
successful prosecution against the Standard Oil Trust, it has taken a similar time to bring the Mafia
Commission prosecution. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (indictment under RICO of
eleven mob leaders, six of whom on Commission and heads of New York families); TIME, Dec. 1,
1986, at 32 (conviction of eight men in commission prosecution, among whom were the leaders of
three of New York City's five families, for racketeering, including murder and extortion). See also S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36-43 (1969) (six of eleven individuals indicted in 1984 had been
identified in 1969 Senate Report on RICO). Finally,just as the "rule of reason" has made thejudici-
ary the traffic cop of competition, it now appears that "pattern" will cast it in a similar role for
integrity in the market place. See supra note 37.
130 Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899) (emphasis added).
131 796 F.2d at 1084.
132 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-15(a), 25, 26 (1982).
133 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). See also Johnson, supra note 50, at 72-74, for a parallel analysis and
conclusion.
135 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969)) ("It is also significant that a
previous proposal to add RICO-like provisions to the Sherman Act had come to grief in part pre-
cisely because it 'could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of... a private
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otherwise, the Wollersheim court followed a discredited approach Con-
gress expressly sought to avoid.
Fourth, a reading of civil RICO in light of the antitrust laws falls into
the lawyers' fallacy, which mistakenly believes that the same words have
the same meaning without regard to context of time and place.13 6 Justice
Holmes put it well: words are not "transparent and unchang[ing] ....
[They] may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which ... [they are] used." 13 7 In sum, the relevant
antitrust statutes were passed in 1890 and 1914 to deal with a free mar-
ket before the merger of law and equity in 1938.138 Law and equity were,
however, merged in 1938 to "strip procedure of unnecessary forms,
technicalities and distinctions "....,s9 RICO is a modem statute en-
acted after the merger of law and equity and passed, among other things,
to create an honest market. To read pre-1938 distinctions into a statute
enacted more than a quarter of a century later is to let the "forms of
action ... rule us from their graves."' 40 In short, "the same words, in
different settings, may not mean the same thing."' 4 '
D. Supreme Court Doctrine Limiting Implication of Claims for Relief Not
Expressly Provided by Statute
Finally, the court in Wollersheim found support for its conclusion that
injunctive relief is not available to private parties in the "Supreme Court
doctrine that limits the implication of causes of actions or remedies not
expressly provided by statute."' 42 The court cited two cases decided in
litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust
context ..... In borrowing its 'racketeering injury,' requirement from antitrust standing principles,
the court below created exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid.") (citations omitted)). See
also State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 679-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(reviews in detail RICO's legislative history and rejects use of antitrust analogy on issues of survival
of a federal cause of action under RICO where RICO is silent).
136 SeeJ. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428-29 (1898) ("law-
yer's Paradise where all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning"). See also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) (Marshall, CJ.) ("Such is the character of human
language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea ... .
137 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (emphasis added).
138 Act ofJune 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
139 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1041, at 141 (1969) (quoting
ChiefJustice Hughes in an address before the American Law Institute).
140 F. MAIrLAND, THE FoRMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 1 (Cambridge 1st ed. 1936).
141 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.).
142 796 F.2d at 1088. Here, as elsewhere, a clear hotion of what is being argued and what is not
being argued is helpful. Up until this point, the analysis in the text has focused on an interpretation
of the language of RICO, that is, statutory construction. It has been argued that if the language of
the statute is plain, and it includes equity relief, it must be followed; it has also been argued that if
the language of the statute is ambiguous, the ambiguity ought to be resolved in favor of finding
equity relief by the use of the liberal construction clause of the statute and that nothing in the stat-
ute's legislative history constitutes a clear message of an intent by Congress to the contrary. At this
point, the analysis in the text turns, not to "statutory construction," but to "implication analysis." In
Johnson, supra note 50, at 63-64, Professor Johnson succinctly summarizes the different
perspectives:
The question to be addressed under the statutory construction analysis is whether section
1964(c) gives private plaintiffs the right to sue in general under section 1964 and thus util-
ize the provisions of section 1964(a), or alternatively whether private RICO plaintiffs can at
least seek equitable relief under the court's general equitable powers.... Ordinarily once
Congress has created a statutory right such as the express private cause of action contained
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1979, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 1 43 and Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington,144 as standing for that doctrine. The court, of course, is
correct that those cases do reflect that doctrine. The court errs, however,
in assuming that those cases control an implication analysis of RICO. It
erred, because it ignored the Supreme Court's new teaching in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,145 which directed that "[iun deter-
mining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal statutory
scheme when the statute by its terms is silent on that issue, the initial
focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was en-
acted." 146 Curran then noted that the law in 1970 was that "[i]f a statute
was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary normally rec-
ognized a remedy for members at that class. Under this approach, fed-
eral courts, following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a
remedy as the exception rather than the rule."1 4 7 Moreover, under the
Supreme Court doctrine in force at the time of RICO's enactment, it was
considered the "duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."1 48 Under
this line of decisions, equitable relief should have been held to be an
implied remedy in RICO, since it can hardly be questioned that implying
such equitable relief would be inconsistent with the design of RICO's
sponsors. As Senator McClellan, RICO's chief sponsor in the Senate
noted, RICO is not "limit[ed] [to] the remedies ... already... estab-
lished. The ability of our chancery courts to formulate a remedy to fit the
wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice."1 49 Thus,
in section 1964(c), the courts have wide discretion in fashioning appropriate relief. How-
ever, Congress can limit this discretion by specifying that certain remedies are to be exclu-
sive. Therefore, the question becomes whether by expressly allowing private RICO
plaintiffs to sue for treble damages under section 1964(c), Congress intended to exclude
private litigants from utilizing other remedies specified in section 1964(a) or from seeking
relief pursuant to the court's general equitable powers. Courts generally require clear evi-
dence of legislative intent to deny a remedy which would otherwise be available to a litigant.
Under an implication analysis, however, the issue is whether the courts should imply a
remedy which Congress failed to provide. The utilization of this analysis presupposes that
the language of section 1964 does not by itself afford private parties the right to seek equi-
table relief....
Thus, while legislative intent is the cornerstone of either the statutory construction or
the implication analysis, there is a difference in what might be called presumptions. Under
a pure statutory construction analysis, it is presumed that all necessary remedies exist for
the private plaintiff; a presumption which can be rebutted by contrary legislative intent.
Under an implication analysis, on the other hand, the presumption is that no private equita-
ble remedy exists; a presumption which can only be rebutted by affirmative legislative intent
that such a remedy should be implied ...
Recently the Supreme Court has stated that in ascertaining legislative intent the courts
should pay particular attention to the contemporary legal context in which the statute was
enacted.
143 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
144 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
145 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
146 Id. at 378 (emphasis added). See also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984)
("Our focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question.") (emphasis
added).
147 456 U.S. at 374-75 (emphasis added) (citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916)).
148 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
149 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969). See supra note 122.
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applying the proper standard for implication analysis under RICO, pri-
vate equitable remedies should have been implied and not, as was mis-
takenly done by the court in Wollersheim, denied.' 50
IV. The Policy Consequences of Finding That Civil RICO Does Not
Authorize Equitable Relief for Private Plaintiffs
The most telling criticism that may be made of the court in Woller-
sheim is that it forgot the "first" rule of statutory construction: "to make
such... construction [of a statute] as. shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuation of the mischief."' 5 ' Had the court read the "statute, not
narrowly or through a keyhole, but in the broad light of the evils it aimed
at and the good it hoped for,"' 52 it would not have come out as it did. It
forgot, in short, that "purpose... is the surest guide to ... meaning."' 5 3
To be sure, the court in Wollersheim recognized that "strong policy argu-
ments . . . support a right to injunctive relief for private RICO plain-
tiffs.' 54 In addition, the court acknowledged that the "force[ful] ...
argument [could be made] that a private injunctive remedy would permit
an injured party to put an immediate stop to racketeering behavior that
threatens his or her business before the business has been brought to its
knees."' 155 Finally, it candidly "recognize[d] that precluding enforcing
parties from employing the weapon of equitable relief partially ham-
strings the statute's effect"' 56 and that the "use of equitable remedies by
private parties would frequently result in substantial benefits to society
generally."' 157 Nevertheless, the court stood behind its judgment that
Congress intended to deny to victims of sophisticated crimes such re-
lief. 58 It almost seems as if the court felt compelled to narrow the stat-
ute because that construction would frustrate the policy of the statute.' 59
150 SeeJohnson, supra note 50, at 62-74. "Certainly it cannot be seriously argued that an interpre-
tation of RICO to include equitable relief as a remedy for a plaintiff with an express cause of action
would do anything but further... the statutory purpose .... A consideration of the statutory
purpose would support the availability of equitable relief for private plaintiffs under either statutory
construction or the implication analysis." Id. at 69; Note, supra note 75, at 959 ("Section 1964(c)
cannot fulfill its statutory purpose of providing an effective remedy for the proscribed conduct of
RICO without the implication of equitable relief for private plaintiffs in all types of RICO cases.").
151 Heydons Case, 3 Co. 7, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1578). Blackstone ranked the rule in Heydons
Case, "first." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 87 (1765). Blackstone also suggested that "statutes
against frauds are to be liberally and beneficially expounded." Id. at 88.
152 United States i rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
153 Cabel v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), afd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). See
United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J.) ("the general purpose is a more
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down."). See also
United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 261 (1959) ("the art of proliferating a purpose") (quoting
Brooklyn Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 450, 451 (1946) (Hand, J.)).
154 796 F.2d at 1088.
155 Id. at 1088-89.
156 Id. at 1089.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See W. SENIOR, CONVERSATIONS wrrH DISTINGUISHED PERSONS 314 (1880) (Erle, CJ.) ("I have
known judges bred in the world of legal studies, who delighted in nothing so much as a strong
decision. Now a strong decision is a decision opposed to common sense and to common conven-
ience .... And as one strong decision is a precedent for another a little stronger. The law, at last,
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Nor did the court satisfactorily explain why Congress would make such a
policy judgment. 160
Equally cogent policy considerations, not noted by the court, mili-
tate against its construction of the statute. First, RICO's private enforce-
ment mechanism was, of course, "intended by Congress . . . to
encourage private enforcement of the laws on which RICO is predicated
... [and to] provide strong incentives to civil litigants ... in deterring
racketeering."' 6'1 But holding that RICO does not provide equitable re-
lief will not mean that such relief is unavailable; it will only mean that its
availability will rest solely on the traditional ancillary powers of federal
courts' 62 or would become a matter of state law under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction, at least over claims, if not parties. The existence of
pendent party jurisdiction, however, has been termed a "subtle and com-
plex" question by the Supreme Court, 63 and the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction is "a doctrine of discretion, not ... right."' As such, no
litigant will be able to know in advance whether a particular court will
choose to exercise such jurisdiction. Uncertainty will be the result, and,
in light of the unjustified hostility to RICO of many district courts, that
uncertainty may altogether too often be resolved by throwing out the
pendent claims.' 65
on some matters becomes such a nuisance that equity intervenes or an Act of Parliament must be
passed to sweep the whole away.").
160 Lamely, Wollersheim the court observed that by "drawing the line between private equitable
relief and private damages, Congress [might have] wished to preclude federal courts from interfer-
ing with the day-to-day running of businesses at the behest of what might be only a disgruntled
competitor." 796 F.2d at 1088. It then immediately added, however, that the private claim for relief
was in fact especially enacted in the teeth of such objections. Id. (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 487-88).
It might also have noted that equity relief is discretionary, while damage relief is a matter of right.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) ("a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair,
and what is workable"). How such remedies could be thought to be unwise is difficult to fathom. In
fact, the court conceded that "it may well have been desirable for Congress to have extended to
private parties the right to injunctive relief .... 796 F.2d at 1089.
161 Alcorn County, 731 F.2d at 1165.
162 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1982), may be invoked to preserve the status quo. See
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966) (preliminary injunction to prevent merger);
IT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 457 F. Supp. 224 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (preliminary injunction
issued to protect damage claim).
163 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973).
164 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
165 See Horn, Judicial Plague Sweeps U.S.: "Result Orientitis" Infects Civil RICO Decisions, NAT'L L.J.,
May 23, 1983, at 13, col. 1. See also infra Appendix B. Denial of private equity relief frustrates
another important purpose of RICO. In addition to the infiltration of legitimate business, Congress
was deeply troubled by the takeover of legitimate unions by organized crime. See Civil Action, supra
note 1, at 249-53, 257, 270. Labor racketeering remains a major challenge to the administration of
justice. See THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME BUSINESS AND LAW OR UNIONS: REPORT, PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON ORGANIZED CRIME (1984); Blakey and Goldstock, On the Water Front: RICO and Labor Rack-
eteering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980). One of the more hopeful signs in this area is the decision
by the Department of Justice to begin to use civil RICO to free mob dominated union locals. See
United States v. Local 560, IBT, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.NJ. 1984), afird, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986); N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at BI, col. I (two construction locals
in New York City placed in trusteeship) (United States Attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani: "We will be
using this remedy in all appropriate circumstances. [It is] one of the most important weapons in
dealing with organized crime."); id., Nov. 22, 1987, at 1, col. I (Department ofJustice to focus on
relation between mob and Teamsters, Longshoremen, Hotel Workers, and Laborers; use of criminal
and civil RICO foreseen). Court appointed trustees, acting independently of the government, will,
of course, seek relief for the victimized union locals. But will they be limited to only seeking damage
relief? In addition, will union members themselves have standing to seek, through RICO, to free
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Second, assuming that a district court chooses to exercise pendent
jurisdiction or that diversity jurisdiction exists, that jurisdiction will be
exercised under a body of law that Congress has already found to be
inadequate in the context of RICO-type claims.' 66 More specifically, if
civil RICO provides for injunctive relief for private parties, then it is not
necessary for private parties to show irreparable injury or the inadequacy
of the remedy at law.167 But if civil RICO does not expressly provide
equitable relief, then traditional equitable criteria, including irreparable
injury and inadequacy of the remedy at law, must be shown under the All
Writs Act,' 68 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 or state law in order to
obtain injunctive relief.' 69 Hence, if civil RICO is read not to provide
equitable relief to private parties, then the obtaining of injunctive relief
by such parties becomes more difficult if not, at times, impossible.' 70
mob dominated unions on their own? Compare Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985)
("indirectly injured parties could recover under RICO when they show that the directly injured party
was under the continuing control or influence of the defendant or his henchman") with Bass v.
Campagnone, 655 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D.R.I. 1987) (union, not members, has standing to sue for
injury to union). But see 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Richard H. Poff) ("workers
are victims of sweetheart contracts"). Even without personal standing, derivative suits may be
brought. See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1982); Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1271 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981).
In either case, will their relief be limited to damages? Obviously, without the power to seek com-
plete relief, neither trustees nor members will be able to achieve Congress' 1970 objective: unions
free of the mob. As such, the court forgotJustice Cardozo's comment in In Re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81,
91, 116 N.E. 782, 785 (1917): "Consequences cannot alter statutes, but may help to fix their
meaning."
166 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970) ("sanctions
and remedies ... unnecessarily limited in scope and impact"); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586 (because
"state and federal [law] was not adequate" Congress enacted RICO). For a powerful critique of the
traditional approach from a historical, comparative, and functional perspective that calls for reform,
see Hummond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time For a New Model, 30 U. TORONTO LJ. 240 (1980) (tradi-
tional limitations, slavishly adopted in the United States from Englishjurisprudence where they were
rooted in ajurisdictional relation between law and equity court, anachronistic in light of their merger
and modem crowded court dockets).
Ironically, too, English law has moved away from the older view. Traditionally, injunctions
against persons to restrain the removal of assets were not permitted in English law under Lister &
Co. v. Stubbs, [1890] 45 Ch. D. 1. The historical materials are reviewed in Rasu Maritime v.
Pertambangan, [1977] 3 AI.E.R. 324, 331 (Denning, J.). Mareva v. International Bulkcarriers,
[1975] 2 Lloyds Rep. 509, marked a dramatic turn, for it upheld the issuance of injunctions to freeze
assets. A new test was formulated in Chandris Shipping v. Unimarine, S.A., [1979] 2 AIl.E.R. 972,
984-85 (Denning, J.). While at first the new test seemed to be applicable only to international litiga-
tion, in Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 3 AIl.E.R. 190, 194, it was made to rest solely on the "risk of
removal of assets." See also Prince Abdul v. Abu-Taha, [1908] 3 AIl.E.R. 409,412. The present state
of English law, in which such injunctions are fairly easily obtained, is reflected in Bayer A.G. v.
Winter, [1986] 1 All.E.R. 733, 737. See generally PROFITS OF CRIME AND THEIR RECOvERY: REPORT OF
HOWARD LEAGUE FOR PENAL REFORM 104-111 (1984) (discussion of Mareva injunctions).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1974) (government in-
junction) ("plainly the intention of Congress . . . to provide [in RICO] for injunctive relief...
without any requirement of a showing of irreparable injury... [or] inadequacy of the remedy at
law"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255,
259-60 (10th Cir. 1981) (private suit not on RICO) (survey of statutes and cases: where a federal
statute authorizes injunctive relief, irreparable harm or the inadequacy of the remedy at law need not
be shown).
168 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982).
169 Civil Action, supra note 1, at 334 n.217. See also Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d
1473 (9th Cir. 1987); FDIC v. Antonio, 649 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (D. Colo. 1987) (appeal pending).
170 See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 99 (6th Cir. 1982) (ade-
quate remedy at law might preclude "injunction sought to secure a potential damages award or even
if sought only to preserve defendants' assets pending a final determination of rights"). But see Lynch
Corp. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 666 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (8th Cir. 1981) (injunction granted to prevent
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Third, the effect of denying private parties equitable relief under
civil RICO is not ameliorated by the option of obtaining prejudgment
attachment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 because where no
federal statute is applicable, the matter is governed by state law, which
varies from state to state depending "upon each state's attitude toward
the debtor-creditor relationship."' 17 1
More than a little irony accompanies these consequences of the Wol-
lersheim decision. RICO's core concern is, of course, with organized
crime activities, even though it constitutes general reform that applies
across the board. 172 The government's experience with efforts to forfeit
assets in organized crime prosecutions is, therefore, illuminating. Even
with the enactment by Congress of special laws providing for preverdict
seizures, 173 the government's success in forfeiting assets has been lim-
ited. 174 Reading out of civil RICO a provision for preliminary equitable
remedies for injured private parties means that such parties will be assur-
edly doomed to a similar abysmal fate. Note, too, the specter of inconsis-
tent results from case to case that the holding of Wollersheim may well
create. RICO's requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity, which
may well extend across state lines, makes it that "unusual case", where a
claim may arise in more than one district.' 75 Under RICO's nationwide
service of process and venue provision, 76 ample room will exist for fo-
rum shopping by the skillful litigator to avoid the unfavorable state law of
a particular forum. Only skillful forum shopping, not the merits of a
dissipation of assets); Producto Carnic, S.A. v. Central Am. Bee and Sea Food Trading Corp., 621
F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1347
(2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
171 7J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 64.04[3], at 64-13 (2d ed. 1985). Here,
one additional comment may be appropriate on Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), in which the court declined to grant an injunction to preserve assets as requested
by a RICO victim. The Ashland court made its analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 64, which provides that
absent a federal statute to the contrary, federal courts are to use state standards in determining the
appropriateness of an attachment. The Ashland court made a fatal mistake, however, when it deter-
mined, without substantial comment, that the injunction requested by the plaintiff was in fact a mis-
labeled request for attachment. See CivilAction, supra note 1, at 339 n.217. Ashland may be summed
up on this point by simply saying that it was wrongly decided. See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755
F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1985) ("At least one commentator has suggested that Rule 64 does not
require that an injunction otherwise proper under Rule 65 must also conform to state law merely
because it is a provisional remedy.") (citing 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 64-04[3], at 64-19 to 64-
21 (2d ed. 1948)). Little that is charitable may be said of the rest of the opinion.
172 See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
173 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (1982).
174 See, e.g., Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-97, 114 (1980) (testimony ofJustice Department as to
the existence of three problems in the preverdict seizure of assets: (1) ascertaining what the assets
are, (2) reaching assets that are in the hands of third parties, and (3) preventing the dissipation of
assets before trials; problems compounded since "sophisticated criminals... have access to the best
lawyers and accountants money can buy"). See also Civil Action, supra note 1, at 258-60 n.59.
175 Compare Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 185 (1979) ("unusual case") with
Butchers Union Local No. 498 v. S.D.C Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1986) (analysis of
nation-wide service of process under RICO). See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 152 F. 290,
292-97 (E.D. Mo. 1907) (analysis of comparable provision under antitrust statutes), af'd, 221 U.S. 1,
47 (1911). Similar considerations led the Supreme Court to apply an uniform federal statute of
limitations to RICO. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., No. 86-497 (Sup. Ct.Jun.
22, 1987).
176 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982).
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claim, will offer hope of success. Accordingly, it is doubtful that a private
party, who may be forced to wait until a verdict is rendered to execute his
money damage award, will collect anything or, for that matter, even
bother to sue in the organized crime area. That means, too, that RICO,
as a practical matter, will generally offer realistic damage relief only
against the white-collar offender who has assets in the community avail-
able for execution. Those who are concerned with the breadth of RICO,
that is, its application beyond organized crime, hardly do well to advo-
cate, therefore, its narrow construction on the question of equitable re-
lief. The result that they will achieve cannot only be described as absurd,
but perverse. No one ought lightly conclude that Congress intended
such a result. "If this was Congress' intent one would expect it to have
said so in clear and understandable terms." 1 7 Nothing that the Woller-
sheim court marshals in behalf of its decision can be fairly described as
"clear" or "understandable."
V. Conclusion
A struggle is being waged today for the soul of the nation-between
the haves and have-nots, not in the classic Marxist sense of a class strug-
gle, but in the older American sense of a struggle between the less privi-
leged and the more privileged. It is a struggle for basic human justice in
a free society. The struggle is as old as Thomas Jefferson's fight against
Alexander Hamilton over the proper role of the federal government in
according special privilege to finance, business and industry in the years
after the Revolution 1 7 8 -of AndrewJackson against Nicholas Biddle over
a centralized eastern money power, which disadvantaged western farm-
ers179-of Abraham Lincoln against Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
over the Dred Scott 180 decision, which froze Congress' power to deal with
177 Russello, 464 U.S. at 25 (narrow reading of "interest").
178 Appointed as the first Secretary of the Treasury in 1783, Alexander Hamilton implemented a
broad based economic plan; he set up a national bank, arranged for the federal government to as-
sume state debts incurred during the revolution, imposed a tariff duty, and instituted an excise tax
on distilled liquors. These measures not only encouraged industry and commerce, but created a
strong attachment to the federal government among the propertied class. Thomas Jefferson, on the
other hand, opposed Hamilton's plan, arguing that the American farmer, artisan, or small merchant
would be forced to bear the principal burden of the taxation; he also believed that manufacturing
would eventually prove to be an oppressive force, and thus it should not be encouraged over agricul-
tural and related interests. See generally J. MILLER, THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 296-322 (1959).
179 In the fall of 1833, Jackson, who preferred local banks to the national bank, ordered the re-
moval of federal deposits from the Second Bank of the United States, located in Philadelphia. Its
president was Nicholas Biddle. The bank was to Jackson the embodiment of evil, since it dealt so
alluringly with paper money. Biddle counteracted with a tight money policy that resulted in business
distress, which continued through 1834. Biddle's actions caused Pennsylvania Governor George
Wolf, among others, much financial embarrassment. The bank's charter expired in 1836, and be-
cause of its policy of contracting its credits after the removal of the deposits, the Democratic admin-
istration of Governor Wolf refused to support Mr. Biddle's request for renewal. Without
Democratic support, the fate of the bank's national charter was sealed; the charter was not renewed.
See generally F. TURNER, THE UNITED STATES: 1830-1850, at 106-09 (1958).
180 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, the question involved the
status of a slave taken into a territory made free by the Missouri Compromise. ChiefJustice Taney
read the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to deprive Congress of the power to liberate
property. Lincoln objected to the decision in his debates with Stephen Douglas. See POLITICAL DE-
BATES BETWEEN LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS 29, 268 (1860). He also spoke against Dred Scott in his first
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the slavery issue in a 1789 mold and hastened a disastrous civil war-and
of Theodore Roosevelt against J. P. Morgan and his colleagues over the
enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act against the great railroad,
meatpacker, tobacco, and oil trusts.181 It was at issue when Woodrow
Wilson wanted to put Louis D. Brandeis on the Supreme Court over the
protests of seven past presidents of the American Bar Association, 8 2 and
it was at issue when Franklin D. Roosevelt sought during the Great De-
pression to secure and protect stock-market regulation at the federal
level against prominent voices in the securities, investment, and banking
industries, who asserted that full-disclosure and financial-integrity legis-
lation at the federal level would inhibit capital formation and make
"grass grow" on Wall Street. 183 That struggle for the soul of the nation
inaugural address. VIJ. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 9-10 (1897). See gener-
ally R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 28-33 (1941).
181 Roosevelt's antitrust activities earned him the name of "trust buster." He launched an attack
against monopolies in 1902, and he kept at it intermittently during the rest of his administration. At
the time, Congress was dominated by economic conservatives, who would not pass legislation that
could form an effective control measure to contain the manifest economic abuses of the times. With
the path to effective regulation blocked by a stubborn Congress, Roosevelt made an effort to control
the great aggregates of capital through the use of antitrust laws. Roosevelt brought suits under the
Sherman Act against such corporations as the Northern Pacific Railroad, the Great Northern Rail-
road, the Standard Oil Company, the American Tobacco Company, the New Haven Railroad, and
the DuPont Corporation. See generally G. MOWREY, THE ERA OF ROOSEVELT, 1900-1912, at 130-33
(1958). Nevertheless, it is a melancholy truth thatjudicial hostility to the Sherman Act largely frus-
trated its early administration in the judicial arena. See Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on
the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 17, 19 (1983). The statistical data is
collected in Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365, 371 (1970). See 16
J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 203[1]
(1983) ("The federal judiciary in 1890 was so instilled with the laissez-faire or social Darwinist theo-
ries then prevalent that they failed to see that the Sherman Act ... could encourage a business
climate closer to the model they desired."). Even later, many judges considered the Act's treble
damage and attorneys' fee provisions an invitation to "racketeering." See, e.g., Milwaukee Towne
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 1951) (attorney fees), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909
(1952). Advances were made in the 1940s and 1950s, but it was not until the Warren Court era that
key decisions of the Supreme Court brought the private enforcement mechanism of the antitrust
statutes into its own. See, e.g., KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-11
(1959) (no "public injury" limitation).
182 Wilson's nomination of Brandeis for the Supreme Court in 1916 was one of the most contro-
versial in the Court's history. Although Brandeis was Jewish, the confrontation was primarily one of
interests and ideologies rather than prejudice. Brandeis had exposed the inequities of men in high
places in the financial system; his clients were not exclusively of the commercial class, and he did not
stand in awe of the majesty of wealth. Support for him was, however, equally as strong. Nine of
eleven Harvard Law School professors supported Brandeis, along with people like Newton D. Baker,
Frances Perkins, Henry Moskowitz, Norman Hapgood, Charles Crane, Paul Kellog, Rabbi Stephen
Wise, Amos Pichot, and Walter Lippmann. See generally P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR
THE PEOPLE 291-299 (1984).
183 See D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGLUATION 80 (1982). Fifty years ago, following the brilliant ex-
pos6 of Ferdinand Pecora, chief counsel of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Congress
passed the Securities Act of 1933 to deal with abuses, frauds and deceits in certain limited areas of
the marketplace. See generally F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939); Landis, supra note 1, at
30:
The act naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of the Twenties that was followed
by the market crash of 1929. Even before the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as
President of the United States, a spectacularly illuminating investigation of the nature of
this financing was being undertaken by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee under
the direction of its able counsel, Ferdinand D. Pecora. That Committee spread on the rec-
ord more than the peccadillos of groups of men involved in the issuance and marketing of
securities. It indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably in imposing those essen-
tial fiduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it was to handle other
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is today being fought anew in the business community, bar associations,
people's money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors, account-
ants, all found themselves the object of criticism so severe that the American public lost
much of its faith in professions that had theretofore been regarded with respect that had
approached awe.
The Act, however, encountered both open and undercover resistance from brokers and investment
bankers. SeeJ. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATIxON OF WALL STREET 79 (1983) (quoting then Prof. Felix
Frankfurter. "The leading financial law firms who have been systematically carrying on a campaign
against [the Securities Act of 1933] have been seeking-now that they and their financial clients have
come out of their storm cellar of fear-not to improve but to chloroform the Act. They evidently
assume that the public is unaware of the sources of the issues that represent the boldest abuses of
fiduciary responsibility."). The 1933 Act was, for example, thought to be so "draconian" that it
would "dry up the nation's underwriting business and that 'grass would grow in Wall Street.'" D.
RATNER, supra, at 80. Richard Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, led the well-
supported fight against securities regulation by the federal government; he viewed such legislation
as indirectly constituting a nationalization of business, which might result in a freezing of the stock
exchange. In addition, George 0. May, of Price Waterhouse & Co., "was ... opposed to ... require-
ments for independent accountants." Landis, supra note 1, at 35 n.12. Businessmen and wire
houses across the country rallied to Whitney's leadership. The Investment Bankers Association is-
sued a statement decrying the Act and asserting that its "practical result... [would] be to suspend
the underwriting or distribution of many capital issues .... Id. at 40. According to one of its
drafters, the 1933 Act was subject to "misinterpretations, deliberate to a great degree, by the widely
publicized utterances of persons prominent in the financial world together with their lawyers." Id. at
40 n.18. In the end, Congress passed the President's legislation, not only the Securities Act of 1933,
but also the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which entrusted much authority over the market to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 456-57 (1958). Early decisions by the pre-New Deal Supreme Court,
however, reflected a similar hostility. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935); R. JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY 147-53 (Vintage ed. 1941) ("[T]he majority used the occasion to
write an opinion which did all that a court's opinion could do to discredit the Commission ....
Every tricky knave in the investment business hailed the opinion .... ").
Apparently, too, an impression is widespread in the securities industry today that RICO simply
"overlaps" all securities fraud. Justice Marshall's dissent in Sedima expressed a similar concern.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 505 ("virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial developments of
private civil remedies under the federal securities laws"). Nothing could be further from the truth.
RICO says any offense involving "fraud in the sale of securities.., punishable under any law of the
United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982). "Offense" means criminal offense. See Trane v.
O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983) ("obviously refers to criminal punishment"); Dan
River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) ("criminal intent is ... necessary in either mail
fraud or securities fraud [under RICO]"); Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 639
F. Supp. 1391, 1395-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (RICO securities violations must be criminal); Frota v. Pru-
dential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (RICO securities violations must
be criminal); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1471 (D.NJ. 1986) (RICO
securities violations must be willful); In Re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp.
1138, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (recklessness suffices for criminal violation); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney,
632 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (RICO securities violations must be willful). Accordingly,
only the criminal fraud provisions of the securities acts fall within RICO. See, e.g., Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982) ("willfully"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1982) ("willfully"). Mere negligent conduct or a transaction that only operates as a fraud does not
fall within the statute. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (intent to defraud rather than
negligence in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act or § 17a(1) of the 1933 Act, but not untrue statements or
admissions or transactions that operate as a fraud in § 17(a)(2) or (3) of the 1933 Act). Such an
overlap between statutes is neither "unusual nor unfortunate." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 468 (1969). Indeed, the securities acts themselves envision it. See, e.g., § 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) ("rights and remedies ... in addition" to "all
other" that might exist). RICO, too, recognizes the overlap. See 84 Stat. 947 (1970) ("Nothing in
this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State or other law imposing criminal penalties or
affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title.").
Unfortunately, the courts of appeal are failing to give full recognition to the fact that civil RICO
enforces the criminal (e.g., § 78ff), not the civil (e.g., § 10b(5)) aspects of the securities acts. See, e.g.,
International Data Bank, Ltd. v Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 152-54 (4th Cir. 1987) (purchaser-seller rule
enforced under § 10b(5); fraud under RICO); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1046-47 (8th
Cir. 1986) (purchaser-seller rules enforced under §§ 10b(5), 1341 under RICO). Civilly, standing
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Congress, and the courts. It has many names: it is called "strict con-
structionism";18 4 it is called "antitrust reform"; 185 it is called "tort re-
rules, of course, limit § 1Ob(5). Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)
(purchaser-seller). But no similar standing rules limit the criminal scope of § 78ff or, for that matter,
§ 1341. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourt's concern must
be with scope of the Rule, not plaintiff's standing to sue"), afd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). An effort to read such private law standing limitations into the
criminal securities statutes-or mail or wire fraud-as they are enforced through RICO is, therefore,
fundamentally misguided. By themselves, the civil provisions of the securities statutes seek only
private redress; RICO, however, seeks to make effective the criminal law standards of the statutes
through a private enforcement mechanism. Plaintiffs under RICO act, not only for themselves, but
also as private attorneys general in the enforcement of the law. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 ("to fill
prosecutorial gaps"). Moreover, Congress carefully drafted the private enforcement mechanism of
RICO, as it did, precisely to avoid such standing limitations. Id. at 3287. ("exactly the problem...
Congress sought to avoid"). But see International Data Bank Ltd., 812 F.2d at 153-54. Congress, too,
was well-aware of the overlap between RICO and the securities statutes, as the point was specifically
drawn to its attention. See CivilAction, supra note 1, at 272-73. Because civil RICO enforces criminal
standards-and requires a showing of a pattern of such "offenses," which may well require a plaintiff
to prove multiple injuries, not only to himself, but also to others--civil RICO-and the private plain-
tiff-serves an important public as well as private function. As such, forcing civil RICO into a purely
private law model misconceives its important public law functions; it is bad policy and bad law. See
generally Chayes, Forward: Public Law Litigation and The Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) (classic
model of private dispute resolution contrasted with contemporary model of public grievance against
aggregates); 8-26 (inappropriate private law standing limitations analyzed); Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). Since the judiciary implied a private
claim for relief in § 105(b), circumscribing it by private standing rule is appropriate. Civil RICO,
however, is an express claim for relief. As such, the "[j]udiciary may not circumscribe [it] .. .be-
cause of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of creating so expansive a
liability." Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748.
184 Compare Meese, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 22 (1985) with Brennan, Con-
struing the Constitution 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1985). Ostensibly, the struggle over strict construc-
tionism concerns which philosophy of interpretation will animate the judiciary in its construction of
the Constitution. Shall it be a dry literalism or a vital organic faith in a living constitution? Should
the original intent of the founders, duly imprisoned in 18th century thought, govern our concepts of
government and human dignity, or should we, injustice Holmes' words, view the Constitution as a
"constitute act ... [which] called into life a being, the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
(1920). At one level, the debate is over a seemingly unresolvable bedrock issue ofjurisprudence. At
another, it is apparently a mask behind which a determined few hide an economic and social agenda
that would, if achieved, restore an older and long-ago discredited polity.
185 justice Brandeis saw American democracy as having a backbone of small tradespeople,
merchants and manufacturers with a sprinkling of professionals. He realized that the last decades of
the 19th century had brought about concentrations of wealth, which did not fit into this scheme.
Groups like the Morgan-backed syndicate, which controlled the elevated railroad, had access to huge
amounts of capital, with which they could buy out or force out competition and bribe state legisla-
tors. If the good of individuals, organized through government, could be negated by concentration
of capital, then such concentration and their consequence had to be opposed. See P. STRUM, supra
note 102, at 62. Ostensibly, the struggle over antitrust reform today is over bringing the free-market
legislation of the 19th and early 20th centuries into necessary conformity with modern economic
analysis and the realities of a highly competitive world economy. Shall we retain Brandeis' ideal of
using law not only to promote free enterprise, but also to circumscribe the power of great aggregates
of capital-for economic, yes, but also political reasons? Rightly or wrongly, here, too, the tenets of
strict constructionism are strangely forgotten in a rush to refashion the law in the mold of the neo-
classical Chicago School of Economics. For example, the Department ofjustice merger guidelines
repeal duly enacted legislation and undisturbed court decisions. Merger Guidelines of the Department of
Justice: 1982, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4500. Guidelines that permit the union of Seven-Up and
Pepsico, Inc., giving Pepsico and Coca-Cola 74% of the soft-drink market, in short, do not guide, but
sanction unrestrained mergers. See Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1986, at A-20, col. 1 (facts of merger).
Fortunately, the Federal Trade Commission, at least, has moved to attack this merger. Id. Jun. 25,
1986, at G-1, col 3. Without the benefit of hearings, congressional action, or the president's signa-
ture, antitrust policy, is, in short, made by announcing that the law will not be enforced. Ironically,
the new guidelines are also being proposed as legislation, reversing the normal order of reform;
implementation first, enactment later. See Proposed Legislation: Administrations Antitrust Law Package,
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form"; 186 and it is also called "civil RICO reform."
Civil RICO reform is being widely urged in the business com-
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 744 (Feb. 24, 1986). In addition, wittingly or unwittingly, antitrust
enforcement programs are starved by the executive of needed resources. In 1985, for example, the
Antitrust Division was allocated $143,119,000 of the annual budget; in 1980, the division had been
allocated over $4 million more, $147,544,000. Compare OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT and
Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1987, at 1-06 (1986) with H.R. Doc.
No. 97-1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 468 (1981). Similarly, in 1985, a total of 1,508 cases passed through
the Antitrust Division: 729 antitrust cases were instituted, and 779 cases were terminated; five years
earlier 3,488 cases passed through the Antitrust Division; 1,808 cases were instituted and 1,680 cases
were terminated. Compare OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT- FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 1-06 (1986) with id. FISCAL YEAR 1983, at I-N6 (1982). Private
suits are increasingly limited by the courts with more stringent requirements. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1987) (merger cannot be enjoined without showing of anti-
trust injury). As a result, antitrust filings have fallen sharply. Compare ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DntEc-
TOR OF THE ADMImSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 104 (1983) (1,200 civil; 74 criminal) with id.
A-12, A-47 (1985) (959 civil; 47 criminal). Proposals, too, would alter common law rules aboutjoint-
and-several liability and narrow the class of cases in which treble damages may be awarded. See, e.g.,
S. 1300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (proposed amendment to Clayton Act). N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1983, at 27, col. 5 (Administration proposals reviewed). The unseen hand of the free market will
soon be largely freed of having to account to the law for the abuse of economic power.
186 No one seriously doubts the reality of our pressing liability-insurance crisis. Nor can it be
doubted that the insurance industry under the flag of the liability crisis has secured legislative reform
of the tort system. But see Wall St.J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 10 (state law changes summarized) ("While 31
states have made changes in the way lawsuits are tried and damages awarded, the moves aren't
expected to yield broad benefits for insurers or their customers.") Yet its cause or cure is another
matter. Surely, here, too, the first requirement of a serious reform proposal is, not only the identifi-
cation of a problem, but also a showing that the remedy is related to the wrong. Should we better
manage insurance companies or reform the tort law system? What is the principal cause of the crisis:
the expansion of legal liability or the insurance industry's profit cycle? See Hunter, Taming the Lastest
Insurance 'CRISIS', N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at F-3, col. 1 (argument advanced that profit cycle is
principal factor). Or some prudent combination of both? Depending on whose accountant you lis-
ten to, the insurance industry last year lost $5.5 billion or made $1.7 billion. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1986, at 20, col. 5. See also, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1986, at 12, col. I (industry claims to have lost $500
million on medical malpractice during last decade, while GAO finds $2 billion profit). The Willard
Commission, set up by theJustice Department to study tort reform, pointed to a 758%o rise in federal
products liability litigation in the past decade. See EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAiLABmLT, I TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP 42 (1986). But the Commission
ignored other data, which shows that a substantial portion of the number is attributed to only one
product, asbestos (see, e.g., KNOWLTON, Asbestos Litigation: Which Way Out?, A.B.A. SEC. TORT & INSUR-
ANCE PRACTICE, August, 1983, at 4 ("of 60,000 claims presented to the Traveler's Companies,
20,000 represent persons claiming some type of injury due to asbestos exposure")); that the vast
majority of tort litigation is tried in state, not federal courts (see Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1986, at 24); and,
that such suits have not significantly outpaced population growth (only 2 percentage points). Id.
Indeed, civil cases generally have declined 10% since 1981 in state court systems, according to the
National Center for State Courts. Id. In fact, "hyperlexis" may be a word without the substantial
reality behind it that many people suppose to exist. Only one in ten people who start out with a
grievance ever make it to a lawyer, half of those who see a lawyer never file suit; and 92% of those
settle without a trial. The stakes, too, are small-half involve less than $10,000-just 12% involve
$50,000 or more. See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 12, 1983, at 98 (study directed by Wisconsin law professor
dealing with cases in 1978). Much is also made of over 400 multimillion dollar jury awards per year.
See Wermiel, The Cost of Lawsuits Growing Ever Larger, Wall St.J., May 16, 1986, at 8, col. 1; In Awarding
Damages, Panels Have Reasons For Thinking Big, id., May 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1. That figure pales com-
pared with the nation's population (240 million). See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNIrD STATES 5 (106th ed. 1986); nor is it significant in light of the fact that two-
thirds of such awards involve permanent paralysis, brain damage, amputation or deaths. See Bus.
WK., Apr. 21, 1986, at 25. In fact, if medical liability awards, for example, are adjusted for inflation,
they have remained constant for 25 years. See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, at 18E, col. 4. Indeed, the
median liability award during this period has hovered around $20,000 in constant dollars. Id., Apr.
13, 1986, at F-3, col. 2. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTER-
TICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (Apr. 1987) (57% closed without indemnity; median payment
$18,000 with average of $80,741; average cost for insurance investigation: $10,985; 50% closed
after suit, but before trial). Moreover, little empirical evidence supports the theory that "tort re-
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munity, principally by segments of the accounting 187 and securi-
form" in the medical malpractice area in fact affects insurance costs. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX STATES CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS
STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS (Dec., 1986). In addition, the much-maligned punitive damage award
is made in less than 13% of all verdicts, id. Many of those are cut down or reversed on appeal. See
Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1986, at 25. It ought not be forgotten, too, that, "[it's the jury-not the govern-
ment, not business, not judges-that is responsible for putting safety improvements in cars, for get-
ting Dalkon shields off the market, for having health hazards removed." Wall St.J., May 29, 1986, at
18, col. 6 (quoting Herbert Hafif, plaintiff's counsel). Nevertheless, no objective observer can seri-
ously argue that our tort system is efficient, effective, or fair. While more people are seriously in-
jured than ever before by defective products or negligent conduct, it costs too much to get adequate
compensation to those who need it. See, e.g., Anderson and Kahn, A Ten-Point Proposal for Asbestos
Supelrfund, FORUM, Spring 1983. But what are the legislative remedies proposed in the name of "re-
form"? Strangely, those who are federalist on other issues ignore the tenets of federalism here.
Tort reform is seen as a national problem requiring a national solution. The remedy: curtail by
national legislation the fees of plaintiffs' lawyers by circumscribing the contingent-fee system (a
method whereby victims as a class, in effect, insure themselves against legal costs), and cap
noneconomic damage awards (which are, in fact, another way of awarding legal fees). See FORTUNE,
Jul. 7, 1986, at 35-36 (Reagan administration backs tort reform). On the role of contingent fees in
the tort system, see generally G. CALABRESI, IDEAL, BELIEFS, ATITUDES AND THE LAW 79-81 (1985)
("Pain and suffering awards plus contingent fees function as mutual insurance system among acci-
dent victims."). If victims have less access to lawyers, society will, of course, have less litigation, yet
not because fewer wrongs are done, but because less access to the courts is available. Little is said,
too, about reforming insurance company inefficiency, curtailing the medical fees of health-care pro-
fessionals, who maintain a wasteful system of "socialized" accounts receivables through government
and private insurance programs, and who are largely able to maintain marketplace freedom in price
setting; or of weeding out from the profession the incompetent doctors, whose conduct gives rise to
the suits. Compare Stein, Medical Negligence Needs a Study, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at 15, col. 2
(estimates of 260,000 to 300,000 injuries and deaths in hospitals each year from negligence) with
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 62-63 (small percentage of physicians account for disproportionate
number of malpractice claims, but nationwide only 406 medical licenses revoked in 1985); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 9, col. 4 (20,000 to 45,000 of 400,000 physicians not fully competent, but
only 1,400 disciplinary actions each year). Neither is attention paid to the fees of defense counsel for
whom, in light of insurance-company reimbursement of the insured, there is little economic disin-
centive to run the meter in major litigation before trying to achieve a realistic settlement, even where
liability and amount of damage are not seriously in dispute. Nor are responsible proposals being
seriously considered that would create a substitute for the tort system which might be a more effi-
cient, effective, or fair system of social insurance for the medical and other injuries, which are an
inevitable incident of life in modem society. Here, the trial lawyers of both camps join hands with
the insurance industry in conspiring against the rights of society. G. SHAw, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA
Act I 32 (Brentano's ed. 1909) ("all professions are conspiracies against the laity"). Instead, "tort
law reform" is a euphemism for choosing to enhance the power of one side in an adversary system,
which would move the clock, not forward to a better system for the 21st century, but backward to
restore a discredited 19th-century system, where only the well-to-do would have lawyers. 0. GOLD-
SMITH, The Traveller, in GOLDSMrITH: SELECTED WORKS 600 (Rupert Hand-Davis ed. 1950) ("Laws
grind the poor, and rich men rule the law."); N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at E-20, col. 1 (fewer law
graduates going into public or public interest legal work, as starting annual salaries in major firms
approach $80,000).
187 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 243 (testimony of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants). After a "spectacular string of corporate failures and financial scam deals," the ac-
counting industry, which is "supposed to audit company books and sniff out chicanery" is itself
coming under close scrutiny. TIME, Sep. 21, 1986, at 61. "Fraudulent financial reporting is ... a
serious problem." REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING I
(Exposure Draft Apr. 1987) [hereinafter FINANCIAL REPORTING]; see also FORBES, May 4, 1987, at 57
(accounting firms engage in "cascading," which involves enlisting clients for accounting services and
then persuading them to buy other management services that compromise firms independence);
Auditors Face U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at Y-14, col. 6 (statement of Eli Mason, Chair-
man of National Conference of C.P.A. Practitioners) ("there has been a marked deterioration in
professional behavior due to unscrupulous marketing practices," that is, cutting prices to obtain a
client); id., Mar. 10, 1985, at Y-8, col. 1 ("Not only is the auditor paid by the client whose financial
statements the auditor must examine on behalf of the public, but accounting firms have been ex-
panding into sidelines such as management consulting, which require being advocates for the cli-
ent."). Since 1980, major accounting firms have had to pay more that $180 million to settle liability
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ties' 88 industries. The arguments being advanced against civil RICO
vary, but usually one or more of eight points are made. First, RICO was
designed to cripple organized crime, not legitimate business.'8 9 Second,
suits. TIME, Sep. 21, 1986, at 61. See also Uneasy Period forAndersen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1984, at Y-
29, col. 3 (within two months Arthur Andersen & Co. agreed to $65 million in out-of-court settle-
ments). "[When fraudulent financial reporting occurs, serious consequences ensue. The damage
that results in widespread, with a sometimes devastating ripple effect." FINANcIA.L REPORMNG, supra,
at 4. The spectacular failures include, for example, the collapse in 1985 of E.S.M. Government
Securities, Inc., of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, which fell after falsified books that concealed millions of
dollars of losses from investors were made possible by a bribed accounting firm auditor. Seegenerally
In Re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528, 530-31, 539-43 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (text of indict-
ment). Investors with accounts at the firm, including as many as a dozen municipalities, lost as much
as $315 million. The collapse of E.S.M. also led to the insolvency of Home State Savings Bank in
Ohio, which lost almost $150 million, and the shutdown of 71 privately insured thrift institutions in
Ohio. See generally Barrons, Mar. 9, 1987, at 71, col. 1. Recently, the accounting firm of Grant,
Thornton, a/k/a Alexander Grant & Company, reached a $22.5 million settlement with the Ameri-
can Savings and Loan Association, which lost $55.3 million; it also reached a $50 million settlement
with 17 municipal governments, which had sued under RICO. See N.Y. Times, Sep. 17, 1986, at 48,
col. 6. Without RICO, it is doubtful that a favorable settlement could have been obtained by the
victims. See supra note 17 (treble damages). No wonder that the accounting industry is a major
contributor to the political campaigns of those in the forefront of the effort to disembowel the RICO
statute. See Nat'l LJ., Sep. 6, 1986, p. 2114-15. But see FINANcI4L REPORTING, supra, at 9 ("strong
and effective deterrence is essential in reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.").
188 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 629 (testimony of Securities Industry Association). In
1981, various writers knowledgeable about Wall Street began to suggest that the recent rise in cor-
porate takeovers was accompanied by insider trading so pervasive that nothing could be done to
prevent it. See, e.g., Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, FORTuNE, Jul. 1981, at 72. John
Shad, Chairman of the SEC, dismissed the significance of these allegations, claiming that such arti-
cles unfairly impugned the integrity of the securities markets and shook investor confidence. See
Hearings on SEC Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-120, 217-68 (1986). He also argued
that no new legislation was needed and that the Commission had sufficient resources to combat it.
See N.Y. Times, Jun. 19, 1986, at 34, col. 3. Most now concede that "the abuse of inside information
in the takeover game is endemic and has grown systematic over the past half-decade." Wall St. J.,
Feb. 17, 1987, at 27, col. 1 (3,000 takeover transactions involving $175 billion in 1986). See generally
Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1987, at 28; NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1986, at 44. It is "probably a safe bet that [the
unfolding federal probe will] vastly understate the total losses incurred by stock market investors, as
well as many target companies that no longer exist and their acquirer who doubtless paid too dearly
for them." Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1987, at 27, col. 1. It is no wonder, too, that the attack on RICO by
the securities industry is vigorous. It is harder to justify that Shad has spoken out against RICO. See
FoR-UNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 109. It is even harder to justify that Shad, until recently, had suggested
that SEC resources were adequate to police insider trading. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1987, at 18, col. 3.
See infra note 191 (private enforcement). Indeed, the SEC, as understaffed and resourced as it is,
actually earns a profit for the government. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1986, at 23, col. I (spent $106
million, but took in $215 million in fees). For a comprehensive survey and critique of the law and
economic literature on insider trading, see Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting A Critical Response to
the 'Chicago School,' 1986 DuKE LJ. 628. Statistical examinations of premerger stock performance
arrive at conflicting results on the extent of insider trading. Compare Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 79
(evidence of insider trading persuasive) with Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1987, at 4, col. 4 (SEC study:
variety of factors consistent with legitimate market for information) and N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987,
at 1, col. I (story on SEC study: variety of factors, including illegal behavior, explanatory of sharp
rise in takeover stock price). A number of civil RICO suits are on file seeking treble damages in
connection with the various scams. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 25, col. 3 (David Berger,
counsel for several plaintiffs, "[t]his was a tremendous racket.").
189 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 241 (testimony of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants) ("the legislative history of civil RICO confirms that Congress intended to create a
weapon in the war against organized crime, but at no time did Congress envision that it was creating
a powerful new weapon to be used against legitimate business people in ordinary commercial dis-
putes having nothing whatsoever to do with organized crime"). But see supra text accompanying
notes 7-13.
A quick review of history would have informed the Institute that the application of RICO be-
yond organized crime was the way most statutes had been implemented over the years. For exam-
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RICO applies in the typical business transaction that uses the mails or
phones.1 90 Third, since law enforcement agencies can be depended
upon to prosecute the real malefactors, private enforcement mechanisms
are not needed.' 9 1 Fourth, multiple damage suits are unnecessary. 92
pie, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights,
was "originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871." It "was enacted to provide a measure of
Federal control over state and territorial officials who were reluctant to enforce state laws against
persons who violated the rights of newly freed slaves and union sympathizers." H.R. REP. No. 548,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Nevertheless in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme
Court held that "although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the
South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States
whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates." Id. at 183. As such, § 1983 has been
used, not only to remedy discrimination against Blacks under color of state law, but to vindicate, for
example, a pregnant school teacher's right not to be subject to arbitrary maternity leave policies. See
Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Similarly, senators during the debates over
the Sherman Act, commented that its purpose was to break up the large monopoly trusts then ex-
isting and subject them to competition. See generally W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE 1-31 (1928). Since then, however, the Sherman Act's broad language has been
applied to invalidate tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947), sue the National Football League for conspiring to blacklist a player, Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), and enjoin the National Collegiate Athletic Association from
restricting football game television contracts of member schools, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The breadth of legislation, in short, is a function, not of
the specific state of mind of the legislators who vote on it, but also the scope of the language they use
in writing the statute. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) ("a statute is not to be
confined to the 'particular application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.' "); United States v.
Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 n.4 (1974) (mail fraud) ("while obviously not directed at credit card frauds
as such [its language] is sufficiently general... to include them if the requirements of the statute are
otherwise met.").
190 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 278 (testimony of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants) ("Claims based on 'mail fraud' and 'wire fraud' predicate offense are easy to plead in
many commercial disputes."). But see supra note 37 (pattern), note 183 (criminal securities fraud),
and infra note 238 (current fraud litigation); Civil Action, supra note 1, at 244 n.23 (good faith defense
to mail fraud).
191 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 310 (testimony of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants) ("It is baseless to assert that the targets of the private Civil RICO cases that private
lawyers have brought in the absence of prior convictions would have been prosecuted if only federal
and state prosecutors had more resources.").
With its principal reliance on the criminal law, public enforcement cannot be relied upon to do
the whole job of policing fraud. As Justice Jackson observed, "the criminal law has long proved
futile to reach the subtler kinds of fraud at all, and able to reach grosser fraud, only rarely." R.
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY 152 (Vintage ed. 1941). It is necessary, in short,
to be candid about the limitations of the criminal justice system in the white-collar crime area. Re-
sources available for investigation and prosecution are scarce. The common law criminal trial is
ponderous. The cases are complex. Offenders will be most often treated as "first offenders" even if
they had actually engaged in a pattern of behavior over a substantial period of time. Indeed, while
the proceeding is in form criminal, it is in substance civil, for a fine, not imprisonment, is the norm
for white-collar offenders. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jul. 1, 1985, at 43 (in federal courts,
probation granted in 40%o of antitrust, 61% of fraud, and 70%6 of embezzlement cases). Unfortu-
nately, too, the government is less than effective in its enforcement of fines. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 4,
1983, at 8, col. 3 (in federal courts, only 55% of all criminal fines collected over past 16 years; only
34%o over past 18 months; most of the 22,532 cases of unpaid federal fines totaling $185.6 million
involved white collar crime). A few convictions will yield only a minimal deterrent effect. See J.
CONKLIN, ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 129 (1977) (citations omitted):
[T]he criminal justice system treats business offenders with leniency. Prosecution is uncom-
mon, conviction is rare, and harsh sentences almost nonexistent. At most, a businessman
or corporation is fined; few individuals are imprisoned and those who are serve very short
sentences. Many reasons exist for this leniency. The wealth and prestige of businessmen,
their influence over the media, the trend towards more lenient punishment for all offend-
ers, the complexity and invisibility of many business crimes, the existence of regulatory
agencies and inspectors who seek compliance with the law rather than punishment of viola-
tors all help explain why the criminal justice system rarely deals harshly with businessmen.
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Fifth, RICO's "racketeer" label leads legitimate businesses to settle gar-
den variety fraud claims for extortionate amounts.193 Sixth, existing
This failure to punish business offenders may encourage feelings of mistrust toward com-
munity morality, and general social disorganization in the general population. Discrimina-
toryjustice may also provide lower-class and working-class individuals with justifications for
their own violation of the law, and it may provide political radicals with a desire to replace a
corrupt system in which equal justice is little more than a spoken ideal.
Public agencies, moreover, will never be funded at adequate levels. The funding of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, for example, has increased since 1979, but its staffing has decreased,
and its pending investigations are down. Yet the number of shares traded on the New York Stock
Exchange has shot up 300% since 1977; the number of first time registrants has increased by 260%.
See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATISTICS ON SEC's ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, March 25,
1985. See also Fedders & Perry, Policing Financial Disclosure Fraud: The SEC's Top Priority, 1984 J. OF
Acar. 58, 60 ("Because certain conduct violates the federal securities laws does not mean that the
commission must file charges and seek to impose sanctions on the malefactor."); supra note 188
(SEC Chairman Shad, until recently, contended that additional resources to police insider trading
were not necessary). Similarly, the futures industry in the United States has grown tremendously in
recent years. The 139.9 million futures contracts traded in 1983 represents a level of trading activity
15 times greater than that reached in 1968. The value of contracts traded exceeds $5 trillion a year.
See S. REP. No. 97-495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1983). Nevertheless, the resources of the Commod-
ities Futures Trading Commission have remained relatively constant. Some would suggest that the
industry is a scandal waiting to happen, for the Commission "is thoroughly out-gunned in the ongo-
ing battle against commodity fraud." Id.
As such, private enforcement mechanisms have an essential role today. Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Steven S. Trott put it well:
[I1n gauging the overall deterrent value of auxiliary enforcement by private plaintiffs, the
deterrence provided by the mere threat of private suits must be added to the deterrence
supplied by the suits that are actually filed. Furthermore, as the federal government's en-
forcement efforts continue to weaken organized crime and dispel the myth of invulnerabil-
ity that has long surrounded and protected its members, private plaintiffs may become
more willing to pursue RICO's attractive civil remedies in organized crime contexts. It
should be remembered, too, that civil RICO has significant deterrent potential when used
by institutional plaintiffs, such as units of state and local governments, which are not likely
to be intimidated at the prospect of suing organized crime members. Finally, civil RICO's
utility against continuous large-scale criminality not involving traditional organized crime
elements should be kept in mind. These considerations suggest that private civil RICO
enforcement in areas of the organized criminality may have had a greater deterrent impact
than is commonly recognized, and that both the threat and the actuality of private enforce-
ment might be expected to produce even greater deterrence in the future.
Oversight, supra note 27, at 140-41.
192 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 177-78 (testimony of Charles L. Marinaccio, Securities and
Exchange Commissioner) ("[The Securities Acts private claims for relief] have served well [with
only actual damages] as supplements to other enforcement mechanisms .... ). But see supra note 17
(treble damages).
193 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 311 (testimony of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants) ("The private claimant's power to brand a businessman or firm a 'racketeer' may cause
almost as much irreversible injury to the legitimate businessman as may an unwarranted criminal
charge." As Justice Marshall noted in the Sedima decision: "[Tihe defendant, facing a tremendous
financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled a 'racketeer,' will have a strong interest
in settling the dispute.") See also 132 CONG. REC. E 3531 (Oct. 10, 1986 daily ed.) (remarks of Rep.
Frederick C. Boucher) ("[RICO] allows plaintiffs to raise the stakes significantly in... [commercial
disputes] because a civil RICO claim carries with it the threat of treble damages, attorney's fees, and
the opprobrium of being labeled a 'racketeer.' As Justice Marshall concluded in examining the cur-
rent situation created by civil RICO: 'Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will de-
cide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for
extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to combat.' ").
Mr. Philip A. Feign, Assistant Securities Commissioner, Colorado Division of Securities, and
spokesman for the North American Securities Administrators Association before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, aptly commented:
Euphemisms like "commercial disputes," "commercial frauds," "garden variety frauds"
and "technical violations" ... are sanitized phrases often used by "legitimate businesses
and individuals" to distinguish their frauds from the "real" frauds perpetrated by the "real"
crooks. Yet all willful fraudulent conduct has in common the elements of premeditation,
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planning, motivation, execution over time and injury to victims and commerce. And it is all
crime.
Oversight, supra note 27 at 535.
On the role of euphemisms in encouraging public and official reluctance to enforce the law and
providing rationalizations for the violators themselves in the white-collar crime area, see PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 104-
08 (1976) ("most white collar crime is not at all morally neutral"); D. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLES
MONEY 102 (1952) (fact that embezzlers rationalize their conduct as different from theft is an impor-
tant fact in behavior pattern). It is simply not true, moreover, that the "racketeer" label results in
extortionate settlements. As quoted by Rep. Boucher, Justice Marshall suggests that "a prudent
defendant, facing ruinous exposure [under RICO] will decide to settle even a case with no merit."
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Accordingly, civil RICO lends itself, he argued, to
the very extortive purpose "it was designed to combat." Justice Marshall cites as authority for this
extraordinary proposition the REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION
ON CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 69 (1985). The Ad Hoc Task Force, in turn, con-
ducted a survey of 3,200 corporate litigation lawyers, of whom only 350 responded. Two factors,
however, undermine the scientific credibility of the general results of the survey: (1) the population
questioned was unrepresentative of the bar, and (2) the response rate was insufficient to warrant
broad generalizations. See D. HUFF, How TO LIE WrrIH STATISTICS 11-26 (sample with built-in bias),
37-52 (sample of insufficient number) (1982). More to the point here, the survey did not ask each of
the respondents a carefully phrased question calling for their opinion or experience with RICO as a
settlement weapon. Instead, the opinion relied upon by Justice Marshall was volunteered by only two
of the 350 respondents as grounds for repealing RICO. In fact, it is the experience of a majority of
seasoned litigators in the RICO area that adding a RICO claim to a suit does not facilitate settlement;
it inhibits it, particularly when a legitimate business is involved. See RICO COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 37, at 121-23.
Generally, businesses wrongfully accused of "racketeering" will not settle suits-even those that
should be compromised-as long as the racketeer label is in the litigation. Indeed, it is difficult to
understand howJustice Marshall or Representative Boucher could believe that a suit with "no merit"
faces a defendant with "ruinous exposure." If the plaintiffs suit has no merit, his chance of success is
zero, and zero multiplied by three (or any other number) is still zero. Before anyone accepts the
Task Force's,Justice Marshall's, or Representative Boucher's claim, he ought to ask for the names of
the defendants and the cases allegedly so settled; he should then inquire of the plaintiffs what their
evidence was. It is doubtful that it will be found that the litigation was meritless. It is doubtful, in
short, that responsible corporate or other defendants are paying offstrike suits in the RICO area-or
any other-at more than their settlement value, no matter what the theory of the complaint is.
Neither the racketeer label nor the threat of treble damages will convince prudent managers to sur-
render lightly scarce resources, merely because another files a suit. No matter how colorfully it is
phrased, the claim that such managers act against their own economic best interest is not credible.
Finally, white-collar crime, principally fraud, is no "garden variety" problem in the United
States today. Current estimates put it in the $200 billion range. See AT-r'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 42 (1985);
see generally, White Collar Crime: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
Parts I-Il (1985). That figure is similar in dimension to drugs. Drug Enforcement Hearings on H.R.
526 before Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (remarks
of Rep. William J. Hughes) ($110 billion spent annually; lost productivity, etc., $60 billion). Ulti-
mately, many of these costs of fraud are passed on to the rest of society. Insurance fraud, for exam-
ple, costs $11 billion annually, and since the typical insurance company must generate $1.25 in
premiums for every dollar it pays out, the bill that the nation must meet amounts to $13.75 billion.
N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 1980, at 27, col. 1. Indeed, the "insurance crisis" that has led legislatures to
rewrite our liability laws to curtail personal injury litigation might be better dealt with by enforcing
vigorously our laws against fraud, for the industry loses more than twice as much each year from
fraud as it says it lost overall last year because of the crisis in personal injury litigation. See N.Y.
Times, Mar. 2, 1986, at 20, col. 1 (industry spokesmen say it lost $5.5 billion; consumer spokesmen
say it made $1.7 billion). But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (insurance crisis ended with
insurance generally available, although at higher rate, and the industry is profitable again). See also
INSURANCE ADJUSTER, Dec. 1983, at 3 (survey by American Society of Industrial Security: 42% of
insurance companies surveyed had no formal policy of prosecuting criminally or suing civilly those
who submit fraudulent claims). While the cost of vexatious litigation is generally spread throughout
society by directors and officers liability insurance, too often the cost of fraud is not shared through
various kinds of insurance, and it rests on the shoulders of the victim, who can ill-afford to carry or
sustain it. No one ought seriously to contend, therefore, that such fraud is a "garden variety" prob-
lem, which may be "weeded out" with business-as-usual legal techniques.
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state jurisprudence is adequate to deal with fraud.194 Seventh, the fed-
eral courts are being unjustifiably inundated with the new litigation
under civil RICO.' 95 Eighth, current remedies against litigation abuse
are not adequate to remedy the misuse of RICO. 196
194 See Oversight, supra note 27, at 634-35 (remarks of Edward I. O'Brien, Securities Industry Asso-
ciation) ("[H]undreds of years of common law interpretation of state law fraud is completely sub-
verted to RICO. . . . [The] nation [ought not] abandon well over 200 years of common law
development by the states of what fraudulent practices are .... ); id. at 590-91 (remarks of Richard
P. Swanson, New York State Bar Association) ("There are, and there have always been, remedies for
common law fraud and securities fraud. There is no evidence whatsoever that those remedies are
inadequate. There is no evidence of an epidemic of fraud in the last 20 years that would necessitate
the broad, new remedies which RICO provides."). But see supra notes 187 (accounting) and 188
(securities).
In the 18th and 19th century, state fraud jurisprudence was developed in the context of the then
prevailing philosophies of laissez-faire and caveat emptor, which were aptly summed up by Mr. Justice
Dennison in Queen v.Jones, [1794] Salk 397,91 Eng. Rep. 330: "[W]e are not to indict one man for
making a fool of another." See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 105-10 (9th ed.
1984); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133 (1931). But see M. RADIN, THE
LAWFUL PURSUIT OF GAIN 54 (1931) ("[C]aveat emptor ... is bad Latin, and from the Roman point of
view, worse law."). Congress found the jurisprudence of the 18th and 19th centuries inadequate in
1970, when it enacted RICO. 84 Stat. 923 ("sanctions and remedies ... unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact"); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586 ("not adequate"). Writing in 1967, the President's
Crime Commission, whose studies led to RICO, noted the following in THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 47-48 (1967):
During the last few centuries economic life has become vastly more complex. Individual
families or groups of families are not self-sufficient; they rely for the basic necessities of life
on thousands or even millions of different people, each with a specialized function, many of
whom live hundreds or thousands of miles away.
The Commission also observed:
Fraud is especially vicious when it attacks, as it so often does, the poor or those who live on
the margin of poverty. Expensive nostrums for incurable diseases, home improvement
frauds, frauds involving the sale or repair of cars and other criminal schemes create losses
which are not only sizable in gross but are also significant and possibly devastating for
individual victims.
Id. at 33-34.
Since 1970, 27 states have enacted RICO-type legislation, 22 of which include the private multi-
ple damage suit. See infra Appendix A. Similar legislation is under active consideration in other
states. But see ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 91 (T. Bynum ed.
1987) (Illinois RICO bill defeated by "large corporations and accounting firms in Chicago"). Con-
gress, too, enacted legislation in the 1930s to deal with securities fraud, precisely because state fraud
law in that area was inadequate to deal with "racketeering" on Wall Street. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REC.
3801 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Duncan Fletcher, leading sponsor of Securities Act of 1933) ("[Securi-
ties Act is] designed to protect the public from financial racketeering of ... investment bankers
...."). As such, the law of the 18th or 19th century, or the federal securities statutes alone, can
hardly be characterized-simply-as not "inadequate." See generally M. RADIN, supra, at 47-56; "Blue
Sky Laws," II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 602-05 (1937); "Consumer Protection," IV ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 282; "Fraud," VI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 427-29.
195 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 631 (testimony of Securities Industry Association) ("Sedima
... cleared the way for an unlimited number of... cases.... mhese are but the first trickles of an
onrushing flood created by the bursting of the dam .... ). But see supra note 29 and infra Appendix
B.
196 Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(testimony of N. Minow) (hearings not printed as of current date). But see REPORT OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 21-22, 1983, at 56 ("Judge
Hunter stated that the Subcommittee on judicial Improvements ... had explored ways and means to
reduce frivolous or meritless litigation in the courts and had canvassed the various courts for ideas
and suggestions. After consideration of the suggestions received, the Subcommittee concluded, as
did many judges, that the existing tools are sufficient, but perhaps not fully understood or uti-
lized."). See also Farguson v. M. Bank Huston, 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11: monetary
sanctions imposed and injunction granted against further frivolous litigation under RICO); Spiegel
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1986) (Rule 38: sanctions applied to
RICO); Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531 (11 th Cir. 1983) (bad faith counsel fees awarded in RICO
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The American Bar Association has heard the call in the business
community for civil RICO reform. The turn around of the Association's
official policy in support of civil RICO is a classic study in special interest
pleading, in which lawyers move from a broad-based public policy analy-
sis to a narrow-focused position reflecting the views of their clients. The
participation of the Association in the process that ultimately resulted in
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 began with the establishment
of the American Bar Association Commission on Organized Crime in
September 1950.197 The Commission was established to assist and carry
forward the work of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organ-
ized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Committee), which consid-
ered the impact of organized crime in a number of areas, including
syndicated gambling, narcotics, the infiltration of legitimate businesses,
and public corruption. 198 The Bar Association Commission studied and
suit: inherent power, Rule 11, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 604-06 (D.
Haw. 1985) (Rule 11: counsel fee award for failure to investigate RICO facts); WSB Elec. Co. v.
Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate System, 103 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (RICO not applica-
ble to labor dispute: Rule 11 sanctions applied); Financial Fed'n, Inc. v. Ashkanazzy [1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,489 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (Rule 11: award of$150,000 in legal fees
in frivolous RICO claim), vacated and remanded, 742 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1984), reinstated in unpublished
opinion, King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Rule 11: dispute over will-frivo-
lous RICO claim and counsel fee awarded). Compare Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 2012
(1984) (Steven, J., dissenting) ("Frivolous cases should be treated as exactly that, and not as occa-
sions for fundamental shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for speed-
ily disposing of unfound claims; if they are inadequate to protect [individuals] from vexatious
litigation, then there is something wrong with those procedures, not with the law."); see also Meyers
v. Bethlehem Ship Bldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938) (Brandeis,J.) ("Lawsuits ... often prove
to... [be] groundless; but no way has been discovered for relieving a defendant from the necessity
of a trial to establish the fact.").
197 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME: ABA, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ix
(1951).
198 S. REP. No. 2370,81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S.
REP. No. 307, 82d, 1st Sess. (1951). See generally E. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951). The
Kefauver committee's origins lay in work done in California by then-Governor Earl Warren, who
created the California Crime Commission, which conducted a comprehensive review of organized
crime in California. See L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLIrICAL BIOGRAPHY 243-47 (1967). At the
time, the work of the committee was not well received. See, e.g., Wilson, "The Kefauver Committee
1950", in 5 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 3439 (A. Schlesinger & R. Burns eds.
1975). Significantly, at the beginning of the probe, "Attorney General McGrath [said] that the Jus-
tice Department had no persuasive evidence that a 'national crime syndicate' did exist." Id. at 3450.
Kefauver made an effort to offer the evidence, but did not persuade scholars. See, e.g., W. MOORE,
THE KEFAUVER COMMITrEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 1950-1952, at 241 (1974) (referring to the
committee's "debatable judgments on the structure of organized crime."). Senator Kefauver's in-
vestigation into organized crime was continued by SenatorJohn L. McClellan. The McClellan Com-
mittee's efforts focused on the infamous Appalachian organized crime gathering in upstate New
York in 1957 and the testimony of Mafia informantJoseph Valachi. That work also had its academic
critics. See A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 696 (1965)
("criminologists . . .were ... skeptical of ... the notion of a centrally organized . . .Mafia"); A.
SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 303 (1978) (skeptic's position is "more persuasive").
Evidence obtained more recently by the Department ofJustice and presented in court supports the
investigations of Senators Kefauver and McClellan. Compare United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408,
419 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., concurring) ("not a shred of legal evidence that the Appalachian gath-
ering was illegal") with United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (prosecution of
"crime family" of Cleveland); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir.) (prosecution
of "crime family" of Philadelphia), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v. Brooklier, 685
F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) (prosecution of "crime family" of Los Angeles) ("Appellants are
members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering
activities, including murder, extortion, gambling, and loansharking"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983); United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1982) (Bufalino, who was at Appalach-
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supported federal legislation formulated in light of the Kefauver Com-
mittee's hearings and findings, although much of it did not become law
until 1962 and 1970199 In addition, the Association drafted or endorsed
model state legislation in the area of witness immunity,200 perjury, 201
and syndicated gambling.20 2 Continuing those reform efforts, the Presi-
dent-Elect of the Association, Edward L. Wright, appeared in 1970
before a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee to present the
views of the Association on the Organized Crime Control Act, which was
then pending before the Committee.203 The Organized Crime Control
Act was, of course, comprehensive reform legislation containing titles
dealing with grand jury proceedings, witness immunity, recalcitrant wit-
nesses, false declarations, witness protection, depositions, the suppres-
sion of evidence, syndicated gambling, racketeer influenced and corrupt
organizations, and dangerous special offender sentencing.20 4 The views
of the Association on these issues were formulated by the Board of Gov-
ernors in response to a request by the President of the United States 20 5
to review the Senate-passed bills.20 6 Those views, too, had matured over
ian, was a member of"La Cosa Nostra, an organization whose members performed murders for one
another as a matter of professional courtesy"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); McFadden, The
Mafia of the 1980's: Divided and Under Seige, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Busting The Mob,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPr., Feb. 3, 1986, at 24; The Mob on Trial, Newsday, Sep. 7, 1986, at 4, col. 1
(background of recent Mafia trials, including Commission prosecution in New York City).
199 See generally Blakey & Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 923, 958-87 (1978) (reviewing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084-1151, 1952, 1953,
1955, 1961-1968).
200 FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERCAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME 157-86
(1952) (text of model legislation) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
201 See Organized Crime Control Hearings Before House Subcomm. No. 5, of the House Comm. on the Judici-
aty, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 579-85 (1970) (text of model legislation) [hereinafter House Hearings].
202 FINAL REPORT, supra note 200, at 57-91 (text of model legislation). The Model Gambling Act
began with a statement of findings and purpose and a mandate that its provisions be "liberally con-
strued." Id. at 62. The legislation, including its liberal construction clause, was enacted in a number
of states. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1.1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & 1984 Supp.). The concept
that legislation should have a statement of findings and purpose to cast light on its text goes back to
Plato; it was also supported by English writers as diverse as Coke and Bentham. See H. CAIRNS,
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 48-52 (1967). It was widely used in colonial legislation.
See, e.g., THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETrS 1 (1648). Additionally, it is an important aid in
construing legislation. See e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("entitled at
least to great respect"). Nevertheless, a restricted preamble may not be used to limit a clear text.
United States v. Briggs, 9 U.S. (9 How.) 351, 355 (1850); Roush v. State, 413 So. 2d 15, 19-20 (Fla.
1982) ("narrow title" does not limit "broad" text); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla.
1981) ("'prefatory' language cannot expand or restrict") (citing Yazzo & Mississippi Valley R. R. Co.
v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889)). See also supra note 21 (liberal construction clause).
203 House Hearings, supra note 201, at 537.
204 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). See supra note 13; see generally McClellan, The Organ-
ized Crime ControlAct (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 57 (1970).
205 House Hearings, supra note 201, at 539. The President had earlier called for such legislation,
including treble damage provisions, in his "Message on Organized Crime." Measures Relating to Or-
ganized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Procedures, of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 449-50 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
206 The Senate had first considered and passed the legislation by a vote of 73 to 1. See 116 CONG.
REC. 972 (1970). Subsequently, it reconsidered it, with the House amendments, including the treble
damage provisions, and passed it without objection. Id. at 36,280-96 (1970). The Association's
voice had been heard in the Senate Hearings through testimony of Rufus King. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 205, at 259, 268 (support expressed for legislation with public and private sanctions,
including treble damages).
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a period of years.20 7 While President Wright informed the Subcommit-
tee that the Association gave its "unqualified ... support" to the 1970
Act,20 8 he recommended to the Subcommittee restoration in the Senate
bill of language, as part of the bill's private enforcement mechanism,
which would authorize the recovery of treble damages for violations of
the Act.20 9 The Subcommittee accepted the Association's suggestion,
and a duly amended bill became law.2 10
The Department of Justice did not, of course, begin to implement
the criminal provisions of RICO until about 1975.211 The criminal de-
fense bar then reacted with extreme outrage,21 2 and it counterattacked
through the Bar Association. In August 1982, criminal defense lawyers
succeeded in getting the House of Delegates of the Association to recon-
sider the Association's position on the criminal provisions of RICO to
"insure . . . [their] effective execution . .. with proper regard for due
process and fundamental fairness." 21 3 Twelve amendments each of
which would have circumscribed the scope of RICO, were suggested.214
207 The report filed by the PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN., THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 208 (1967) recommended that a comprehensive set of re-
forms be adopted to control organized criminal activities. They included the use of civil antitrust
type remedies because of the easier standard of proof. Legislation to accomplish this objective was
introduced in 1967. The legislation, which included private equity and treble damage relief, was
studied by the Association and endorsed by the House of Delegates. Those recommendations were
given to Congress in 1969 and 1970. See Senate Hearings, supra note 205, at 556-58; House Hearings,
supra note 201, at 147-49. It is simply not true, therefore, to suggest that while RICO "for the most
part originated in the Senate," the civil provisions permitting suit by private parties "originated in
the House." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488 (Oakes, J.).
Nevertheless, Judge Oakes' view of RICO's legislative history has misled other courts, including
Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398 (Sedima's analysis of the legislative history of RICO termed "persuasive").
See also McCarthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 139-40 (D. Haw. 1984); White v. Fosco, 599
F. Supp. 710, 715-16 (D.D.C. 1984); Gardner v. Surnamer, 599 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (E.D. Pa.
1984). On Judge Oakes' view, see Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1081 ("precedential value... [in] doubt
by the Supreme Court's total rejection of the.., historical analysis of RICO").
208 Senate Hearings, supra note 205, at 538. While the Association's support was "unqualified," it
urged "prompt consideration of seven specific amendments to the bill. Id. at 547-48. Acceptance of
the amendments, however, was not made a condition of the Association's support. Id. at 551 (If the
amendments were not adopted the Association's position "would not be changed. It would support
[the bill].").
209 Id. at 543-44.
210 The vote was 431 to 26. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,363 (1970). It was signed into legislation on
Oct. 15, 1970 by the President following Senate reconsideration of the House amended bill.
211 See supra text accompanying note 27.
212 William G. Hundley, a prominent Washington defense counsel (his clients have included for-
mer Attorney General John Mitchell), was quoted: "But they're using this [RICO] against all kinds
of defendants. You know as well as I do that Congress never would have passed it if they ever
thought they were going to use it against governors and people like that." Are Prosecutors Going Wild
Over RICO, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 8, 1979, at 32, col. 1. Defense attorney Stanley S. Arken of
New York called RICO "cruel." George Collins of Chicago called its draftsmen "brilliant," but the
statute "totalitarian." In Pursuit of the Mob, Nat'l LJ., Nov. 26, 1979, at 12, col. 2. Sherman Magidson
of Chicago said, "RICO can reach out and castrate people." RICO the Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20,
1970, at 83. "It's like the death sentence," according to Harvey M. Silets of Chicago. "If a RICO
count is in the indictment, unless you work a [plea bargaining] deal, you are really courting the
danger of losing not only your liberty but your business as well." Racketeering Law Facing Key Test,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 18, col. 1. The potential for abuse "is not fanciful. It's there," added
Stephen Horn of Washington. Id. at 18, col. 2. "It's like using a cannon to go hunting for squir-
rels," said Barry Tarlow of Los Angeles. "The way it has been applied and the threats to apply it
involve a gross violation of individual rights and liberties." Id. at 18, col. 3.
213 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report on RICO 2 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 ABA REPORT].
214 The twelve recommendations were:
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None of them has been adopted by Congress. 215
The private civil bar did not, of course, begin to implement the civil
1. Replace the term "racketeering activity" by the less pejorative phrase "criminal
activity."
2. Provide that a criminal activity may be charged only if it occurs within five years of the
date of the indictment.
3. Provide that the criminal activities must occur in different criminal episodes which are
separate in time and place yet sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of
activity.
4. Provide that the criminal activities must be related by common scheme or plan.
5. Require that a pattern of criminal activity include at least one offense other than a viola-
tion of section 1341 (mail fraud), section 1343 (wire fraud), section 2314 (interstate trans-
portation of stolen goods), and section 2315 (sale or receipt of stolen goods).
6. Apply section 1962(a) only to those who are involved as principals in a pattern of crimi-
nal activity or collection of an unlawful debt.
7. Provide that sections 1962 (b) and (c) include a mens rea element requiring that the
accused knowingly commit the proscribed activities.
8. Repeal section 1962 (d).
9. Repeal the liberal construction dause, Pub. L. No. 91-452, section 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
10. Provide that section 1962(a), relative to forfeiture read, "may have forfeited" rather
than "shall forfeit."
11. Require that parties not charged with RICO offenses be granted a jury hearing, to be
held immediately after the verdict in the initial prosecution and prior to any final judgment
of forfeiture, regarding their claim to ownership in any property sought to be forfeited.
12. Add this language to section 1963(b): "A hearing shall be held in accordance with
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
1982 ABA REPORT, supra note 213, at 1-2. The report's recommendations were vigorously con-
tested, and they provoked a sharp dissent. Bar Association policy does not require the circulation of
such dissenting views. The majority report and the dissent, however, are reprinted in RICO Com-
MrrlE:E REPORT, supra note 37, at Appendix A. The majority did not explicitly call for a reconsidera-
tion of criminal RICO; it termed its recommendations only "fine-tuning." 1982 ABA REPORT, supra
note 213, at 2-3. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the recommendations demonstrates that
collectively they constituted nothing less than a major effort, not to fine-tune the statute, but to
return, insofar as practicable, to pre-RICO law, which the Congress had described in 1970 as "un-
necessarily limited in scope and impact." 84 Stat. 923; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586 ("The view was that
existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem [of sophisticated forms of
crime], which was of national dimensions.").
The principal moving force behind the ABA's position on criminal RICO was Barry Tarlow, a
Los Angeles criminal defense lawyer. See Burke, Did Jurors HearAbout "Mafia Ties"?, Nat'l LJ., Mar.
28, 1981, at 3, col. 1; Seigel, Arizona Hits Racketeers in Wallet, L.A. Times, May 3, 1983, at 17, col. 1.
Tarlow has written urging a narrow construction of RICO. See, e.g., Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA.
L. REv. 291 (1983); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165
(1980); Tarlow, Using the RICO Statute in Civil Litigation, Nat'l LJ., May 24, 1982, at 1, col. 3. He also
filed an amicus curiae brief for the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice in Turkette, 452 U.S. at
577, which advocated that RICO be held not to apply to illicit associations, a position that the
Supreme Court rejected eight to one. Had Tarlow's views obtained in Turkette, the recent series of
successful organized crime prosecutions in major cities throughout the nation, which is beginning to
cripple the mob, could not have been undertaken. See McFadden, The Mafia of the 1980's: Divided and
Under Seige, N.Y. Times, Mar 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1; The Mob on Trial, Newsday, Sep. 7, 1986, at4, col.
1, (background of recent Mafia trials, including Commission prosecution in New York City).
215 Congress returned to RICO in the passage of the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984," Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). The 1984 Act set aside several court decisions that
had given the criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO a narrow reading. See, e.g., United States v.
McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983) (imposing restrictions on forfeiture of proceeds and the
time of forfeiture), vacated, 404 U. S. 979, afd as modijied, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (imposing restrictions on pre-trial freeze orders). The
Association's recommendations in these areas were generally not followed. See Comprehensive Drgs
Penalty Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 40 (1983) for the testimony of the Section of CriminalJustice on the various forfeiture propos-
als then under consideration. Congress also returned to RICO in the passage of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). The 1986 Act adopted the substitu-
tion of assets concept, which had failed to pass in the 1984 Act. Compare § 2301 (no substituted
assets) with § 1153 (substituted assets) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n)).
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provisions of RICO on anything more than an isolated basis until about
1980.216 Here, too, civil defense lawyers reacted with extreme out-
rage,2 17 and they, too, counterattacked through the Bar Association and
succeeded in getting the House of Delegates of the Association to recon-
sider its position on the civil provisions of RICO. Reflecting the com-
plaints voiced in the business community, the opponents of civil RICO
protested that it was not being used "against 'mob' enterprises," but in a
wide range of claims in commercial civil litigation-'garden variety' fraud
cases involving legitimate businesses." 218  Civil RICO was "inappropri-
ately federaliz[ing] many areas of state common laws and displacing ex-
isting, effective federal remedies."21 9 In addition, curtailment of "civil
Rico would save the federal courts from a virtual flood of unwarranted
litigation." 220 In August 1986, the House of Delegates passed two reso-
lutions aimed at circumscribing civil RICO, one of which included a rec-
ommendation to set up a RICO Coordinating Committee to study
216 See supra text accompanying note 29.
217 "I see it as a strong-arm abuse," said Jane E. Durgon, counsel to Nissan Motor Acceptance
Corporation. See CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Apr. 1985, at 46. "It's inconceivable to me that Congress
intended to federalize every state cause of action involving mail or wire fraud," added Spencer Hosie
of San Francisco, California. Id. at 45. "RICO was passed as an effort to deal with organized crime.
It was never debated as a method to deal with garden-varieties fraud," complained Philip A. Laco-
vara of Washington, D.C. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at 30, col. 1. "The mere use of RICO may
be so prejudicial that it has undue force," noted Arthur Mathews of Washington, D.C. See N.Y.
Times,Jun. 27, 1983, at 23, col. 2. "It is sort of lawful libel," said Michael Klein of Washington, D.C.
See Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16. "Bankers, accountants and securities brokers out there are
confounded at the prospect that the racketeer statute is being applied to them!", noted Andrew
Weisman of Washington, D.C. See TWA AMBASSADOR, Jul. 1984, at 92. Their clients agreed. "It
doesn't sit very well in the board room of some of your largest corporations to be labeled racke-
teers," commented William Fitzpatrick of the Securities Industry Association. See Wall St.J.,Jun. 17,
1985, at 1, col. 1. Unlike the criminal defense counsel, the civil defense bar also commanded impres-
sive editorial support. See Wall St.J., Jan. 24, 1986, at 20, col. 1; Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1985, at A-26,
col. 1. But see N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at E-22, col. I ("The best way for worried corporations to
avoid the stigma and penalties of RICO is to prove they did not commit mail or wire fraud."). Com-
pare Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16, col. 1 (Carl Icahn, Wall Street raider: It is "an abomination
that a company management should resort to these gutter and smear tactics [under RICO]") with
N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1987, at 25, col. 3 (Icahn confirms SEC investigation into his takeover activity
for possible securities fraud action). See also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir.
1983) (Murnaghan, J., for the majority) ("Congress was out to attack the problem of organized
crime, not the problem of corporate control and risk arbitrage."). But see id. at 293 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot subscribe to the notion that it is the function of the courts to exclude white-
collar, corporate crime from [RICO]"). Those involved in the enactment of RICO joined in the
public discussion. See L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at 20, col. 1 (Prof. G. Robert Blakey) ("We knew
we weren't limiting... [RICO] to organized crime. If this was the appropriate way to handle the
mobster, then it also was the right way to handle the businessman who does the same things .... );
id. (AbnerJ. Mikva, former congressman, who fought RICO, and now D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
judge) ("I absolutely, flatly deny what Blakey says. Blakey is just plain wrong."). Even organized
crime figures, inadvertently,joined in the debate. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 8, 1985, at 11, col. 2 (Gennaro
J. Angiulo, leader of Boston organized crime family: "I wouldn't be in a legitimate business for all
the money in the world."). See generally, B. Seigel, RICO's Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A. Times,
Feb. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1; K. Sylverster, Civil RICO's New Punch, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1;
Lewin, Targets of Racketeering Law, N.Y. Times, Jun. 27, 1983, at 19, col. 2. Civil RICO is not totally
without supporters. See, e.g., Mokhiber, Why We Picketed the Corporate Law Firm of Wilmer, Cutter &
Pickering Chanting "Hands OffRICO", 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 147 (1986).
218 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, RICO COORDINATING COMMrITEE REPORT 3 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 ABA REPORT]. But see supra note 193 (role of euphemisms).
219 1987 ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at 5-6. But see supra note 194 (adequacy of state law) and
text accompanying notes 7-13.
220 1987 ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at 6. But see supra note 29 and infra Appendix B.
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pending reform legislation. 221 In February 1987, the House of Delegates
endorsed the reform legislation that had been considered in the 99th
Congress but suggested that it be made even more stringent.222 As such,
the Association has made an almost complete turnaround on both the
criminal and the civil provision of RICO.
Following the rejection in the Supreme Court223 of the Second Cir-
221 1987 ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at 3.
222 Id. at 1-2. The proposed legislation endorsed by the Association was H.R. 5445, as passed by
the House of Representatives. Id. The endorsement suggested that the bill also include:
1. Additional Damages. (a) Substitute the term "additional damages" for the term "punitive
damages", (b) provide that the judge, rather than the jury, shall determine whether addi-
tional damages are appropriate and in what amount, and (c) delete the "equitable factor"
from the list of factors that are to be considered in determining the amount of additional
damages.
2. Attorneys'Fees. Provide that, in business versus business suits, that reasonable attorneys'
fees be awarded to a defendant prevailing on the merits of a civil RICO claim if plaintiffs
RICO claims are not "substantially justified."
3. Pleading. Delete language amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
particularity of pleading. Ifa requirement for particularity of pleading is deemed necessary,
it should be incorporated in the RICO statute itself.
4. Statute of Limitations. Provide that a civil RICO action cannot be brought after the latest
of (1) three years after the date of the cause of action accrues or (2) one year after the date
of conviction of the defendant of a predicate act or of a RICO criminal prosecution.
5. "Person" and "Enterprise"Amendments. Amend 18 U.S.C., Section 1962 (c) to:
a. Provide that "person" (1) be a different entity than the "enterprise" under that section,
and (2) not be part of an affiliated group whose membership also includes the "enterprise."
b. Remove the "enterprise" from liability for treble damages or injunctive relief under the
civil provisions of RICO either directly or through the application of principles of agency,
respondeat superior, or similar doctrines.
6. "Conduct"Amendment. Amend 18 U.S.C. 1962 (c) to provide that a person may be found
to have "conducted" an enterprise's affhirs only when such person has actively participated
in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
The perspective brought to the reform of civil RICO by the RICO Coordinating Committee was
reflected in the rationales offered for the various amendments. "Additional" damages would be less
"pejorative and inflammatory" than "punitive." Id. at 8. Courts, rather than juries, would make the
award of "additional" damages. "[L]oopholes" that let injured persons recover from entities under
"agency or respondeat superior doctrines" should be closed. Id. at 9. But see infra note 235. As
such, "banks ... [and] securities brokers ... would be insulated from the application of RICO...."
1987 ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at 9. Narrowing the concept of "conduct" would be the "better
view." Id. But see infra note 236. As such, it "would... insulate accountants and bankers." 1987
ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at 9. But see THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERIM REPORT, PRESIDENT COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME
11, 26 (1984) (Illegal money laundry schemes run by "accountants, money brokers, money couriers,
bankers and banks;" not limited to organized crime famiies, but involve motorcycle groups and
legitimate businesses, including Gulf Oil Corp., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
Bethlehem Steel Corp. and Southland Corp.). The recent work of the Bar Association calls to mind
the remarks ofJustice Brandeis in 1905, then in private practice, before the Harvard Ethical Society:
"We hear much of the 'corporation lawyer' and far too little of the 'people's lawyer'. The great
opportunity of the American bar is and will be to stand again, as it has in the past, ready to protect
also the interests of the people." A. MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 30 (1933).
223 Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Judge
Oakes in Sedima suggested that civil RICO suits against "respected and legitimate 'enterprises'
[were] ... extraordinary if not outrageous." 741 F.2d at 487. He was not moved to make a similar
comment, when a prominent labor leader was accused of "racketeering." United States v. Scotto,
641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). In fact, Scotto was a
capodedna in the organized crime family of Carlo Gambino. See generally Waterfront Corruption: Hear-
ings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981); Note, United States v. Scotto: Progression of a Waterfront Corruption Prosecution from
Investigation Through Appeal, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 364 (1981). Indeed, Scotto was named as such
in the Senate report on RICO. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1969). Neverthe-
less, this data was not part of the government's trial proof. Questions on appeal are limited to those
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cuit's effort to rewrite civil RICO, attention in the struggle over civil
RICO reform shifted, as the Court rightly suggested,224 to Congress,
where hearings were held in the Senate225 and House.2 26 A concerted
drive was made to amend RICO to include the rejected criminal convic-
tion limitation. 22 7 Broadly, representatives of segments of the business
community found themselves pitted against consumer groups and state
attorneys general. 228 At first, the Department of Justice presented able
testimony against the criminal conviction limitation; it also supported the
provision of a private enforcement mechanism and expressed considera-
bly less alarm than the opponents of civil RICO with the various allega-
tions of RICO abuse.229 The Department ofJustice's love affair with the
concept of private civil enforcement, however, turned out to be a Sep-
tember to July romance. 230 Nevertheless, at about the time that the De-
properly raised. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1954). Scotto, not having been heard
on the issue, ought not have had his appeal decided on the basis of extra judicial factors, for it has
long been the rule that facts not a part of the record cannot be made part of a decision. See Knapp v.
Western Vt. R. R. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 117, 121 (1874) ("[facts] form no part ofrecord and cannot
be considered"); Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Audi alteranpartem-hear the other side! [A] demand.., spoken with the voice of... Due Process
. .. "). Similarly, how could Judge Oakes have known that a "respected" enterprise was "legiti-
mate" in a particular transaction unless evidence was heard on the issue. Indeed, even in a RICO
litigation, with nothing other than the complaint before him, the rule was that the judge was to take
the plaintiffs allegations as true. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1056 n.4, 1058, 1062 (8th
Cir. 1982), afd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
The Oakes' decision moved Judge Pratt in Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1984) to
observe:
Despite the clarity of Congress' language [in drafting RICO] defendants argue that since
RICO's primary purpose is to eradicate organized crime, it is [not] directed ... against
businessmen engaged in 'garden variety fraud' . ... While RICO's primary focus may have
been on organized crime, when considering the statute Congress also recognized that fraud
is a pervasive problem throughout our society ... which causes billions of dollars in loss
each year .... Congress further acknowledged that existing state and federal law was not
capable of dealing with this problem.
When Congress provided severe sanctions, both civil and criminal, for conducting the af-
fairs of an 'enterprise' through a 'pattern of racketeering activity,' it provided no exception
for businessmen, for white collar workers, for bankers, or for stockbrokers. If the conduct
of such people can sometimes fairly be characterized as 'garden variety fraud,' we can only
conclude that by the RICO statute Congress has provided an additional means to weed that
'garden' of its fraud.
224 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 ("It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being
brought almost solely against . . . [respected businesses] rather than against the archetypal, intimi-
dating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correc-
tion must lie with Congress.").
225 See generally Oversight, supra note 27.
226 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee onJudiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(hearing not printed as of current date); 113 CONG. REc. H3643 (daily ed. May 13, 1987) (insertion
in record of testimony of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
227 See generally Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, NAT'L L.J., Sep. 6, 1986, at 2114.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Oversight, supra note 27, at 141 ("Analysis of the available evidence seems to suggest
that the collective weight of [the burden that private civil RICO action have imposed on legitimate
businessmen, on the federal courts, and on the federal civil justice system] may not be as great as is
claimed, and that the burden in individual cases may be balanced by the social value of the remedy's
availability against large-scale, systematic illegality.").
230 Compare Letter from Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton to Vice President George
Bush (Jul. 22, 1986) ("The Department ofJustice believes... [that the criminal conviction limita-
tion] would best respond to the increasingly troublesome issues that civil RICO" raises) with Letter
from Acting Assistant Attorney General Philip D. Brady to Congressman John Conyers (Sep. 30,
[Vol. 62:526
EQUITABLE RELIEF
partment of Justice changed its position, the principal spokesman for
business groups in Congress, Congressman Frederick C. Boucher, of-
fered a multifaceted reform package, which passed the House of Repre-
sentatives, 231 but failed by two votes to pass in the Senate in the closing
1985) ("[W]e do not believe that... [the criminal conviction limitation] is the best approach to
limiting the scope of civil RICO." Brady added, "the Department also believes that the preferable
course would not include the elimination of treble damages and attorneys' fees for successful private
litigants in civil RICO cases."). Theodore C. Barreaux, Vice President of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, attributes the Department ofJustice's switch from opposition to sup-
port of a criminal conviction limitation for civil RICO to a series of meetings between accounting
institute lawyers and Department officials. Nat'l LJ., Sep. 6, 1986, at 2115. Significant, too, was a
change in personnel-the substitution at the position of the Deputy Attorney General in the Depart-
ment ofJustice for D. Lowell Jensen, a widely respected and experienced federal and state prosecu-
tor, Arnold I. Burns, a prominent New York corporation and securities lawyer, who is outspoken in
his opposition to civil RICO. See, e.g., 19 THE THIRD BRANCH: BULLETIN OF FEDERAL COURTS 3 (Mar.
1987) (interview of Arnold I. Burns) ("[B]ankers, merchants, insurance company agents are sued
under the civil RICO statute ... and that is a terrible thing."). The Administration's proposal is
embodied in Title IV of S.635, 100th Cong., ist Sess. (1987). For a detailed refutation of the cur-
rent position of the Department ofJustice, see Goldsmith & Maynes, The Undermining of Civil RICO, 2
CIuM.JusT. 6 (1987). See also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490 n.9 (1985). What the federal criminal prosecu-
tors appreciate, but the federal civil policy makers undervalue, is the devastating impact on criminal
prosecutions if most complaining witnesses in criminal RICO cases can be cross-examined about
their hopes to recover treble damages, if, but only if, the criminal prosecution results in a conviction.
231 132 CONC. REc. H. 9377 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986). The 1987 ABA REPORT, supra note 218, at
6-7 summarized H.R. 5445, which it termed a "compromise":
[The Boucher bill] divides civil RICO into three basic categories:
1. Treble damage suits would be retained for the U.S. Department of Justice and state
attorneys general and in cases where the defendant has been convicted of criminal offenses,
or predicate acts.
2. In cases where individual consumers have been harmed in connection with the
purchase of a consumer product or service, the remedy would be actual damages, attorneys
fees and "punitive" damages up to twice the amount of actual damages.
3. In cases where businesses are harmed, the remedy would be actual damages plus attor-
neys' fees.
It then noted other "key provisions":
1. Illicit activity. To remove the stigma of a defendant being labeled a "racketeer," the
compromise renames the Act the "Pattern of Illicit Activity Act," and replaces "racketeer-
ing" and variants of that term with the phrase "illicit activity" or "criminal."
2. Definition of Pattern. The compromise reduces from ten to five years the number of years
in which at least two acts of illicit activity must have occurred to constitute a "pattern" of
illicit activity.
3. Attorneys Fees. The compromise retains existing law regarding attorney fees. Thus, at-
torneys fees may be awarded as a part of costs to successful plaintiffs.
4. Pleadings. The compromise amends Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to require that in a section 1964(c) action, the plaintiff must, as to each defendant, plead
with particularity the facts supporting the plaintiffs cause of action.
5. Statute of Limitations. The Compromise provides that a civil RICO action cannot be
brought after the latest of (1) three years after the date when the cause of action accrued;
(2) three years after the date when the conduct causing injury to the plaintiff terminated; or
(3) two years after the date of conviction of the defendant of an offense under section 1962
or of an illicit activity, if such conviction was for the conduct in violation of section 1962
upon which the claim of the plaintiff is based.
6. Effective Date. The compromise basically makes the various procedural changes applica-
ble only to cases commenced after the date of enactment. The detrebling of damages, how-
ever, would be effective upon enactment and would thus apply to most pending cases.
The heart of the "compromise" Boucher bill lay in its effective date provision. Philip A. Lacovara of
Washington, D.C., who represents the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in the
Congress, put it well: "We're talking very big numbers. There are probably billions of dollars in
claims where you treble the damages." Nat'l LJ., Sep. 6, 1986, at 2114. Charles B. Curtis of Wash-
ington, D.C., who is also representing the accountants, agreed: "[There is] easily over $2 billion of
outstanding liability in pending litigation right now." Id. See also id. (Prof. G. Robert Blakey: "The
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hours of the 99th Congress. 232
The struggle over civil RICO continues in the judicial forum. While
the Supreme Court rejected the effort of the Second Circuit to rewrite
civil RICO, it did not change the basic attitude of the lower courts, which
remains hostile to civil RICO. 233 Judicial efforts to narrow the scope
of the statute continue largely unabated. The most significant efforts-
apart from "pattern" 234-focus on various techniques for an "enter-
prise," as opposed to individuals, to avoid responsibility or liability
people seeking 'reform' are pirates. They're no longer flying the stars and stripes. They're flying the
Jolly Roger.").
Congress has, of course, wide latitude in making civil, as opposed to criminal, statutes retroac-
tive. See, e.g., Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1135-38 (E.D. La.
1985) (Local Government Antitrust Act held constitutional: elimination of treble damage suits
against local governments). The Constitution only prohibits, without qualification, ex post facto
criminal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Nevertheless, not everything that
is constitutional is wise. Justice Frankfurter-then a professor of law-put it well in 1925:
"[P]reoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation rather than its wisdom ... [is] a false
value." P. KURLAND, FELIx FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 177 (1970). Making legislation
retroactive-whatever its naked constitutionality-is, in the words ofJustice Doe, one of the giants of
early American jurisprudence, in Kent v. Gray, 53 N.H. 576, 580 (1873), "wholly irreconcilable with
the spirit of our institutions." Justice Doe elaborated:
[I]t is most manifestly injurious, oppressive, and unjust, that, after an individual has, upon
the faith of existing laws, brought his action ... [that] the legislature should step in, and,
without any examination of the circumstances of the cause, arbitrarily repeal the law upon
which the action.., had been rested. [Sluch an exercise of power is irreconcilable... with
the great principles of freedom upon which [our institutions] are founded ....
Id.
RICO, in short, did not make anything unlawful that was not already unlawful before its passage
under its predicate offenses. See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1986)
("RICO is a remedial statute, as opposed to a substantive statute.... The provisions of section 1963
do not create 'new crimes' but serve as the prerequisites for the invocation of increased sanctions for
conduct which is proscribed elsewhere in both federal and state criminal codes."); Basic Concepts,
supra note I, at 1031-33. No question is presented by RICO's civil provisions of a sudden or unex-
pected new liability. See, e.g. ,J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONsTrrrUToNAL LAw 386-87 (1986)
(discussion of Anderson v. Mount Clemen Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)) (broad and unexpected
construction of Fair Labor Standards Act, which led to the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947). When
Congress passed RICO, it held out to victims of sophisticated forms of crime the promise of treble
damages to encourage the private enforcement of the law. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
Litigation has now been instituted in a trusting reliance on that promise. See infra Appendix B. It is a
promise, therefore, that Congress ought not lightly break, particularly when it is recognized that
making the amendments retroactive will insulate from their just desert the conduct of the perpetra-
tors of the recent insider trading frauds. See supra note 188. To be sure, the amendments contain a
treble damage suit applicable to those convicted of RICO or one of its predicate offenses. Careful
plea bargaining, however, can obviate those provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,Jun. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 2
(Kidder, Peabody & Co. pays $25.3 million to settle insider trading allegations without criminal
charge); id., Apr. 24, 1987, at 29, col. 6 (Ivan F. Boesky guilty plea) ("Lawyers said the felony charge
was so finely drawn that his vulnerability to lawsuits from stockholders was considerably lessened.").
Nor can much be expected quickly from disgorgement programs like the $50 million fund set up by
Boesky. See BARRONS, Mar. 9, 1987, at 70, col. 2 (Although several funds have been set up in recent
years, defrauded investors have yet to collect a cent.).
232 132 CONG. REC. S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986). For a general analysis of the reform pro-
posals, see Goldsmith, RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 Mime. L. REV. 4 (1987).
233 Before Sedima, 61% of the reported decisions were dismissed on various motions of defend-
ants. See Oversight, supra note 27, at 127. Since Sedima, through 1986, 55.9% of the reported deci-
sions have been, in whole or in part, dismissed on various motions of the defendants. See Appendix
B infra. The principal ground (40.47) has been the lack of a proper allegation of "pattern." Id. See
Moran, The Meaning of Pattern, 62 Cm[-]KENr L. REV. 139 (1985) ("hostilejudges free to fashion new
limitations on civil RICO").
234 See supra note 37.
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for those associated with it235 or for those who might be secondarily
235 One route taken to reach this result is the rule that an entity cannot be under § 1962(c) an
"enterprise" and a "person" charged as a defendant in the same count of the complaint or indict-
ment. The rule originated in Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc. 535 F. Supp. 1125
(D. Mass 1982), in which the district court, expressing reservations about recognizing a federal claim
for relief in a matter traditionally left to the states, reached a series of decisions reflecting a basically
hostile view toward the plaintiff and RICO. In addition to the enterprise-defendant rule, for exam-
ple, the court imposed a "commercial" injury limitation on the statute (id. at 1137), a result contrary
to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337-45 (1979), under
the comparable language of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Judge Shadur soon joined in the result. See
Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In Parnes, he dismissed a
complaint filed under § 1962(c) against a commodities brokerage firm for the allegedly fraudulent
conduct of two of its employee brokers concededly "conducting themselves within the scope of their
authority for common-law purposes." Id. at 23. Noting that his "text analysis owe[d] nothing to the
litigants" and reflected "intuitive unease" at the "unanticipated" application of RICO to a "garden-
variety fraud," he held that "the civil plaintiff can sue [under § 1962(c)] only the 'person' and not the
'enterprise' for damages suffered from . . . 'racketeering activity.'" Id. at 24. A majority of the courts
of appeal has adopted these holdings. See Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, 802 F.2d 122, 122-23 (5th
Cir. 1986) (collecting decisions under § 1962(c) from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th
circuits); see also Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 29-34 (1st Cir. 1986).
Only the Eleventh Circuit takes a contrary position. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). Apparently, the Ninth Circuit is unknowingly on
both sides of the issue. Compare United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807, 822 n.21 (9th Cir.)
(enterprise may be a defendant), reh'g. granted, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) with Rae v. Union Bank,
725 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1984) (enterprise may not be a defendant). A different result, how-
ever, has usually been reached at the court of appeals level under § 1962(a), where the leading
decision is Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984)
(dictum), afd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985), on remand, 647 F. Supp. 1026, 1033 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (injury under § 1962(a) not limited to investment). The dictum of Haroco became a holding or
was otherwise approved in Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987);
Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (9th Cir. 1986); Schofield,
793 F.2d at 29-34; Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985); B.F.
Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984),judgment reentered on remand, 617
F. Supp. 49 (D.NJ. 1985). Nevertheless, a number of district courts would still extend the immunity
of entities under § 1962(c) to § 1962(a). See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F.
Supp. 419, 428 (D. Minn. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
Ostensibly, the rule that an enterprise may not be a defendant in a claim under § 1962(c) stems
from two considerations, neither of which supports the rule. First, the rule is said to be rooted in a
belief that an enterprise cannot be "employed by or associated" with itself as a matter of simple
language usage. See, e.g., Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31. To be "self-associated" seems, of course, a strain
on the normal use of words, but to be "self-employed" hardly departs from standard usage. See IX
THE OXrORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 31 (Supp. 1985). Second, the rule is said to reflect an unease at
the prospect of holding an enterprise liable where it is the "victim" of the pattern of racketeering
activity. See, e.g., B.F. Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 634. That an enterprise may play different roles-perpetra-
tor, victim, instrument, or prize-in RICO violations, depending on the nature of the enterprise and
the type of racketeering activity, was first suggested in Civil Action, supra note 1, at 306-25; the article
was then cited with approval in Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401 ("helpful"). The approach reflects little
more than basic linguistic theory. See generally G. DILLON, INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY LINGUIS-
TIC SEMANTICS 68-82 (1977) (reviews the relevant literature on "Semantic Roles"). The Third Cir-
cuit's unease at holding a "victim" enterprise liable as a basis for a rule that no enterprise may be
liable, however, moved the ABA's Civil RICO Task Force to comment: "Mhis hardly seems a rea-
son to fashion a general rule that applies even when the enterprise is not the victim, but is instead the
perpetrator." AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE, A.B.A. SEC. OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND Busi-
NESS LAw 374 n.607 (1985) (emphasis in original). In fact, the Task Force, generally no friend to
civil RICO, recommended that the enterprise be treated as a defendant under appropriate circum-
stances. The Task Force offered the following rationale for its position:
[S]uppose the Board of Directors of a corporation commits multiple mail frauds in its oper-
ation of the company. Surely each participating member of the Board faces possible RICO
liability. The only policy reason not to hold the company liable as well is to protect corpo-
rate assets owned by innocent shareholders. But this interest may well be outweighed by
(1) the preference of allocating risk of loss to persons who have exercised some choice in
corporate governance or who can otherwise potentially exercise some control over corpo-
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rather than primarily liable to disassociate themselves from the enter-
rate affairs; (2) the desire to encourage private enforcement actions when a legitimate en-
terprise is being turned to corruption; (3) the need to encourage shareholders to insist
upon internal audit procedures to protect against such corporate activities; (4) the aim of
ensuring full compensation of losses suffered by victims; (5) the availability of actions on
behalf of the corporation or shareholders against the Board members; and (6) the appropri-
ateness of holding the corporate entity liable as a separate person just as many of the advan-
tages of "personhood" inure to its benefit. Accordingly, under circumstances like these,
the policies underlying RICO would appear to argue in favor of liability of an "enterprise"
which also is a "person" pursuing its affairs through racketeering activities.
Id. at 374-76.
Those courts holding that an enterprise may be a defendant under § 1962(a) recognize that no
textual language stands in the way of the rule, and if it were not adopted, the rule might "insulate
corporations from all liability" under RICO; if an enterprise that acted as a perpetrator could not be
sued under §§ 1962(c) or (a), it could not, in short, be sued under RICO at all. Schofield, 793 F.2d at
31 n.2 (emphasis in original).
Since neither of the ostensible justifications supports the rule, it ought to be reconsidered. "In
law ... the right answer usually depends on putting the right question." Estate of Rogers v. Com-
missioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.). The issue is not whether the enterprise may be
"employed by or associated" with itself, but whether the conduct of a person who is employed by or
associated with the enterprise may be attributed to the enterprise itself. That question, in turn, is
not answered by the text of RICO, but by the general doctrines of criminal agency or criminal respon-
deal superior. Ironically, the First Circuit used the enterprise-defendant rule to justify the rejection of
respondeat superior under RICO rather than respondeat superior to justify rejection of the enterprise-
defendant rule. See Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32-34; accord Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230
(8th Cir. 1987) ("where... principal.., was a victim"). Most importantly, these doctrines, as well as
the victim exclusion rule, also answer the second concern. When the enterprise is the victim, the
conduct of a person employed by or associated with it will not be attributed to it, for under the law of
criminal agency or criminal respondeat superior, the person must, not only act within the scope of his
agency or employment, but also with intent to benefit his principal or employer, the enterprise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279, 332 n.30, 337 (D.N.J. 1984) (rules for criminal respon-
deat superior under RICO are those of criminal, not civil law), aft'd, 780 F.2d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986). Similarly, under the victim exclusion rule, which is read into
federal criminal statutes, such individuals or entities cannot be found criminally responsible. See W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.8 (2d ed. 1986) (victim not within class liable). ("The busi-
nessmen who yields to the extortion of a racketeer ... may be unwise ... ; to view [him] . .. as
involved in the commission of the crime confounds the policy embodied in the prohibition") (quot-
ing Model Penal Code § 2.06 comment, at 323-24 (1985)). But see NATONAL COM'N ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 158 (1970). The approach that uses § 1962(a) as the
exclusive vehicle to reach the enterprise as perpetrator, moreover, suffers from underinclusion. Un-
fortunately, it fails to reach an enterprise that is not run for profit (a social club) or a pattern of
racketeering activity that does not produce income (murder), where it might be appropriate under the
express text of § 1963(a) to order "dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise." Indeed,
§ 1963(a)'s express reference to a remedy directly applicable to an "enterprise" sharply undercuts
the textual support for the supposed intent of Congress not to hold enterprises responsible for the
conduct of their agents or employees. See also §§ 1961(3) ("person" includes "entity") and (4) ("en-
terprise" includes "entity"); § 1963(a) ("whoever" defined in I U.S.C. § 1 (1982) to include "corpo-
rations, etc."). Entity responsibility, moreover, is the norm, not the exception, in federal criminal
jurisprudence, since at least the turn of the century. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R. R.
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) ("no valid objection in law and every reason in public
policy" why an entity should be liable); Civil Action, supra note 1, at 290 n.151 (cases collected and
analyzed). See generally Commissioner v. Beneficial Finance Co., 390 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33
(1971); Note, Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1246-51 (1979). Accordingly, corporations have regularly been
indicted and convicted since 1909. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-43 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982). Similar rules are also applicable to partnerships, United
States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125-27 (1958), and voluntary associations, United States
v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381, 389-90 (1913). Both the individual and the entity are responsi-
ble. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 408-11 (1962). That this result should obtain under
RICO ought not strike a discordant note, for a broader standard of civil liability is in fact the rule in
other areas. In American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), a
manufacturer of fuel cutoffs sought treble damages against a non-profit trade association. The
Supreme Court held that the association could be held liable for the conduct of an agent acting with
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apparent authority even though he did not act for the benefit of the principal. Id. at 567. Compare Philadel-
phia and Reading R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486 (1852) ("The rule of'respondeat supe-
rior,' or that the master shall be civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant, is of universal
application, whether the act be one of omission or commission, whether negligent, fraudulent or
deceitful. If it be done in the course of his employment, the master is liable; and it makes no differ-
ence that the master did not authorize, or even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he
disapproved or forbade it, he is equally liable, if the act be done in the course of his servant's em-
ployment.") with Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 438-40 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (respondeat superior rejected under RICO). Unless such an enterprise is made a defendant, it is
difficult to see how it could be dissolved or reorganized, that is, at least unless it is made a defendant
solely for the purposes of relief. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 19(a); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 nA (1977); United States v. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279, 337 (D.NJ. 1984)
(union not liable for unlawful conduct not undertaken with intent to benefit it, but retained as nomi-
nal defendant for purposes of relief), affd, 780 F.2d 267, 284, 295-96 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2247 (1986). But even then, "dissolution" would seem to be a harsh remedy without some
showing of "enterprise responsibility." Schofild, on the other hand, suggests that RICO is aimed at
individual, not entity responsibility. 793 F.2d at 33. This suggestion, however, mistakenly gives
insufficient weight to the definitions of"person," at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) ("individual or entity"), and
"whoever," at 1 U.S.C. § I (includes "corporation [etc.]" as well as individuals). See, e.g., Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.) (liability not limited to human beings), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983). See also supra note 14. In addition, Schofield recognizes the incongruity of limiting
§ 1962(a) to "income-related" conduct, but blames the statute, not its own construction of it. 793
F.2d at 31 n.2. The blame lies instead on Schofield's analysis.
Finally, the rule, if applied to group enterprise theories, threatens to undercut the central, but
not exclusive, purpose of RICO: an attack on organized crime itself as comprised of associations-in-
fact. Compare United States v. Standard Drywall Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(corporations cannot be defendant and one of a group constituting an enterprise) with Fustok v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (contra). Fortunately,
Haroco, while adopting the enterprise defendant rule under § 1962(c), expressly recognizes it ought
not be held applicable when the enterprise is an association in fact. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401. See also
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 730 (2d Cir. 1987) ("iTihere is neither a conceptual nor a doctri-
nal difficulty in positing an entity associated with a group of which it is but a part.") In its ill-consid-
ered rush to insulate legitimate businesses from RICO liability, the American Bar Association
disagreed. See supra note 222. The effect of rejecting this aspect of Haroco and adopting the Bar
Association recommendation would be to overrule Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, and to make legally
impossible the direct prosecution of organized crime families, for illegitimate businesses. As such,
many prosecutions could not have been brought, and RICO's central purpose would be thought-
lessly frustrated. See, e.g., United States v. Langella, 804 F.2d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 1986) (mob commis-
sion as enterprise; head of families and members as defendants); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d
1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (mob family as enterprise; head and members as defendants); United
States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221-24 (3d Cir.) (mob family as enterprise; members as defend-
ants), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). Accordingly, the Association has come full circle-from sup-
port to opposition against an organized crime statute.
It is difficult to evaluate the development and wide-spread acceptance of the enterprise-defend-
ant rule under § 1962(c) in the absence of any'defensible rationale for it. To attribute its develop-
ment judicially to the same economic based motivation that lies behind its advocacy by the Bar
Association would be too facile. The simultaneous development of the contrary rule under
§ 1962(a), opposed by the Association, undermines that inference. Dean Roscoe Pound in his Eco-
NOMIC INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL HIsToRY 100-05, 109-115 (1923) rightly offers powerful alternative
explanations of the development and growth of legal concepts, although he concedes that "it would
be grievous error to reject the economic interpretation wholly because of the extravagance of its
advocates [and that] it has an element of truth which we may not ignore .... " But see M. COHEN, LAW
AND SOCIAL ORDER 329-30 (1933) ("[Pound] seems to argue as if the presence of ethical notions and
logical reason proves that economic forces were not influential. This is clearly an inadequate view,
since logical, ethical and economic considerations are not mutually exclusive. There is a large mass
of evidence to show that our honest convictions are largely molded by the interest of the class to
which we belong."); M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT 201 (Collier ed. 1962) ("It is clearly a case of
what James and Dewey have called vicious intellectualism to argue as if the presence of a good
logical reason for a rule excludes a social or economic motive for it."). Instead, the explanation
seems to lie in the force of shallow logic and snowballing precedent. Once the rule was adopted by
district courts-for the wrong reasons-it seemed to acquire a life of its own, and it swept through
the courts of appeal largely without careful or independent analysis of its rationale or perverse con-
sequences. Accordingly, it is to be fondly hoped-but not expected-that the remaining circuits will
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prise.236 Efforts, too, have been made to read the concept of cognizable
decline to adopt it, that the Eleventh Circuit will remain firm in its opposition, and that eventually
the Supreme Court will resolve the split by rejecting the rule, or that Congress, despite the American
Bar Association, will itself overturn it.
236 Attacks have, for example, been made on the application ofrespondeat superior or agency princi-
ples to RICO. See supra note 235. In addition, the route of attack sometimes taken has been a
restrictive reading of the concept of "conduct" in § 1962(c). Two variations of this reading have
been made. One seeks to exclude from "conduct" matters that are not "essential or integral" to the
affairs of the organization. Compare Oversight, supra note 27, at 660-61 (testimony of Donald E.
Egan, counsel for American National Bank & Trust Co. in Haroco) with Official Transcript of Pro-
ceeding Before the Supreme Court of the United States, BKT Case No. 84-822, American Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Washington, D.C., Apr. 17, 1985, at 116-24 (bank's affairs not
"'conducted" by making unlawful loans). The second seeks to insulate from liability persons, princi-
pally outside accountants, lawyers, insurance companies, who are not personally involved in the
"management" of the organization. Both variations owe their origin to arguments both accepted
and rejected in the prosecution of Marvin Mandel, the governor of Maryland. See United States v.
Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F.
Supp. 1025 (D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 1079
(D. Md.), supplemented by, 415 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977), rev'd, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), a]Jd by equally
divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). Mandel was
convicted of a § 1962(b) violation; he was also charged with a § 1962(c) violation. Codefendants
were convicted of a § 1962(c) violation. Mandel was convicted (count 21) of acquiring an interest in
Security Investment Company "through" a pattern of racketeering activity. In addition, he was
charged (count 22) with conducting business with the State of Maryland "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity. Count 22 was dismissed by the district court. Codefendants were convicted
(count 23) of operating the Security Investment Company "through" a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity; they were also convicted (count 24) of operating Marlboro Race Track "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity. The racketeering activity alleged in each count consisted of mail fraud and
bribery. The basic allegation was that Mandel had received approximately $350,000 in "gifts" from
his codefendants during his six years in office in return for which he strengthened their financial
position. Mandel argued to the district court that "through" in § 1962(b) should be read to mean
"only those 'racketeering acts' which proximately resulted in the acquisition or maintenance of the
interest in the enterprise could be alleged to be part of the 'prohibited pattern.'" 415 F. Supp. at
1020. The district court rejected the contention, holding that such a "narrow... meaning of the
word 'through' would ... reward subtle and sophisticated patterns ... in which it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to identify the 'proximate cause' of an acquisition .... " Id. It would "unnecessa-
rily frustrate Congress' intention to rid the influence of racketeering activities from legitimate busi-
nesses." Id. Similarly, Mandel's codefendants argued that "conduct or participate" in § 1962(c)
required "involvement in the operation or management" of the enterprise. Mandel 591 F.2d at
1375. As such, the mere transfer of a partnership interest in Security Investment Company from one
of the codefendants to Mandel did not violate § 1963(c). The district court agreed, and set aside the
jury verdict on count 23, which was appealed by the government. The court of appeals upheld the
district court's interpretation, and added: "We find additional support for [the district court's] view
in the use of the word 'through' . . . . We do not believe Congress meant to sweep so broadly,
especially in light of the mandatory forfeiture penalties .... Id. at 1375. The transfer of the
interest was "the antithesis of operating it." Id. at 1376. "Mandel's interest was purely passive[;]...
he was not entitled to any management role .... " Id. It was not "the situation where the ...
enterprise [was] . . . a front for racketeering activity." Id.
The panel's holding in Mandel may not be the law of the Fourth Circuit today, not only because
the panel decision was set aside, but also because of the Webster decisions. United States v. Webster,
639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982); see also Note, United States v. Mandel: The Mail Fraud and En Banc Procedural Issues, 40 MD. L.
REV. 550, 582 n. 178 (1981) (cases collected on effect of vacating and affirming by equally divided en
banc decision). The Webster panel opinion, relying on Mandel, held that the "operating through"
requirement meant that the affairs of the enterprise had to be "advanced or benefited." Webster, 639
F.2d at 185-86. On rehearing by the panel, however, the court abandoned any effort to define "con-
duct through" in so simple a fashion. The court observed that:
It would have been far preferable had the earlier panel opinion adhered strictly to the lan-
guage of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) .... Unfortunately, we introduced 'promoted,' 'improved,'
'advanced' and 'benefited'... for 'conducted' . ...
Webster, 639 F.2d at 186. The court then noted that the required nexus would vary with the character
of the enterprise and the alleged pattern, giving as an example a non-profit enterprise, whose affairs
could not be "benefitted." Id. at 186-87. See also United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-61
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claims in an artificially narrow fashion,237  and to introduce
(5th Cir. 1981) (unmodified Webster rejected as "unduly restrictive"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982). Nevertheless, the language of Mandel was picked up in dictum by the Eighth Circuit's en
banc rehearing in Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983) ("ordinarily will require
management or operation"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983), and has been the basis for district
court holdings. See, e.g. ,John Peterson Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 613 F. Supp. 887, 900
(D. Minn. 1985) ("managerial role" required). No other court of appeals, however, has squarely
adopted the rule, and those to which it has been argued have rejected it. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966,970 (11th Cir. 1986) (not necessary for
outside auditor to participate in management; "conduct" means performance of activity necessary or
helpful to enterprise); United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 983 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[RICO] draws no
distinction between the foot soldier and the general...."), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1518 (1986); United
States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1984) (policeman protecting drug dealer), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir.) ("[Defendants] argue that
§ 1962(c) in essence requires that a defendant must be an 'insider' or 'manager' of the damage-
causing enterprise in order to suffer liability. We do not believe the language and purpose of
§ 1962(c) support such an interpretation."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); United States v. Mar-
tino, 648 F.2d 367, 382 (5th Cir. 1981) (low echelon participants in arson ring), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
943 (1982). The Bar Association would like to convert this minority perspective into the general
rule to protect "accountants and banks." See supra note 222. Not only does this recommendation
reflect profoundly unwise policy, it would not even be effective to achieve its stated objective. Ap-
parently, the lawyers who prepared the Association's report are unaware of the basic principles of
criminal jurisprudence. A focus on "conduct" as a means of limiting RICO is misconceived; it ig-
nores the distinction between principals in the first degree and principals in the second degree and
conspiracy. If one principal in the first degree or a co-conspirator commits an offense, other persons
can be principals in the second degree or co-conspirators, even if they could not be guilty as princi-
pals in the first degree of the offense. See, e.g., Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117, 120-21
n.5 (1932) (women, who cannot violate Mann Act, may, if conduct goes beyond mere acquiescence,
be aiders and abettors or co-conspirators); W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-r, CIMINAL LAw § 6.5(g)(2) (2d ed.
1986). Outsiders would only be insulated, therefore, if no insider with whom they were associated
fell into the management category, an unlikely event in most white-collar scams.
237 Here, the attack on responsibility under RICO seeks to frustrate the use of § 1962(a) as a
means of holding an entity responsible, where it cannot be an enterprise under § 1962(c). Under
§ 1962(c), the injury to the victim, of course, flows from the commission of the racketeering acts.
Even so, Sedima struck down a concerted effort to narrow liability under § 1962(c). 473 U.S. at 495.
("If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provi-
sions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a
claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous
'racketeering injury' requirement.") (citations omitted). An effort is now being made, however, to
give § 1962(a) a similarly artifical and narrow twist by arguing that for the injury to be cognizable
under RICO, it must flow from the gravamen of the offense, that is, the "investment or use" under
§ 1962(a), and not any aspect of the violation, including the racketeering activity. The decisions at
the district court level are split. Compare Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107, 109
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (injury must be from investment, not racketeering acts) and Heritage Ins. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. Ill 1986) (same) with Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 647 F. Supp. 1026, 1033 (N.D. Il. 1986) ("[To so rule] would
effectively shield deep corporate pockets") and Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 805-07 (S.D. La. 1986) (contra) ("To [so] rule.., would emasculate the
statute with regard to corporate defendants."). Gilbert is illustrative of these decisions that adopt the
"investment or use" only rule: it was on remand after Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 769 F.2d 940,
941 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the Third Circuit reversed the district court's attempt to impose an
organized crime limitation on civil, but not criminal RICO. Undaunted in its effort to circumscribe
the statute, it then read the concept of injury narrowly.
The decisions such as Gilbert that have adopted the "investment or use" only rule have been
singularly free of careful analysis. As such, they are subject to severe criticism on analytical and
policy grounds. Analytically, injury under § 1962(a) may flow from-
1. Racketeering activity,
2. The investment (or use) of the income (or its proceeds) in an enterprise, or
3. both.
It is, of course, possible to be injured by "racketeering activity" that does not produce income (un-
successful fraud) that is part of a pattern of racketeering acts that does produce income (successful
frauds). Nothing in the statute, however, says injury by the first kind of activity is not injury within
the statute. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495-99 (damage not limited to racketeering or competitive in-
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jury); Marshall & Isley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987) (sufficient to show injury
from "some or all of the activities comprising the violation"). The investment only rule, however,
would preclude recovery for such acts. Where "racketeering activity" produces income and it (or its
proceeds) is invested (or used) in an enterprise, injury may be of at least three types-
1. to the enterprise into which it is invested (or in which it is used),
2. to another entity or individual, who suffers competitive or other disadvantage, or
3. to the entity or individual from whom it was obtained by the racketeering acts.
Little doubt exists-although the decisions have not discussed the concept in detail-that direct
investment or competitive injury is within the statute. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15 (direct or
competitive). Nevertheless, the decisions adopting the "investment or use" only rule seem to as-
sume, but largely without careful analysis, that the victim of "racketeering activity" is not separately
injured by the investment (or use) of the income (or its proceeds). This view is fundamentally mis-
taken. Property, including money, taken by theft or fraud is converted. The victim may sue for fraud
or conversion. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Custom Cycle Delight, Inc., 664 F.2d
1371, 1372 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law). Any distinct act of dominion over the property, however,
is a separate conversion. See, e.g., Gowin v. Heider, 237 Or. 266, 272 391 P.2d 630, 626 (1964)
("[T]he plaintiff... [has] his election to make either the original conversion of the later one the basis
of [his action]."). Unauthorized use of money may be a distinct act of dominion. See, e.g., Bonello v.
Perera Co., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 512 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (New York law). Accordingly, even the "investment or use" only rule ought not prevent a
victim of a "racketeering activity" that does produce income from bringing suit under § 1962(a) for
its separate investment or use in an enterprise.
The policy objections to the "investment or use" only rule are equally strong. It took the
Supreme Court's decision in Sedima to prevent § 1962(c) from being confined to indirect or competi-
tive injury in a misguided effort to secure legal immunity for "legitimate" enterprises. Congress did
not intend to confine RICO to organized crime or to preclude its application to white-collar crime.
That, however, might well be the effect of the adoption of no enterprise-defendant rule under
§ 1962(c) and a narrowly defined "investment or use" only rule under § 1962(a). It would, in short,
largely frustrate the textual and policy considerations that have led circuit courts of appeal to adopt
the rule that the "person" who plays the role of "enterprise" may also be a "defendant" under
§ 1962(a). See, e.g., Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1398 ("we hold that where a corporation is the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, it can be both the 'person' and
the 'enterprise'). Masi, 779 F.2d at 397, 401 ("a corporation-enterprise may be held liable under
subsection (a) when the corporation is also a perpetrator. . . . This result is in accord with the
primary purpose of RICO, which, after all, is to reach those who ultimately profit from racketeering
.) (citing Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402, aftd, 479 U.S. 606 (1985); Schofield v. First Commodity
Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) ("we agree with .... Haroco ... which found that a culpable
enterprise may be held under... § 1962(a)"). The courts would have in two steps adopted a policy
that Congress specifically declined to adopt when RICO was enacted in 1970. The no-person-enter-
prise rule under § 1962(c) coupled with the investment-only rule under § 1962(a) would accomplish
in two steps what the organized-crime-only-no-legitimate-business rule sought to achieve. As such,
the two rules, taken together, constitute an effort to reverse Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 ("Congress
wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises.") (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590).
Other variations on the theme have been advanced. May a victim include among the pattern of
racketeering acts he alleges those that are only injurious to others? Compare Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney,
632 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (yes) with Bender v. Continental Tower Ltd., 632 F. Supp.
497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (no). This rule was too much for even judge Shadur. See S.J. Advanced
Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (may include acts
injurious to others); Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[Elach victim can
sue the RICO violator adducing evidence of the offense against the other victim to meet the statute's
proof requirements as to a 'pattern.' "). It has now been authoritively rejected by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. See Marshall & Isley Trust, 819 F.2d at 809 ("[Sedima placed] on the courts [the onus] to develop
a sensible description of what can constitute a 'pattern' . . . .By stiffening the requirements for
showing a pattern, courts can narrow the application of RICO in accordance with a presumed con-
gressional intent. Given such a definition of 'pattern,' however, it is wrong to require a plaintiff to
show injury resulting from every act comprising the pattern."). See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979) (civil rights) ("[A]s long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury
as a result of the defendant's conduct, he is permitted to prove that the rights of another were
infringed."); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (civil rights) ("gen-
eral pattern of discrimination"); Denny v. Hutchins, 649 F.2d 816, 822 (10th Cir. 1981) (civil rights)
(other discrimination to show intent). Is it necessary for the victim himself to be injured by a com-
plete, as opposed to partial, pattern which may also be injurious to others? Compare Town of Kearny
v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1412, 1418-19 (D.N.J. 1986) (yes) with
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common law limitations on the underlying predicate offenses.2 38 In
Virden v. Graphics One, 623 F. Supp. 1417, 1425 (D.C. Cal. 1985) (no). See also Marshall &Isley Trust
Co., 819 F.2d at 809 ("Imposing such a requirement... would conflate... two separate inquiries:
First, was there a pattern ...., and second, was the plaintiff injured by the ... violation? ...
[P]laintiff [need not] allege an injury... caused by at least two predicate acts, or caused by all the
acts adding up to a pattern."). Each of these issues ought to be resolved by a reading of the plain
language of the statute; it says "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). It does not say "gravamen" or "complete violation"; it says
"violation." If it is argued that the provision is open to more than one construction, the liberal
construction clause requires that the construction that enhances, not retards, the remedy be
adopted. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10 ("[I]f Congress' liberal construction mandate is to be applied
anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident."). That the narrow
view is being taken reflects judicial hostility, not a careful analysis of the text, legislative history, or
policy of RICO. See also N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Gulf& Western Indus., 650 F. Supp. 1115, 1127-28 (D.
Kan. 1986) (recovery under § 1962(a) and (b) limited to injury from investment or acquisition).
238 The bulk of the civil RICO claims for relief now being pressed in the courts are for fraud. See
infra Appendix B. The principal predicate fraud offenses relied upon are mail and wire fraud. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). Should, for example, common law concepts of reliance be read into
the elements of the claim for relief either as part of "fraud" or "by reason of"? An answer to that
question requires a review of the development and scope of the two statutes. See generally Rakoff, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 Dug. L. REv. 771 (1980) (best general treatment of the develop-
ment of mail fraud). The scope of the statutes may be quickly summarized. The mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes are in pari materia; decisions under each are regularly used to interpret similar lan-
guage in the other. See, e.g., United States v. Soteras, 770 F.2d 641, 645 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985) ("equally
applicable"); United States v. Westbo, 746 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[tjhese mail fraud rules
are equally applicable to wire fraud"); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977)
(mail fraud cases used to interpret wire fraud). The purpose of the two statutes, taken together, is to
prohibit schemes to defraud that utilize, in varying circumstances, the mails or interstate communi-
cation facilities. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S.
306, 314 (1896). Mail or wire fraud may be found where two elements come together: a scheme to
defraud and the use of the mails or wires to execute the scheme. See Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (two elements); United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1986).
The boundaries of "scheme to defraud" are, however, not limited to common law concepts of fraud
or false pretenses. Durland, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14. See generally Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855, 860-61 (1966); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); Haas v. Henkel,
216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910). See United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987)
(§ 1344: " 'scheme to defraud'. . . measured in a particular case by determining whether the scheme
demonstrated a departure from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and candid
dealings in the general life of the community"). The extension of the concept by the "intangible
rights" doctrine and breach of fiduciary relations rule, two matters of great controversy, was recently
and is now before the Supreme Court, not only under mail fraud, but securities fraud. See United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.) (Winans), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986); United
States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir.), reu'd sub. non., McMalley v. United States, No. 86-234 (Sup.
Ct.Jun. 22, 1987) (rejection of intangible rights doctrine under § 1341, but not § 371). See generally
Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud, 21 AM. L. REV. (1983); Coffee, From Tort to Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 117 (1981); United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-60 (1st Cir. 1987) (cases collected on
public or private fiduciary's failure to disclose material information). The phrase has been "broadly
interpreted" by the courts. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 409 (2d Cir. 1985). "Congress ...
decided not to define [it] ...because the range of potential schemes is as broad as the criminal
imagination." United States v. Bonansinga, 773 F.2d 166, 173 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct.
2281 (1986). See also Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.) ("The law does not define
fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human ingenuity."), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941). Where a false statement is made, knowledge or reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity is required. See, e.g., United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 188 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir) (mail fraud
and securities fraud), cert denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). Future promises may be false. Durland, 161
U.S. at 313; United States v. Pritchard, 773 F.2d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (intent to pay), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 860 (1986); United States v. O'Boyle, 680 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1982). Direct
evidence of intent to defraud is not required; it may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See
United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) ("may infer" instruction upheld), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct 1947 (1986); United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The
evidence established a pattern of conduct by defendant from which the jury could infer a scheme to
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addition, an effort has been made--improperly and properly-to impose
defraud."); United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 331 (1984);
United States v. Alson, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). But a
false promise to perform may not be inferred from mere nonperformance. See Soper v. Simmons
Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Otherwise, it is ajury question. United States v.
Stephens, 779 F.2d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gaspard, 744 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1217 (1985); Alexander, 743 F.2d at 475. The use of the mails or wires
need not have been essential to the scheme, only an "incident to an essential part." Pereira, 347 U.S.
at 8. See also United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974) (mailing after obtaining property not in
execution) ("sufficiently closely related"); United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 1004-06 (11th
Cir. 1985) (pattern instruction upheld). The defendant himself need not have mailed the letter or
made the phone call. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9; Bonansinga, 773 F.2d at 169-73 (mailings between
victims sufficient, but not where merely adjusting accounts); United States v. Soteras, 770 F.2d 641,
645 (7th Cir. 1985) (reasonably foreseeable); United States v. Westbo, 746 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir.
1984) ("Once membership in a scheme to defraud is established, a knowing participant is liable for
any wire communication which subsequently takes place or which previously took place in connec-
tion with the scheme."); United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236, 240-42 (5th Cir. 1984)
(others may mail; mailing not "essential," but "integral"). It is only required that it be shown that
the defendant "caused" the mailing or the communications "with knowledge that the use of the
mails [would] follow in the ordinary course of business, or 'where such use can reasonably be fore-
seen, even though not actually intended .... Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9. Mailings subsequent to the
execution of the scheme will not support a conviction. See Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94
(1944). But attempts to "lull" the victim, even after property has been obtained, may be included.
See United States v. Brewer, 807 F.2d 895, 897-98 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987);
United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) ("an attempt to buy time in order to avoid or
at least postpone detection"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985); United States v. Adkins, 741 F.2d
744, 750 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Mailings 'designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, post-
pone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect' are mailings in furtherance of the
fraudulent scheme.") (quoting United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 800 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 829 (1975)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2113-14 (1985); United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885,
890 (1st Cir. 1982) ("deliberate attempt to lull detection"). The question of furtherance, including
lulling, is for thejury. See United States v. Lane, 735 F.2d 799, 806-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1206 (1985). The mailing or use of the wire need not itself involve a false representation; it may
merely be the means by which the property was obtained by the scheme to defraud. See United
States v. Contenti, 735 F.2d 628, 631 (Ist Cir. 1984) (insurance checks) ("Each separate use of the
mails in furtherance of the scheme constitutes a separate offense .... The mailed letter need not
itself disclose any intent to defraud."). See also United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir.
1984) (each transportation, like each mailing or telephone call, constitutes a separate offense), cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985). Each participant in a scheme is "responsible for the use of the mails
[by others] in the execution of the scheme." United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1007 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1984). Mail and wire fraud require intent to defraud. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9. Intent to defraud
is negated by its converse: good faith. See Kimmel, 777 F.2d at 293; United States v. Casperson, 773
F.2d 216, 221-24 (8th Cir. 1985). But it is not necessary that there be a false representation. See
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1506-10 (D.NJ. 1985) (RICO scheme to
defraud: cases collected).
A number of conceptual difficulties arise, however, under civil RICO when the parties or the
courts "confus[e] mail fraud with common law fraud." Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Ware-
house Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1986). A civil claim for relief under a common law tort action
in deceit requires, inter alia, a showing of the following elements: Justifiable reliance upon a false
misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff in taking action or refraining from it. See W. PROSSER &
W. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984); see also Contractor Utility Sales Co. v. Certain-
Teed Corp., 748 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 2984) (law of Pa.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1397 (1985).
Efforts by different courts to read these common law principles into the RICO predicate acts of
mail and wire fraud have created varying opinions. In Flowers v. Continental Grain Co., 775 F.2d
1051 (8th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff brought a civil RICO action against the owners of a rendering
plant. Plaintiff, the former manager of the plant, sued the owners alleging extortion and mail fraud
as predicate acts. The Flowers court found the RICO count insufficient, partly because mail fraud was
not charged. 775 F.2d at 1054. At the same time, the Flowers court confused the elements of mail
fraud with those of common law fraudulent misrepresentation. See also Horn, 776 F.2d at 780-82
(common law fraud, including reliance, read into § 1343). In Flowers, the Eighth Circuit also found
that "[tihe complaint does not charge that defendants made any representations to plaintiff known at
the time to be false." 775 F.2d at 1054. A material misrepresentation of fact, however, is an element
of common law fraudulent misrepresentation, but it is not an element of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1341 prohibits "having devised... any scheme ... to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent... representation .... (Emphasis added). See McLendon, 602 F.
Supp. at 1506-10. The Flowers court, moreover, found the complaint insufficient for a lack of a "clear
allegation that plaintiff has parted with property because of his reliance on representations made by
defendants that they knew were false." 775 F.2d at 1054. See also Blount Financial Servs. v. Heller,
No. 86-5342 (6th Cir. May 27, 1987) (false statement and reliance required for RICO mail fraud).
While reasonable reliance is an element of common law fraudulent misrepresentation, it is not an
element of mail fraud. All that is required is a scheme to defraud and the use of the mails to execute
the scheme. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9. It is not necessary that the victim detrimentally relied on the
mailing. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 455 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967
(1972). For a violation of the mail fraud statute, the intended victim need not even have actually
been defrauded. See United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 912 (1981). In McLendon, on the other hand, the court properly dealt with the first common law
fraud element wrongly required by Flowers-a misrepresentation or omission. In holding that a ma-
terial misrepresentation or omission was not an element of mail fraud, the McLendon court said:
A course of conduct may comprise a scheme or artifice to defraud, even absent particular
fraudulent statements or omissions. Indeed, the statute discusses two separate types of
mail/wire fraud offenses: one may act pursuant to a "scheme or artifice to defraud," or one
may act "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations of promises."
[O]ther courts ... have given the statute such a disjunctive meaning.
602 F. Supp. at 1507 (emphasis in original). Thus, McLendon, unlike Flowers, but in accord with
general mail fraud jurisprudence, did not require a showing of material misrepresentation or omis-
sion for the predicate act of mail fraud in a civil RICO complaint.
Flowers second imposition of a common law deceit element upon mail fraud involved the court's
requirement of a showing of reasonable reliance to the victim's detriment. The Amco court correctly
held that "[t]o find a violation of the federal mail fraud statute it is not necessary that the victim have
detrimentally relied on the mailed misrepresentation." 782 F.2d at 482. The court noted that "the
intended victim need not even have been defrauded for liability to attach under the mail fraud stat-
ute." Id. Simply, "justifiable reliance is not an element that need be proven to establish a mail fraud
violation." Id.
Analytically, the reliance issue turns on whether or not such reliance is an element of the wrong
or an element of the nexus between the wrong and the injury. Traditionally, reliance was an element
of deceit; the nexus between deceit and the injury was independently conceptualized in proximate
cause terms. See, e.g., Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 130 (1889). Since the concept of a "scheme to
defraud" requires neither a representation nor reliance, it is difficult to see how the element of
reliance can be introduced into RICO, except as part of causation, a result that would be indefen-
sible as a matter of general jurisprudence; it would give to RICO a more narrow definition of cause
than that which is followed in other federal statutes.
Congress' use of"by reason of" to indicate casual connection is a feature found in a number of
other federal statutes. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982) (3x damage; by reason of); 15 U.S.C. § 72
(same); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1) (by reason of); 22 U.S.C. § 2399(b) (2x damage; by reason of); 29
U.S.C. § 187 (actual damage; by reason of); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (3x damage; by reason of).
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187, is illustrative. In Mead v.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 523 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1975), for example, the court found, that for
purposes of § 187, an "injury occurred 'by reason of' particular unlawful conduct if such conduct
'materially contributed' to the injury.., or was a 'substantial factor' in bringing it about. . . 'not
withstanding other factors contributed also .... .' As the words 'by reason of' make clear, section
303(b) requires.., a casual nexus between the... activity and the injury suffered by the plaintiff."
See also Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 1983). "By requiring the
[plaintiff] to show that the.., violation.., was a substantial factor in causing the injury, the court
preserve[s] the [plaintiff's] right to compensation for losses proximately caused by the [violation]
...." Id. at 538. For recovery under the Labor Management Relations Act, "[i]t is sufficient if the
evidence 'support[ed] ajust and reasonable inference'" of damage through the violation. Mead, 523
F.2d at 1377 (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946)). Accordingly,
in actions under the Labor Management Relations Act, the court may "infer from.., circumstantial
evidence that the necessary causal relation between the.., conduct and the claimed damage ex-
isted." Mead, 523 F.2d at 1378.
A comparison of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b), with RICO
is significant for several reasons. Not only is the "by reason of" language identical, but § 303, like
RICO, "was drawn directly from the treble damage provision of the Clayton Act .. " Id. at 1376.
In addition, even though the "by reason of" language was used, both acts were enacted separately
from the antitrust acts. RICO was drafted separately from the antitrust laws "because [placing RICO
within the antitrust laws] ... 'could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of...
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special pleading requirements on RICO plaintiffs. 23 9
a private litigant... [including restrictive antitrust] 'proximate cause' [rules]." Sedima, 473 U.S. at
498 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 6994-95 (1969)). Similarly, § 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act "was enacted as an alternative to subjecting unions to antitrust liability for secondary activities."
Mead, 523 F.2d at 1376. Thus, while both statutes borrowed the Clayton Act's "by reason of" lan-
guage, both acts were enacted outside of the antitrust laws, so that they might develop their own
jurisprudence, freed of restrictive antitrust precedent. See also Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank of Mary-
ville, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) ("cause" for 12 U.S.C. § 1975 "by reason of" in unrevised 31
U.S.C. § 231) ("But for" alone rejected; nexus required between fraud and loss); Commerce Tank-
ers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of Am., 553 F.2d 793, 800-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
923 (1977) (§ 4 of Clayton Act proximate cause); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp.
692, 701-03 (D. Md. 1981) ("by reason of" violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2072 met though fraud on Com-
mission, not consumer, based on concept of agency). But see United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d
852, 856 n.5 (2d Cir. 1966) ("by reason of" fraud under 41 U.S.C. § 119 requires reliance). For
antitrust proximate causation, see generally Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529-46 (1983) (proximate cause and standing factors in anti-
trust); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1981) (actual injury);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (not susceptible to con-
crete proof); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 697-701 (1962)
(inferred from circumstantial evidence); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264
(1946) (need not be measured with exactness); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) (uncertainty of extent distinguished from uncertainty of fact); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927) (need not be calculated with
absolute exactness). As such, it is improper to read common law limitation into the "defraud" predi-
cate offenses in RICO.
239 Under FED. R. Civ. P. 8, the general concept of notice pleading should have been held to be
applicable to RICO. Nevertheless, early efforts were made by the district courts to impose special
"probable cause" pleading requirements on the statute, which, fortunately, were rejected by the
courts of appeal. Compare Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1175
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (probable cause); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 97 (D. Or.
1985) (not probable cause, but higher than notice since, like fraud, involves an injury to reputation);
Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 575-76 (D. Utah 1986) (strict and liberal pleading com-
pared); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plead elements to
probability) and Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp.
1042, 1045-47 (D. Utah 1983) (same) with Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, 747 F.2d 384, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1984) (notice pleading applies to RICO and Bache Halsey and
Taylor rejected), afd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) and Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v.
Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 790-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (notice pleading applies to RICO;
particularity shown; complaint reinstated), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Tryco Trucking Co.,
Inc. v. Belk Store Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (Bache Halsey and Taylor
rejected). See also Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (complaint should
not be read "inflexibly"); Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Weaver, 776 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1985), on panel
rehearing, 780 F.2d 1198, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986) ("It is indeed necessary to plead all of the elements of
a RICO violation but it suffices to do so in accordance with the liberal notice-pleading procedure of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
On the other hand, under FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), fraud must be pled with particularity. Compare
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982) (fraud requires person, time, place and repre-
sentation under Rule 9(b)), a ffd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983) and Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384,
405 (7th Cir. 1984) (same), afl'don other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) with Seville, 742 F.2d at 792 n.7
(pleading fraud with particularity "does not require that every element of an offense that includes
fraud also be pleaded particularity"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985). The basic rules may be
easily stated; they should be more widely learned. See infra Appendix B (21.1% reported decision
found failure to plead fraud with particularity).
Pleading fraud with particularity is rightly required to protect reputations and to avoid baseless
strike suits that give rise to negotiating points. See Bresson v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 641 F.
Supp. 338, 346 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (2d Cir. stricter); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F.
Supp. 1454, 1463 (D.NJ. 1986) (3d Cir. distinguished from 2d Cir.); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
v. Alexander Grant & Co., 627 F. Supp. 1023, 1028-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Saine v. AIA, Inc., 582 F.
Supp. 1299, 1306 n.5 (D. Colo. 1984); D & G Enters. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 574 F. Supp. 263, 266-67 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Somerville v. Major Exploration, 576 F. Supp.
902, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). RICO charges are in fact subject to abuse. Saine, 582 F. Supp. at 1306
n.5; Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (N.D. Ga. 1983), afd on other grounds, 755 F.2d
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A comprehensive evaluation of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Woller-
810 (1 1th Cir. 1985). But no difference exists in the basic elements between criminal and civil RICO
charges. Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 F. Supp. 902, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Haroco,
747 F.2d at 402 n.20; Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1170-71 (5th
Cir. 1984); Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 626 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569
F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 491 n.17 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The predicate offenses must be
strictly construed. See I.S.Joseph Co. v. Lauritzen, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir. 1984). It is improper
to file and then seek to prove. See Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 604 (D. Haw. 1985); Beck v.
Cantor, Fitzgerald and Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1552-53 (N.D. Ill. 1985); McKee v. Pope Ballard
Shepard & Fowle, Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 927, 930-32 (N.D. Ill. 1985); D & G Enters., 574 F. Supp. at 266.
Rule 8 and Rule 9(b) must be reconciled. See Corwin v. Marey, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1068
nA (5th Cir. 1986); Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1985); McGinty v. Beran-
ger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228-29 (1st Cir. 1980); Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Martin, 616 F.
Supp. 924, 927 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 481. A basic outline of the scheme, not
evidence, must be set out. Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank, 600 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Conspiracy
charges, too, require particularity. Kronfeld, 638 F. Supp. at 1468-69; Kravetz v. Brukenfeld, 591 F.
Supp. 1383, 1387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Rich-Taubman Assocs. v. Stamford Restaurant Operating
Co., 587 F. Supp. 875, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (attribution permissible); Saine, 582 F. Supp. at 1307;
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1984); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp.,
576 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Eaby, 561 F. Supp. at 137. Where multiple parties are involved, the roles of each must be
carefully delineated. See In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138,
1158-59 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529, 1538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Co., 611 F. Supp. 83, 89-90 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Harris Trust & Savings
Bank v. Ellis, 609 F. Supp. 1118, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1985); McKee, 604 F. Supp. at 931; Arndt v. Pruden-
tial Bache Sec., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Banowitz, 600 F. Supp. at 1469; Saine,
582 F. Supp. at 1303; Hudson, 579 F. Supp. at 629; Somerville, 576 F. Supp. at 912-13; D & G Enter-
prises, 574 F. Supp. at 267; Friedlander, 571 F. Supp. at 1194; Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 481; Eisenberg,
564 F. Supp. at 1352; Eaby, 561 F. Supp. at 135. But collective allegations may be appropriate in
dealing with corporate officers or partners. Banowitz, 600 F. Supp. at 1469 (corporate); Somerville,
576 F. Supp. at 911 (corporate); Kravetz, 591 F. Supp. at 1387 (partner). State of mind must be
alleged, and a basis for the inference set out. Compare Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller &
Co., 632 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (alleged); Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp.
244, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (yes) (proof of fraud must be more than failure to perform); McKee, 604 F.
Supp. at 931 (yes), and D & G Enterprises, 574 F. Supp. at 266-68 (yes) with Kronfeld, 638 F. Supp. at
1465-66 (yes) (conspiracy and aiding and abetting); and Caliber Partners, Ltd., 583 F. Supp. at 1311
(no). Representations must be detailed. See Kronfeld, 638 F. Supp. at 1464 (omissions need not be
related to documents); Kravetz, 591 F. Supp. at 1386; Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 482. Mailings must be
set out. See Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Folsom v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 178, 187-88 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Sellers
v. General Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Caliber Partners, Ltd., 583 F. Supp. at
1313; Serig v. South Cook County Serv. Corp., 581 F. Supp. 575, (N.D. Ill. 1984); Eisenberg, 564 F.
Supp. at 1347. But see Seville, 942 F.2d at 791 (other detail may suffice); In re National Mortgage
Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (same). Less detail is re-
quired where multiple transactions are alleged. See Kronfeld, 638 F. Supp. at 1464 (class of plaintiffs);
Ambrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Onesti v. Thomson
McKinnon Sec., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 481. Where
the information is peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party, less detail is required. See Rich-
Taubman Assocs., 587 F. Supp. at 880; Somerville, 565 F. Supp. at 482. Pleading fraud based on infor-
mation and belief is proper, but a basis must be set out. See Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 639 F.
Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (basis may be inferred); Serig, 581 F. Supp. at 579 n.2; Somerville, 576
F. Supp. at 909; D & G Enterprises, 574 F. Supp. at 267; Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 482. But see Banco de
Desarrollo Agropecuario v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (information and belief
not acceptable); Schnitzer, 633 F. Supp. at 97 (same); Equitable Life, 627 F. Supp. at 1029 (cannot be
based on information and belief. An opportunity to discover is appropriate to flesh out a charge.
See Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1084-85; Eaby, 561 F. Supp. at 136-37. Leave to amend is usually
granted. See Mullen v. Sweetwater Dev. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 809, 819 (D. Colo. 1985); Beck, 621 F.
Supp. at 1567; Eaby, 561 F. Supp. at 137. But see Emmanouilides v. Buckthorn, Ltd., 642 F. Supp.
964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (second amended complaint rejected). Leave to amend is subject to Rule
11. See Beck, 621 F. Supp. at 1567; Fredlander, 571 F. Supp. at 1194; Saine, 582 F. Supp. at 1306 n.5.
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sheim ought, of course, to begin by attempting to place the opinion in this
larger economic and political context. The difficulty, however, is that the
opinion does not fit comfortably on one side or the other of this tradi-
tional struggle. To the degree that its reasoning, like that of the Second
Circuit's in Sedima 240 is the child of the reasoning of Kaushal,241 it suffers
all the flaws of its sibling and its parent. As such, it could be placed easily
into the general line of decisions that seek, for whatever reason, to nar-
row RICO in contradiction of its plain language, particularly the liberal
construction clause, and its broad remedial purposes. Accordingly, no
court properly seeking to be faithful to the text of the statute, its legisla-
tive history, its express purposes, or the relevant teaching of the
Supreme Court ought to feel any hesitancy about disagreeing with the
Wollersheim opinion and inviting a resolution of the conflict by the
Supreme Court. Candor, however, requires the frank acknowledgement
that the opinion in Wollersheim resists such an easy classification. Too
much in it honestly recognizes the ambivalence of the relevant legal
materials and the substantial policy reasons reflecting the purpose of the
statute that might legitimately lead a court to decide the basic issue the
other way. Kaushal should, of course, be rejected as a willful effort to
impose, for whatever reason, a particular result on RICO. Wollersheim
cannot be so easily characterized. In fact, the Wollersheim opinion is well-
written and carefully crafted. Its analysis of the language of the statute
openly recognizes that alternative readings of RICO are "plausible." 242
Its marshalling of the relevant legal materials from the legislative history
is comprehensive. Its analysis of the remedial purpose of RICO and the
adverse consequences of its own decision is perceptive, even if it did not
lead the court to reach the correct decision. Nevertheless, the impact of
Wollersheim will be the same-whether it is an example of result-oriented
jurisprudence that willfully seeks to narrow the statute judicially, or the
honest, but mistaken, effort of a court trying to do its best with a difficult
question. Like Kaushal, Wollersheim must be classified as wrongly decided.
While the Wollersheim opinion deserves respect, no other court ought to
feel compelled to adopt its reasoning or follow its result, and, if neces-
sary, the statute should be quickly amended by Congress to assure that
the right of victims of sophisticated forms of crime may be fully vindi-
cated in the judicial forum.
An honest evaluation of the Wollersheim opinion and any effort to
place it in a larger economic or political context, however, must also con-
clude with another recognition. It may be that the core of the analysis
here is wrong. The separate reform movements, which this analysis
posits as parts of a whole, and integral to the traditional American strug-
Dismissal is inappropriate unless no set of facts could be proved that would warrant relief. See Mc-
Lain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Pleadings are to be taken as true and construed to do substantial justice.
See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1056 n.4, 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), afdon rehearing, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
240 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
241 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
242 796 F.2d at 1084.
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gle between the less privileged and the more privileged, may be in-
dependent. In fact, the struggle over civil RICO itself-at least for some
of its participants-may not be part of larger economic and political is-
sues in the nation. It may be, too, that much of the hostility among mem-
bers of the judiciary to civil RICO reflects little more than their
traditional resistance to change245 and a justifiable, but unjustified, con-
cern with RICO as an uncontrollable source of new litigation, which ap-
parently threatens their ability to do justice under law in the matters
already entrusted to their care, rather than a particular economic or
political philosophy. If so, then other comments addressed to the judici-
ary are in order. The "[r]esolution of the pros and cons of whether a
statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for" 244 the legislative
branch. "[H]ostility to the extraordinary breadth of civil RICO is not a
reason for courts to restrict its scope." 245 The possibility that litigation
might be a burden on courts is "not sufficient to justify ajudicial decision
to alter [a] congressionally [drafted remedial scheme]. ' 246 If RICO
should be rewritten, in short, it should be rewritten by another branch of
government.247
The history of legal institutions and laws in the 20th century has
been the adaptation of the nation's 19th century institutions and laws to
20th century problems. If those who would reform our basic laws truly
believed that those adaptations are misguided-and they are not merely
Bourbons, forgetting nothing and learning nothing, who long for the
restorations of lost privileges-they should be asked what is their new
design for our basic institutions and laws that will deal with 20th century
problems. Is your only solution to restore 19th century institutions and
laws? A nation may be captivated for a while by economic and political
rhetoric of various kinds of crisis, but a Latin proverb says it well: Magna
est veritas et praevalebit.248 The issues here, too, are not merely legal. Be-
hind the struggle for the attention of judges and lawmakers, the harsh
facts of life remain. Our legal institutions cannot long close their doors
to a cry for human justice. Anyone who drives an American car knows
that the economic woe of such basic industries as autos is not caused by a
lack of bigness, but the lack of quality workmanship and management
imagination. 249 Rewriting the law of torts will not make the stark facts of
243 See R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMACY 313-14 (Vintage ed. 1941) ("The
entire philosophy interest, and training of the legal profession tend toward conservatism.... This
trend to conservatism in the profession of the law is intensified in the case ofjudges by the weight of
the official tradition of social and intellectual isolation."). See also F. MArrLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND
THE RENAISSANCE 25 (1901) ("Taught law is tough law.")
244 United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984).
245 Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986).
246 Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 512 n.13 (1982).
247 United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 n.15 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[A]ny further narrowing of
RICO, however appropriate that may be, is ajob for Congress, not the courts."); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The sweep of RICO is admittedly broad, and our
function is to apply the language of the statute as drafted in Congress, not to rewrite the statute as
we might prefer it to be.")
248 Great is truth and it shall prevail.
249 See generally N.Y. Times, Jun. 1, 1987, at 21, col. 4 (independent surveys of car-buyers show
less satisfaction with American than foreign-made cars); GM: What Went Wrong, Bus. WK., Mar. 16,
1987, at 102. General Motors has had its run in with civil RICO. See, e.g., Allison on behalf of
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medical malpractice disappear or cure the cancers caused by asbestos or
make fertile the wombs of women injured or sterilized by defective birth
control devices. Civil RICO could, of course, be directly repealed, not
indirectly gutted, judicially or legislatively. But the problem of lack of
integrity in an increasingly interdependent society, for which trust is es-
sential, will not go away.250
On January 28, 1986, SenatorJoseph R. Biden gave a talk at the New
York University School of Law Center for Research in Crime and Jus-
tice.251 In it, he reflected on the administration of justice in recent and
past white-collar crime investigations and prosecutions involving such
major corporations as General Electric, E. F. Hutton, and General Dy-
namics for price fixing, bank fraud, and defense procurement fraud.
Thoughtfully, he suggested that, as a nation, we must do more than seek
to hold accountable those who head our political institutions.252 An ef-
fort must also be made to hold accountable those who exercise power in
our other great institutions. In 1970, Congress made such an effort in
the Organized Crime Control Act, not only to deal with those who run
General Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp, 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1120 (D. Del. 1985) (termination
of derivative fraud suit against management upheld under business judgment rule), afd, 782 F.2d
1026 (3d Cir. 1985) (mem.). Roger Smith, GM's Chairman, has also recommended in a letter ofJan.
12, 1987, to Vice President George Bush, the Head of the Presidential Task Force on Regulation
Relief, on behalf of the Business Round Table, that civil RICO be circumscribed by a criminal con-
viction limitation. But see Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of Proof, 60 NoTR
DAME L. REV. 566 (1985) (an excellent analysis of the policy objections to the criminal conviction
limitation).
250 Those reformers, particularly attorneys, who would reinterpret our constitution or rewrite
our antitrust, tort liability, or federal fraud laws must also face fundamental questions. Just as gener-
als are morally responsible for unnecessary civilian deaths in battle, so, too, are attorneys responsi-
ble for overkill, which deprives victims of needed redress in meritorious litigation as a price of
protecting from appropriate legal accountability those who have money and power. Here, too, it is
more than ironic that the attack on the most effective fraud statute on the books itself takes the form
of a scam fostered by people and institutions that depend most on trust: the government itself,
attorneys, accountants, and securities dealers.
251 Biden, The Challenge of Institutional Responsibility, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (1986).
252 He observed:
Our society is increasingly characterized, in both its public and its private life, by large and
impersonal organizations which have the power to do great good or great evil. We have
learned how to create them, but we have not yet learned how to control them. From our
earliest days as a nation, much of our political energy and creativity has been expended,
rightly, on devising and implementing systems of accountability for those who exercise
political power. Today, we must develop equally sophisticated techniques for holding re-
sponsible those organizations and individuals who wield great economic power for private
purposes, but with significant public consequences. We accord great wealth and prestige to
those who lead our corporations and, by and large, we have prospered as a nation by doing
so. Now we must find new ways to call to account those who abuse that trust.
Id. at 247-48. On the size of the wealth afforded to corporate executives, see Executive Pay, Bus. WE.,
May 4, 1987, at 50. ("While most managers and run-of-the-mill executives had to settle for raises of
less than 6%o, the average chief executive's salary and bonus jumped 17.9% to $829,887 in 1986....
Of the 25 highest-paid executives, a number hail from well-paying Wall Street firms .... ). But see L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 17-18 (1914) ("The goose that lays golden eggs has been consid-
ered a most valuable possession. But even more profitable is the privilege of taking the golden eggs
laid by somebody else's goose.")
Biden then asked:
[H]ow long [can] a democratic society that depends upon the confidence of its people...
afford to tolerate legal and corporate standards of accountability ... that deviate so signifi-
cantly from the traditional American demand for honesty and integrity among those who
exercise great power[?]
23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. at 247-48.
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underworld syndicates, but also those who engage in patterns of criminal
activity by, through, or against the other organizations in our society.253
The struggle over civil RICO ought to be seen in Senator Biden's terms;
it is about accountability in the administration ofjustice in a free society.
The outcome is yet in doubt. 254
253 See also Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1411 (N.D. Il1. 1986) ("[To the extent RICO
is used as a weapon against 'white collar crime,' this purpose is not contrary to the intent of Con-
gress but is in fact one of the 'benefits' Congress saw the Act as providing.") Writing in 1967, the
President's Commission on Crime and the Administration of Justice, whose studies led to RICO,
observed:
[W]hite-collar crime [is] - [a term] now commonly used to designate those occupational
crimes committed in the course of their work by persons of high status and social repute
[that] ... are only rarely dealt with through the full force of criminal sanctions.
Serious erosion of morals accompanies [the white collar offender's] violation. [Those who
so] flout the law set an example for other business and influence individuals, particularly
young people, to commit other kinds of crime on the ground that everybody is taking what
he can get.
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociT 47-48 (1967). See generally White Collar Crime: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
254 This Article began by quoting from one of the principal spokesmen for 19th century jurispru-
dence. It may be appropriate to end by quoting from the remarks of Congressman Steiger, whose
participation in the floor debates on RICO played so central a role in the Wollersheim opinion:
[I]n this country today, if a poor man's son commits a crime and a rich man's son commits
the same crime, the chances are that the poor man's son will receive the full weight of
justice and the rich man's son will either get off or receive a much lighter sentence. It is
unfortunate, but this is a fact of life ...
I will submit to all of you distinguished members of the bar that is exactly what happened
with organized crime. It is a fact of life. Because of the sophistication, because of the
wealth, and because of the ability of organized crime to keep the best counsel, they have
been able to abrogate the law.
116 CONG. REC. 35,355 (1970). Congressman Steiger was not prophetic about organized crime. See
supra note 198. He may yet be wrong in the broader struggle between the privileged and the less
privileged.
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Appendix B
RICO CASE STUDY*
1985
RICO PROVISION ALLEGED TO BE VIOLATED
1986 Total
§ 1962(a) solely 4 (4.5%) 3 (2.3%) 7 (3.2%)§ 1962(b) solely 1 (1.1%) 1 (0.8%) 2 (0.9%)
§ 1962(c) solely 35 (39.3%) 51 (38.3%) 86 (38.7%)
§ 1962(d) solely 1 (1.1%) 2 (1.5%) 3 (1.4%)
Multiple provisions 24 (27.0%) 37 (27.8%) 61 (27.5%)
Not expressly stated 24 (27.0%) 39 (29.3%) 63 (28.4%)
CASES CITING § 1962(c) 59 (90.7%) 88 (93.6%) 147 (92.5%)
(omitting cases whereirn no one provision was expressly stated)
CASES WITH INDEPENDENT GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION
No independent grounds
Other grounds for jurisdiction
CASES MAKING SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO THE ABA TASK
FORCE REPORT
42 (47.2%)
47 (52.8%)
50 (37.6%)
83 (62.4%)
92 (41.4%)
130 (58.6%)
1 (1.1%) 8 (6.0%) 9 (4.1%)
CASES WITH FINAL JUDGMENT AWARDED
Final judgment
No final judgment
CASES WITH MOTION TO DISMISS
No motion made
Motion made and denied
Motion made and granted
Motion made and partially
granted/partially denied
15 (16.9%)
74 (83.1%)
(18.0%)
(41.6%)
(37.1%)
27 (20.3%)
106 (79.7%)
(9.8%)
(23.3%)
(58.6%)
2 (2.2%) 11 (8.3%)
42 (18.9%)
180 (81.1%)
29 (13.1%)
68 (30.6%)
111 (50.0%)
13 (5.9%)
CASES WHERE RACKETEERING AcTivrry WAS LIMITED TO ONE EPISODE
Episode (1 place, 1 time)
Nonepisode (pattern)
15 (16.9%)
74 (83.1%)
39 (29.3%) 54 (24.3%)
94 (70.7%) 168 (75.7%)
PARTIES' ALLEGATIONS OF "PROFESSIONAL CRIMINAL TYPE" ACTIVITY
None alleged 83 (93.3%) 121 (91.0%) 2(
Alleged: bribery 2 (2.2%) 4 (3.0%)
commercial bribery 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.8%)
embezzlement 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.5%)
extortion 1 (1.1%) 2 (1.5%)
theft 1 (1.1%) 2 (1.5%)
political corruption 2 (2.2%) 0 (0.0%)
other 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.8%)
(91.9%)
(2.7%)
(0.5%)
(0.9%)
(1.4%)
(1.4%)
(0.9%)
(0.5%)
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CASES wrrIH FINAL JUDGMENT
Final judgment ordered
No damages awarded
Damages awarded
Pre-Sedima
4 (10.5%)
2 (50.0%)
2 (50.0%)
AMONG CASES WHERE FINAL JUDGMENT WAS AWARDED
Held RICO violation
Held no RICO violation
Arbitration sought by defendant
No arbitration sought
Arbitration ordered
Arbitration refused
CASES WITH MOTION TO DISMISS
Motion granted
Reason: lack of pattern
lack of adequate
particularity in
complaint
insufficient allegations
of predicate
offenses
failure to allege injury
required by statute
failure to name
required enterprise
as defendant
failure to allege prior
criminal conviction
other
Motion partially granted/denied
Reason: lack of pattern
lack of adequate
particularity in
complaint
failure to name
required enterprise
as defendant
other
(100.0%)
(0.0%)
(50.0%)
(50.0%)
(25.0%)
(25.0o%)
(44.7%)
(0.0%)
Post-Sedima
(20.7%)
(71.1%)
(28.9%)
(73.7%)
(26.3%)
(28.9%)
(71.1%)
(10.5%)
(15.8%)
94 (51.1%)
38 (40.4%)
5 (29.4%) 12 (12.8%)
5 (29.4%) 21 (22.3%)
7 (41.2%) 20 (21.3%)
1 (5.9%) 11 (11.7%)
2 (11.8%)
6 (35.3%)
1 (2.6%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (100.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
(0.0%)
(28.7%)
(6.5%)
(8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.7%)
5 (41.7%)
PREDICATE OFFENSES ALLEGED VIOLATED
Mail fraud 24 (63.2%)
Wire fraud 13 (34.2%)
Security fraud 16 (42.1%)
Criminal prosecution 1 (2.6%)
None expressly stated 1 (2.6%)
(58.7%)
(50.5%)
(19.6%)
(3.3%)
(14.7%)
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NATURE OF THE CASES
Security fraud 18 (47.4%) 53 (28.8%) 71 (32.0%o)
Bribery 3 (7.9%o) 12 (6.5%o) 15 (6.8%Y)
Common law fraud 16 (42.17) 101 (54.9%$) 117 (52.7%$)
Antitrust/unfair competition 3 (7.9%o) 12 (6.5%o) 15 (6.8%$)
Nonsecurities fraud 2 (5.37o) 18 (9.8%o) 20 (9.0%$)
Labor-related 1 (2.6%o) 9 (4.9%') 10 (4.5?$)
Theft or conversion 0 (0.0%o) 15 (8.2%o) 15 (6.8%o)
Not expressly stated 16 (42.17) 49 (26.6%o) 65 (29.3%o)
TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES IN SURVEY: 222
Total number of pre-Sedima cases: 38 (17.17)
Total number of post-Sedima cases: 184 (82.9%o)
Total number of 1985 cases: 89
Total number of 1986 cases: 133
Among the total number of 1985 cases:
pre-Sedima cases: 38 (42.7%o)
post-Sedima cases: 51 (57.3%o)
Among the total number of 1986 cases:
pre-Sedima cases: 0 (0.07)
post-Sedima cases: 133 (100.07)
PLAINTIFFS INVOLVED IN SUIT, OF TOTAL CASES SURVEYED**
Business 95
Natural person 112
Class action 10
Non-profit organization 3
Government 10
Other 9
DEFENDANTS INVOLVED IN SUIT, OF TOTAL CASES SURVEYED**
Business 171
Natural person 107
Non-profit organization 2
Other 11
CASES WITH A RULE 11 MOTION
No motion made 87 (97.8%o) 126 (94.7o) 213 (95.9%o)
Motion made and denied 1 (1.17) 5 (3.5%o) 6 (2.7%o)
Motion made and granted 1 (1.1 %) 1 (0.8%) 2 (0.9%o)
Motion made/denied/warned 0 (0.07) 1 (0.8%o) 1 (0.5%o)
* Study covers all reported cases (222) decided from January 1, 1985 through December 31,
1986 wherein RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)) was at issue. Statistics reflect the total number
of applicable cases for each year, the corresponding percentages for each year, the aggregate
number of applicable cases, and the aggregate percentages. This data is subject to two caveats. It is
not known if reported decisions, which are fewer in number than filings, are representative of filings;
the number of decisions in many of the subcategories are also so small that percentages may be
misleading. See supra note 193 (discussion of ABA Task Force study).
** One suit may involve more than one type of plaintiff. Where that is true, more than one
category of plaintiff is noted.
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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 1986 DATA ON CIVIL RICO
FILINGS***
Civil RICO
Filings
78
56
83
99
84
96
79
93
96
106
90
109
Total 1069
Caseload
Terminated
4
711
17
25
17
16
26
35
45
47
44
294
As of December 31, 1986, 894 Civil RICO cases were pending.
*** Letter of Pamela D. Crawford, Civil Program Analyst, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, dated March 24, 1987 to Professor G. Robert Blakey.
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
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SELECTED INDEX
Agency principle under RICO: text at fn. 236; fn. 236
All Writs Act: text at fli. 168; fl. 168
Alternatives to Equity Relief under RICO: text at fa. 161-70; fn. 161-70
Antitrust laws:
analogy to RICO text at fri. 15-16; fh. 114; text at fra. 126-41; fli. 126-41
history fn. 128-140; text at fa. 181; fh. 181
proposed reforms text at fli. 185; fha. 185
statistics fn. 19
statutes fh. 16
Attachment: text at fi. 171; fi. 171
Competitive injury limitation on RICO: text at fh. 33; fh. 33-34
Cognizable claim under RICO: text at fi 237; fi. 237
Conduct under RICO: text at fh. 236; fha. 236
Enterprise under RICO: text at fi. 41; fh. 41; text at fi. 235; fa. 235
Equity powers of courts: text at fi. 78-84; fh. 78-84
Implication doctrine: text at fh. 142-50; fi. 142-50
Legislative history of RICO: text at fi. 95-122; fh. 95-122; fi. 206-10
Liberal construction clause of RICO: text at fh. 21-23; f. 21; text at fi. 91-
94; fh. 91-94
Mail fraud statute: fi. 238
Organized crime limitations: text at fi. 31; fh. 31-32
Pattern under RICO: fh. 37; text at fh. 42; fi. 42
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